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Abstract
As more and more aspects of users’ lives go online, they can interact with each other,
access services and purchase goods with unprecedented convenience and speed. How-
ever, this also means that users’ devices and data become more vulnerable to attacks.
As security is often added to tools and services as an after-thought, it tends to be poorly
integrated into the processes and part of the effort of securing is often offloaded onto
the user. Users are goal-driven and they go online to get things done, protecting their
security and privacy might therefore not be a priority.
The six studies described in this dissertation examine the role of effort in users’ security
and privacy behaviours online. First, two security studies use authentication diaries to
examine the user effort required for authentication to organisational and online bank-
ing systems respectively. Second, two further studies are laboratory evaluations of
proposed mechanisms for authentication and verification. Third, two privacy studies
examine the role of effort in users’ information disclosure in webforms and evaluate a
possible solution that could help users manage how much they disclose.
All studies illustrate the different coping strategies users develop to manage their ef-
fort. They show that demanding too much effort can affect productivity, cause frus-
tration and undermine the security these mechanisms were meant to offer. The work
stresses the importance of conducting methodologically robust user evaluations of both
proposed and deployed mechanisms in order to improve user satisfaction and their se-
curity and privacy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Real-world problems
As more and more aspects of users’ lives go online, individuals can interact with each
other, access services and purchase goods with unprecedented convenience and speed.
However, the increasing connectedness and availability also mean that users’ devices
and data become more vulnerable to attacks and exploitation. As security is often
added to tools and services as an after-thought, it tends to be poorly integrated into
the processes [65]. As a result, the effort of securing is often offloaded onto the user.
Users are asked to prove they are human as opposed to a robot, create an account on
the websites they visit, preferably with a strong unique password, check URLs, verify
SSL certificates, to name a few. These demands ignore the significant user effort that
is required. At the same time, users are goal-driven and they go online to accomplish
their tasks and protecting their security and privacy are often not their priority. Users’
effort does not only comprise the time consumed and the cognitive and physical de-
mand but also the emotional costs of frustration and embarrassment. Online security
and privacy can be considered enabling tasks because they make it possible to move
services known from the physical world (e.g., news, banking, shopping) to the online
world providing speed and convenience. However, the way in which these systems
are often implemented means there are hurdles users have to overcome in order to
access them. These hurdles include logging in, being verified as human, completing
forms etc. Although humans are goal-oriented and dislike being interrupted, the indus-
try still relies on users to perform security and privacy tasks that are disruptive to their
workflow and keep them away from their primary task. At the same time, attackers are
often excellent psychologists who know human attitudes towards effort and exploit the
heuristics that guide human behaviour to their own advantage [169, 240].
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Today, one of the main selling points of online services and products is how fast
they are and how seamlessly they can fit into users’ daily activities. In crass discrep-
ancy to that are the security compliance demands the industry puts on users. As Herley
stresses, “[security] advice almost always ignores the cost of user effort” [112, p. 141].
At the same time, the environment is hostile. Online vendors are incentivised to elicit
as much information from users as they can [176]. Attackers are lurking trying to
infect users’ computers with viruses and draft them into their botnets. Attackers and
security experts are not the only ones in competition for user attention, the online en-
vironment is full other different stimuli (e.g., adverts, notifications) that try to attract
users’ attention as well [113].
1.2 Research gap
Research so far has failed to take a holistic view of users and the effort that they need
to expend for security and privacy tasks. The amount of effort required to perform a
task is a simple decision making rule or heuristic. Yet, security and privacy research
has not given it due consideration. Studies have too often just focused on assessing if
using a new authentication mechanism or following a procedure is doable and they do
so in an isolated laboratory setting, away from other tasks and demands the user faces
in the real world. In other words, evaluations are often only conducted pre-deployment
under perfect conditions assessing if the user “can do it” and not if they want to do
it or how adding this security-related effort would affect their productivity and actual
security in a long term.
1.3 Research question
The study of effort in security and privacy behaviours online is important as it can
improve the design of future processes and systems, making a difference for both the
users and industry. Through six studies using a mix of quantitative and qualitative re-
search methods, this doctoral dissertation aims to answer the research question: What
is the role of effort in users’ security and privacy behaviours online? To scope this
question, the following sub-questions were devised:
1. For security, how does effort influence users’ behaviours with regard to authen-
tication and verification?
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2. For privacy, how does effort influence users’ behaviours with regard to informa-
tion disclosure?
3. Are there differences between the role of effort in security and privacy be-
haviours?
4. What are users’ coping strategies for managing security and privacy effort?
5. What are the factors that moderate how much effort users expend?
6. What is the relationship between actual and perceived effort?
1.3.1 Research scope
The focus of the research is on understanding the role of effort in users’ security and
privacy behaviours online. The six studies described in this dissertation investigate
user behaviours for authentication, verification and information disclosure and explore
their perceptions of effort and the actual effort (measured as time) involved.
The first two studies aim to learn about users’ adoption of already deployed au-
thentication solutions and explore the different strategies they had developed to cope
with authentication effort. Further two studies assess mechanisms pre-adoption and
aim to learn about the perceived effort and actual time required when used on two
different devices, as well as making participants reflect on possible contexts of use.
These two studies can only be treated as preliminary assessments, part of a series of
evaluations as the technologies go through their development cycles. Finally, the last
two studies explore how users disclose information through webforms. After learning
about actual disclosure, its relationship with effort and motivations in the first study,
an intervention is designed and evaluated in a follow-up study.
The focus of all six studies is not on assessing security but on learning about
the user effort involved in behaviours related to security and privacy. However, all
participant perceptions relating to security and privacy are recorded and analysed since
they have an impact on user decisions and behaviours. When participants had questions
regarding security, the researcher answered them using information provided by the
creators of the technologies. This dissertation makes no attempt to evaluate the security
of the proposed mechanisms or to assess what level of security would be appropriate
for the participants.
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1.3.2 Effort, security and privacy defined
Throughout the dissertation, ‘effort’ and ‘workload’ are used interchangeably. Both
terms refer to the amount of work that has to be completed to achieve a certain goal.
‘Effort’ is more of an abstract concept while ‘workload’ can be seen as quantifiable
and also related to creating work in an organisational context. The concept of effort is
further described in Section 3.3. The term ‘security’ refers to a state where a system
and/or data is free from compromise. ‘Privacy’ describes an individual’s right and/or
ability to control how their data is being shared. In terms of the difference between
security and privacy, in this dissertation, the simplified view is adopted that while users
would not like some of their data to be compromised (security), they have the desire to
share personal details about themselves depending on context (privacy). The Glossary
Section (p. 213-214) contains more detailed definitions of these and other key terms.
1.4 Publications
Below is a summary of the author’s publications during her PhD outlining her contri-
bution to the six studies and the resulting publications.
Authentication in an organisation
This study was conducted by Angela Sasse and collaborators from NIST, Michelle
Steves and Mary Theofanos, as well as Dana Chisnell from UsabilityWorks. The study
was designed and carried out before the commencement of the author’s PhD and she
was invited to help with the analysis. Two main publications came out of the work: a
NIST Report (#1) and an article at HCI International 2014 (#2). For the report (#1),
the author’s analyses directly contributed to Chapter 6 of the report and the author
wrote a first draft of this chapter. The publication went through several rounds of
edits and revisions with Hannah Wald from Booz Allen Hamilton being a technical
writer on the report. The author of this dissertation wrote up article #2 based on the
study and presented it at HCI International. The publication focused on the qualitative
results of the study and it was mostly based on her analyses. Angela Sasse gave the
article structure and provided ideas for the solutions that could be implemented to
address the problems discovered. Chapter 4.2 contains elements of this article but it
was substantially re-written to include the author’s other analyses in line with the focus
of this dissertation.
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1. Steves, M., Chisnell, D., Sasse, A., Krol, K., Theofanos, M. & Wald, H. (2014). Report:
Authentication Diary Study. NISTIR 7983.
2. Sasse, M.A., Steves, M., Krol, K. & Chisnell, D. (2014). The Great Authentication Fatigue
– And How to Overcome It. HCI International 2014, 6th International Conference on Cross-
Cultural Design.
Two-factor authentication in online banking
The study was part of Eleni Philippou’s MSc project in 2014. It was jointly designed
by Emiliano De Cristofaro, Eleni Philippou and the author. Eleni Philippou ran the
lab sessions. The author analysed the quantitative and qualitative data and wrote up
the article (#3) with Emiliano De Cristofaro’s edits and comments. It was published at
the NDSS Workshop on Usable Security (USEC 2015). Section 4.3 contains an edited
version of this publication.
3. Krol, K., Philippou, E., De Cristofaro, E. & Sasse, M.A. (2015). “They brought in the
horrible key ring thing” Analysing the usability of two-factor authentication in UK online
banking. NDSS Workshop on Usable Security (USEC 2015).
Vernitski Authentication Grid
Constantinos Papanicolaou conducted a laboratory evaluation of the Vernitski Authen-
tication Grid as part of his MSc project in 2013; he created a working prototype of the
grid and ran the study sessions. The author designed the study, analysed the quantita-
tive and qualitative data and wrote up the article (#4) published at HCI International
2015. Section 5.2 contains an edited version of this publication.
4. Krol, K., Papanicolaou, C., Vernitski, A. & Sasse, M.A. (2015). “Too taxing on the mind!”
Authentication grids are not for everyone. HCI International 2015, 3rd International Con-
ference on Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy and Trust.
Human verification mechanisms
The study went through several cycles of design with feedback from other members of
the team. The author ran the sessions with all participants in the study and analysed
the quantitative data. Simon Parkin and the author jointly coded and analysed the
qualitative data. The author wrote up the initial draft of the article (#5) published
at the NDSS Workshop on Usable Security (USEC 2016). The second publication
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based on the study (#6) was an article at the IEEE International Conference on Identity,
Security and Behavior Analysis (ISBA 2016). This publication focuses on participants’
perceptions of biometrics using the example of NoBot. The article received a Special
Contribution Award at ISBA 2016.
5. Krol, K., Parkin, S. & Sasse, M.A. (2016). Better the devil you know: A user study of two
CAPTCHAs and a possible replacement technology. NDSS Workshop on Usable Security
(USEC 2016).
6. Krol, K., Parkin, S. & Sasse, M.A. (2016). “I don’t like putting my face on the Internet!”
An acceptance study of face biometrics as a CAPTCHA replacement. IEEE International
Conference on Identity, Security and Behavior Analysis (ISBA 2016).
Quantifying disclosure
So¨ren Preibusch designed and implemented the study on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
The author was responsible for coding the quantitative and qualitative data. While
So¨ren analysed the quantitative data, the author analysed the qualitative data. The
article (#7) published at the Workshop on the Economics of Information Security
(WEIS 2012) had an economics focus. Section 6.2 briefly summarises the relevant
findings and presents additional analyses in line with the focus of the thesis that were
not part of the publication.
7. Preibusch, S., Krol, K. & Beresford, A.R. (2012). The privacy economics of volun-
tary over-disclosure in Web forms. Workshop on the Economics of Information Security
(WEIS 2012).
Informing disclosure
The study followed from the previous one that focused on quantifying disclosure.
So¨ren Preibusch and the author jointly worked on the design of the study. The au-
thor coded and analysed the qualitative data while So¨ren analysed the quantitative data
that the author had previously coded. Article #8 is a position paper that the author
wrote based on the findings from both disclosure in webforms studies. Some ideas
from this article are contained in Chapter 6. The author also wrote up article #9 which
was published at the Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2016).
Chapter 6.3 is an edited version of this publication.
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8. Krol, K. (2014). “Wait: That’s optional!” Designing helpful over-disclosure alerts. Design-
ing Human Technologies (DHT) 2.0.
9. Krol, K. & Preibusch, S. (2016). Control versus Effort in Privacy Warnings for Webforms.
Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2016).
Publications spanning multiple studies
During her PhD, the author also published the following articles which draw upon the
results of more than one study presented in this dissertation.
10. Krol, K., & Preibusch, S. (2015). Effortless Privacy Negotiations. IEEE Security & Privacy,
13(3), 88-91.
This magazine article focuses on offline and online privacy decisions and suggests
lessons learned from the physical world can help develop better solutions for privacy
in the online world. It contains a high-level summary of both disclosure in webforms
studies.
11. Parkin, S. & Krol, K. (2015). Appropriation of security technologies in the workplace.
Workshop on Experiences of Technology Appropriation: Unanticipated Users, Usage, Cir-
cumstances, and Design at ECSCW 2015.
This is a position paper for a workshop that discusses the impact of security on ap-
propriation of technologies in the workplace. The author of the thesis contributed
examples from the authentication diary studies.
12. Parkin, S., Krol, K., Becker, I., & Sasse, M.A. (2016). Applying Cognitive Control Modes
to Identify Security Fatigue Hotspots. Security Fatigue Workshop at the Symposium on
Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2016).
This is a position paper discussing security fatigue. To support the arguments made,
the author used the findings from both authentication diary studies and the study on
verification mechanisms.
13. Krol, K., Spring, J.M., Parkin, S., & Sasse, M.A. (2016). Towards robust experimental
design for user studies in security and privacy, The LASER Workshop: Learning from
Authoritative Security Experiment Results.
This article proposes five principles for conducting methodologically robust experi-
ments in usable security and privacy. The author of the thesis devised the five principles
and the studies in this dissertation are used as examples.
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1.5 Academic service
During her PhD, the author acted as a reviewer for the European Conference on In-
formation Systems (ECIS) 2013, the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium
(PETS) 2014, the Information Systems journal (2014), the IEEE Security and Privacy
magazine (2015) and the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Sys-
tems 2016. The author was also a volunteer at the HCI International 2015 conference.
1.6 Research contribution
The research presented in this dissertation makes several substantive and methodologi-
cal contributions towards understanding the role of effort in users’ security and privacy
behaviours online.
1.6.1 Substantive contributions
The diary studies on authentication propose a taxonomy of coping strategies. The stud-
ies show that too much security-related effort can lead to abandonment of provisioned
services and devices, having an impact on individual and organisational productivity.
Users replace secondary security tasks with other tasks that have an acceptable level of
effort. Their willingness to expend effort is associated with the level of security they
believe they require.
There is a paucity of studies that would evaluate security mechanisms post-
adoption. This dissertation fills the gap that studies often only consider user perfor-
mance with proposed mechanisms rather than how deployed mechanisms are appro-
priated and how the effort they require fits in with existing tasks. In this dissertation,
several mechanisms are evaluated post-adoption: various authentication mechanisms
in an organisation, two-factor authentication for online banking and reCAPTCHA.
Evaluating mechanisms post-adoption provides insight into how users have incorpo-
rated security technologies and processes into their every-day lives. Two studies in
this dissertation also examine proposed mechanisms never evaluated before: the Ver-
nitski Authentication Grid and NoBot. The results show that even when presented
with a mechanism in the lab, participants see them very contextually reflecting in what
situations they would be willing to use them and why.
Two studies on information disclosure benchmark the amount of information
users provide in webforms. They explore user motivations behind expending the effort
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to disclose and assess the role of mandatoriness and incentives in the process. The sec-
ond of the studies evaluates the wording and options for warning messages. It shows
that rather than deleting all optional information indiscriminately, users would like to
have control over how much they share.
1.6.2 Methodological contributions
The studies in this dissertation use robust research methodologies often involving mul-
tiple stages of collecting both quantitative and qualitative data. Actual behaviours are
the primary focus and the studies do not solely rely on self-reports as these suffer from
various shortcomings (as discussed in Chapter 3). Nevertheless, post-experiment inter-
views and feedback help interpret participants’ reactions, and discrepancies between
actual and perceived effort are thematised as well.
1.7 Overview of studies
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the studies presented in this dissertation.
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C
hapter1.
Introduction
Study Authentication diaries Auth. and verification mechanisms Disclosure in webforms
Auth. in an
organisation
2FA in online
banking
Vernitski Auth.
Grid
Verification
mechanisms
Quantifying
disclosure
Informing
disclosure
Described in Section 4.2 Section 4.3 Section 5.2 Section 5.3 Section 6.2 Section 6.3
Research
methods
used
Auth. diary,
interview
Auth. diary,
two
interviews
Laboratory
evaluation,
interview
Laboratory
experiment,
interview
mTurk
experiment,
questionnaire
mTurk
experiment,
questionnaire
Sample size 23 21 36 87 1,500 4,620
Effort
captured
through
Self-reports,
authentication
events
Self-reports,
authentication
events
Timing,
self-reports
Timing,
self-reports,
NASA TLX
Timing,
self-reports
Timing,
self-reports,
ratings
Data
collection
July –
August 2011
August 2014 August 2013 October 2014 –
February 2015
January –
March 2012
October –
December 2012
Main
publications
Steves et al.
(2014) [242],
Sasse et al.
(2014) [225]
Krol et al. (2015)
[145]
Krol et al. (2015)
[142]
Krol et al. (2016)
[144], Krol et al.
(2016) [143]
Preibusch et al.
(2012) [193]
Krol (2014)
[140], Krol and
Preibusch (2016)
[147]
Table 1.1: Overview of the six studies presented in the dissertation.
Chapter 2
Literature review
This chapter reviews relevant research in the areas of psychology, human-computer
interaction (HCI) and usable security and privacy. First, it synthesises the literature on
effort and decision making and justifies the theoretical stance taken in this dissertation
– the theory of bounded rationality and heuristic decision making. Second, it describes
models developed to conceptualise security and privacy decisions. Third, the chapter
clarifies the research approach taken in this dissertation that embraces the user with
their capabilities and needs rather than forcing them to comply. Fourth, it discusses the
principles of security and privacy behaviours as uncovered by research to date. Fifth,
the literature review focuses on several mechanisms and the research conducted on
them as they will be the focal point of the studies presented in this dissertation. The
areas described are: authentication, two-factor authentication, CAPTCHAs as well as
security and privacy indicators.
2.1 Effort and decision making
The principle of least effort was first discussed by Ferrero in 1894 [76]. According to
this principle, humans choose the path of least resistance or effort to achieve their goals.
The principle has been applied to many fields since – ranging from the ways people
choose words [284] to the ways they seek information [79]. More than a century
ago, the need to reduce effort led to the development of early computing machinery
deployed at scale [258].
2.1.1 Effort in economic theories
Humans invest effort in order to obtain something they want in return. For that reason,
it is plausible to look for a theory that would govern human behaviour in economics.
Amongst the earliest models to explain humans’ trade-offs in weighing the costs and
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benefits of personal data disclosure is the privacy calculus. Culnan and Armstrong [59]
take the model of a fully rational utility maximiser for whom the risks of disclosure
must not exceed the benefits thereby unlocked (e.g., completion of a purchase or sign-
up for a service free of charge) and who considers if “their personal information
will subsequently be used fairly and they will not suffer negative consequences” [59,
p. 106]. Whilst the original concept interprets the negative consequences narrowly
(e.g., the monetary losses following data breaches or price discrimination), they can
be understood more broadly to encompass all costs associated with disclosure, includ-
ing the physical and cognitive effort of recalling and entering information. Revealing
details about oneself thus becomes an input to a production function in the classic in-
terpretation of economics [108]: a range of inputs (that is personal data items) would
yield a desirable output, such as the completion of an online transaction. Users achieve
efficiency by minimising their inputs for a given output, that is they seek to reduce their
effort.
Although the interpretation of users balancing the pros and cons of disclosure ap-
peals by its simplicity, it hinges on the classic concept of the homo oeconomicus, the
idea that individuals would make judgements fully informed and fully rationally. Mill
summarised that this approach sees the individual as “a being who inevitably does
that by which he may obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, conveniences, and
luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour and physical self-denial with which they
can be obtained.” [168, p. 56]. This model has been found to be no accurate depic-
tion of human behaviour and laboratory experiments into the behavioural economics
of privacy have demonstrated that consumers’ privacy decisions contravene their pref-
erences (e.g., [235, 25]). This model also ignores the social drivers of disclosure, by
which the individual would create their image in society [274, 163] and accumulate
social capital [72]. Economic anthropologists such as Sahlins [214] and Mauss [164]
pointed at tribal societies where economic exchange is based on reciprocity. Although
contemporary societies tend to be market economies rather than gift economies, pri-
vacy research still asks whether reciprocity could explain information disclosure and
trust [66].
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2.1.2 Effort and mental shortcuts
Heuristics
One critique of the privacy calculus also highlights the sheer impossibility of mak-
ing a rational decision about data disclosure. On the one hand, users lack insight into
companies’ data processing practices and are thus unable to assess the risks associated
with disclosing their details. On the other hand, even if they had all relevant details,
the amount of information would be too large to process – in particular for privacy-
related decisions that occur during habitual web use. For example, McDonald and
Cranor [165] estimated that reading all privacy statements a typical web user is con-
fronted with would involve costs exceeding 201 hours a year, worth about $3,534 a
year per American Internet user.
Users therefore resolve to heuristics, mental shortcuts that may not deliver the best
solution, but are a good enough approximation. Simon [234] introduced the notion of
satisficing, implying that individuals make choices that are not optimal but sufficient
in the given circumstances. Simon suggested that humans use simple rules of thumb or
heuristics to make decisions. They do not optimise because it is impossible to in each
situation fully understand all variables and outcomes and estimate the expected utility
of each possible course of action.
Contemporary heuristics frameworks, such as by Tversky and Kahneman [255]
and Gigerenzer [91], build upon Simon’s ideas and emphasise that heuristics help peo-
ple in taking decision in a fast and frugal way. They are fast as humans are goal-
oriented and a long process of decision making is holding them back from reaching
their goal and frugal because the decisions rely on a limited amount of information.
Heuristic thinking has been applied to the field of security and human behaviour by
Stajano and Wilson [240] who proposed a range of seven decision principles individ-
uals employ to make fast and frugal decisions and that are commonly exploited by
criminals. For example, the social compliance principle refers to the fact that in so-
ciety, people are conditioned to follow the instructions given by those in a position
of authority. Online criminals have been exploiting this by posing as representatives
of authoritative bodies and asking individuals to comply with their requests. Another
principle the researchers identified is time pressure, where victims are compelled to act
fast which results in them taking decisions without much deliberation. Both principles
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have been exploited for example in phishing emails posing to be from the tax office
urging individuals to pay taxes as soon as possible to avoid fines [110].
Effort has also been considered to be a heuristic. Kurger et al. [150] conducted a
series of experiments to assess if effort is a heuristic for the quality of artwork. The au-
thors conducted three experiments where participants were asked to assess the quality
of a poem, a painting and a suit of armour, respectively. In each experiment, partici-
pants were provided with various pieces of information about the artwork including the
name of the artist, the materials used, the weight of the object which varied depending
on the artwork. Also in each experiment, participants were given the information on
the time it took the artist to complete the artwork which the researchers treated as a
proxy for effort. The results showed that indeed participants used effort as a heuristic
for quality. They assessed the quality of the work to be higher the more time the artist
spent on creating it. The effect of effort was moderated by ambiguity as participants’
perceptions of quality were more influenced by effort when it was more difficult to
judge the quality of the piece of art.
Thinking fast and slow
According to a theory by Kahnemann [128], heuristic decision-making could be cate-
gorised as “thinking fast”. The idea that human brains sometimes think “fast” and at
other times “slow” has its roots in a critique of expected utility theory. As mentioned
above, utility theory treats humans as fully rational agents and does not account for
cognitive biases. In response, Kahneman and Tversky proposed prospect theory [129]
according to which when making decisions humans assign values to gains and losses
as opposed to final assets. The value function tends to be concave for gains and con-
vex for losses, that is it is steeper for losses than for gains. Instead of probabilities,
the authors spoke of decision weights. The decision-making process comprises of two
stages, termed editing and evaluating. The editing phase is a preliminary evaluation
of decisions and outcomes where individuals create a simple representation of differ-
ent prospects. In the evaluation phase, the prospects that resulted from editing are
evaluated and the ones with the highest value are selected.
The idea behind thinking “fast and slow” is that humans can exhibit two modes
of thought: “System 1” is a fast, impulsive and emotional way of thinking. It is often
unconscious, requires little effort but is prone to biases. At the same time, “System 2”
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is slow, deliberate and more rational, it is more likely to be employed for complex deci-
sions. Kahneman [128] described a range of experiments that show that System 1 and
System 2 thinking can often lead to different decision outcomes even when the inputs
are the same. System 1 thinking is easier because it interprets new situations through
the lens of existing patterns even if the new situation has little in common with previ-
ous ones. System 1 can be influenced by different biases such as anchoring, optimism
and loss aversion, framing and sunk cost. Anchoring refers to the human tendency to
be influenced by irrelevant numbers. If primed with an unrelated number, participants
in studies have been shown to give higher or lower numbers as answers to questions
depending on the value they were previously primed with (e.g., [255]). The optimism
bias is the human tendency to think that they are less at risk of experiencing adversity
and harm than others [231]. The sunk cost fallacy or escalation of commitments [241]
refer to the idea that individuals are likely to continue with their predefined course of
action despite negative outcomes rather than to abandon the entire endeavour.
In terms of effort, System 1 requires less effort and enables fast decision making,
System 2 however, requires deliberation and time. A similar distinction between low
and high effort decisions is reflected in Rasmussen’s framework describing levels of
performance which will be summarised in the next section.
Nudge
Thaler and Sunstein [249] built on the research conducted in the area of heuristics and
proposed a differentiation between the automatic and reflective system in individual
decision making. The automatic system corresponds to System 1 as described by Kah-
neman [128]; it is responsible for decisions taken fast and instinctively. The reflective
system corresponds to System 2 which is activated for decisions needing careful delib-
eration, for example, concerning future life plans. Thaler and Sunstein [249] argue that
since every-day decisions are the result of the autonomous system, nudging can help
people take decisions that would benefit them in terms of health, finances and overall
well-being. Nudging means changing the choice architecture so that a beneficial op-
tion is more likely to be chosen, without forbidding other options. A classic example
is displaying fruit at eye-level in a shop without removing access to junk food. Sec-
tion 2.4.6 provides examples of how the nudge theory has been applied to security and
privacy behaviours.
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Levels of performance
Rasmussen [194] defined three levels of performance which Reason [197] then later
applied to sources of human error. These theories predominantly stem from the study
of safety and are based on an industrial setting, often in aviation, where the goal is
to avoid accidents. However, they have also been successfully applied to other do-
mains such as healthcare and security. Rasmussen [194] specified three levels of per-
formance: knowledge-based, skill-based and rule-based performance. Humans take a
knowledge-based approach often in novel situations where there are no clear solutions
or guidance. The individual has to apply conscious attention and adapt to the situa-
tion making this approach effortful, tiring and error-prone. Rule-based performance
refers to situations where an individual pursues a goal in a conscious manner but the
actions they have to take can be performed automatically. In this way, tasks can be
performed in a near-unconscious manner which requires reduced effort. Finally, skill-
based performance applies to situations where there is a match between the specific
circumstances and the solutions that the individual was prepared or trained for in a
work context. To illustrate these approaches in a security context, if a novel situation
appears that an individual is not prepared for, they will have to expend effort and take
a knowledge-based approach. With time, they might develop a workaround that un-
dermines security but saves effort and will apply this solution in future cases to avoid
fatigue and achieve their primary task.
The described theories have in common is that they emphasise that certain deci-
sions are taken unconsciously in order to minimise the effort that is needed for deciding
on a course of action. Similarly, Gardner [88] suggests that human brains have two sys-
tems for interpreting risk, one primitive and unconscious while the other one rational
and conscious. If these two systems arrive at different conclusions, they can make
humans worry about statistically rare risks such as child abduction and terrorism but
ignore more frequent risks such as obesity and addiction.
Osman [178] argues that although the dominance of the unconscious is a popular
idea and individuals might feel encouraged to follow their “gut feeling” [89], there is a
general lack of evidence that unconscious decisions lead to better outcomes. Based on
research conducted by Richardson [206], Osman argues that individuals can improve
their performance through the mental practice of tasks. This corresponds to the levels
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of performance specified by Rasmussen which meant that there are problems that indi-
viduals can be trained for. Taking a step back, regardless of who is right in the debate,
the outcome is that humans either take fast and effortless decisions that are subject to
biases or they can be trained through repeated effortful practice to react in desirable
ways. In either case, this is not conducive to informed security and privacy decisions.
In the case of effortless and unconscious thinking that minimises effort, as mentioned
above, Stajano and Wilson demonstrated that heuristics can lead to detrimental secu-
rity choices. In the case of providing training, it could be an option for organisations
wanting to train their employees in security [20]. However, even in a workplace situa-
tion, training employees is only possible until a certain point [20] as employees’ main
focus is to meet their production goals. When it comes to individual users, it would
be hardly feasible to train all Internet users in security and privacy. Taking the exam-
ple of phishing, attackers’ techniques are ever changing and currently becoming more
sophisticated and any teaching would need to be updated on a regular basis making
it effortful for the users to keep up with [190]. Faced with these dilemmas, this dis-
sertation takes the stance that the design of security and privacy-enabling technologies
should be conducive to promoting an informed security and privacy choice, minimising
the effort that is involved.
2.1.3 Models explaining human protection behaviour
There are three classic psychology models that aim to capture what factors impact
human behaviour and how humans are persuaded to take a particular course of action,
in particular protective behaviours: theory of reasoned action [78, 7], theory of planned
behaviour [6] and the health belief model [117]. They will now be discussed in turn
from the point of view of how they thematise effort.
Theory of reasoned action
The theory of reasoned action focuses on the role of attitudes and behaviours. It sug-
gests that the decision to take a particular action is influenced by the expected results
that the individual is hoping to achieve. The theory proposes that two factors influence
intention – the individual’s attitudes as well as subjective norms. The theory has been
used to predict how humans will behave based on their pre-existing attitudes and in-
tentions. In terms of effort, the theory of reasoned action implies that a stronger intent
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towards a particular behaviour would lead to an individual being ready to invest more
effort in achieving it.
Theory of planned behaviour
The theory of planned behaviour was proposed by Ajzen [6] to expand on the theory
of reasoned action by adding the concept of behavioural control. The theory states that
the intention to perform a behaviour can be predicted based on three factors: one’s atti-
tude towards an action, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control. The term
attitude refers to one’s belief if a certain behaviour would make a positive or negative
influence on their lives. Subjective norms refer to an individual’s perception if their
immediate environment (e.g., colleagues, friends) would approve of this behaviour.
Perceived behavioural control relates to an individual’s perception of how easy or how
difficult it is to perform an action. This last factor is related to self-efficacy [15] that
is the belief in one’s ability to successfully accomplish a task. Thus, self-efficacy has
an impact on how much effort an individual is ready to expend to achieve a goal.
Ajzen states that “holding intention constant, the effort expended to bring a course
of behavior to a successful conclusion is likely to increase with perceived behavioral
control” [6, p. 184]. This means that an individual will be willing to expend more
effort to achieve a goal if they believe they will be successful.
In the field of information security, Herath and Raghav Rao [111] applied the the-
ory of planned behaviour to compliance with security policies in organisations. They
found that while perceptions about the severity of a security incident, response effi-
cacy and self-efficacy positively impacted attitudes towards security policy, the cost
associated with a response had a negative effect.
The health belief model
The health belief model [117] is a theory aiming to explain what influences individuals’
likelihood to adopt health-promoting behaviours. The theory suggests that three fac-
tors explain individual differences between taking health-promoting actions: perceived
severity, perceived susceptibility of developing a health problem and perceived bene-
fits and barriers. Later, self-efficacy was also added to the model [209] to emphasise
that also a person’s belief that they can successfully achieve a desired outcome plays a
role. The model thematises effort as a factor when mentioning perceived barriers say-
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ing that individuals weigh the perceived costs of taking an action against the benefits.
The barriers may include inconvenience, time, pain or monetary cost necessary to take
a preventive action.
Protection motivation theory
Protection motivation theory [207] was developed to explain the influence of fear ap-
peals on decision making. Fear appeals refer to the fact that individuals can be per-
suaded to take a particular action, be it to buy a product or to cast a vote, by arousing
fear. Protection motivation theory suggests that individuals take the decision to pro-
tect themselves based on the perceived severity of a threatening event, the perceived
likelihood of it happening (e.g., their own susceptibility), the efficacy of the preventive
action and their perception of their own self-efficacy. Confronted with a choice to take
a protective action, individuals can cope through adaption or maladaption. Individ-
uals will respond adaptively if they believe that “the recommended coping response
is effective [. . . ] and that one can successfully perform the coping response” [208].
Maladaptive responses emerge if individuals do not perceive a coping strategy to be
effective and/or they do not believe they can enact a preventive behaviour successfully.
Figure 2.1 summarises the cognitive processes behind adaptive and maladaptive re-
sponses. In terms of effort, Rogers introduces the notion of “response costs” to mean
“inconvenience, expense, unpleasantness, difficulty, complexity, side effects, disruption
of daily life, and overcoming habit strength” [208, p. 104].
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Figure 2.1: The cognitive process in protection motivation theory as proposed by
Rogers [208].
Protection motivation theory has been applied to many areas such as healthcare
and marketing; it has been also popular in information security research. While most
researchers applied the theory to study the adherence of staff to organisational security
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policy (e.g., [121, 189]), Jenkins et al. [125] applied the theory to authentication. They
used fear appeals to prompt users to create unique passwords. The researchers used
keystroke dynamics to detect password reuse and provided just-in-time fear appeals to
encourage participants to choose a unique password for a website they were creating
a password for. They found that around 88.4% of those who received a fear appeal
registered a unique password. In comparison, only around 4.5% of those who were
not confronted with a fear appeal created a unique password. While it is an interest-
ing study in terms of detecting password reuse and using fear appeals, applying it to
prevent password reuse seems rather flawed. In a piece of research that was published
in the same year, Floreˆncio and Herley [82] demonstrated the sheer impossibility of
creating a strong unique password for every system. The work by Jenkins et al. [125]
seems to ignore this and fails to consider the consequences of making users create a
new password for every system. For example, participants might have resorted to writ-
ing the newly created password down, which, depending on the threat model, might
lower the security of that password. This is not to mention other costs associated with
using just-in-time fear appeals such as: disruption to the primary task, task switching
costs, frustration etc. Although the authors acknowledge that “[r]arely is the act of
“being secure” the primary purpose of using a computer” [125, p. 208], they feel en-
titled to shift the user focus to a security task without considering if it is justified and
what the cost could be. Following Herley [113], it is important to stress that human
attention should be treated as a precious resource and used very wisely.
2.2 Conceptualising security and privacy decisions
2.2.1 Models of security decisions
Safety and security decisions
Rasmussen [195] developed a model showing the factors that influence employees’
safety behaviour. He identified three main forces that impact individual behaviour: the
security management of users, management pressure towards efficiency and gradient
towards least effort. His theory specifies that individual actors adapt their behaviour
based on criteria such as workload, cost effectiveness, risk of failure and joy of explo-
ration. Albrechtsen [9] adapted Rasmussen’s model to describe information security
behaviours. As shown in Figure 2.2, there are three forces that influence performance:
2.2. Conceptualising security and privacy decisions 21
Figure 2.2: Albrechtsen’s [9] adaptation of Rasmussen’s [195] model for information security.
the management exerts pressure towards more efficiency while staff exhibit a gradi-
ent towards least effort. At the same time, information security management provides
a counter-gradient pushing the movement away from the boundary of unacceptable
risk. Albrechtsen stresses that “high information security workload creates a conflict
of interest between functionality and information security” [p. 276]. According to Ras-
mussen [195], the fact that employees violate policy appears rational given their actual
workload and time constraints they are under. While Albrechtsen and Rasmussen em-
phasise the important role of workload and individuals’ predisposition to apply least
effort, other prominent frameworks do not give it much weight.
Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP) model
The Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP) model by Wogal-
ter [278] traces the signal from a security warning through a series of steps until it
reaches the receiver. The path the signal goes through is shown in Figure 2.3. Effort
is represented there only indirectly in the middle three factors – attention switch, at-
tention maintenance and memory comprehension. Wogalter’s model is problematic, it
assumes conscious deliberation on the side of the user and seems to ignore habit. The
human-in-the-loop security framework by Cranor [57] builds upon Wogalter’s work.
Although it does mention habituation as a factor in users’ behaviour, it does not correct
his generous assumptions of a conscious decision.
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Figure 2.3: The Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP) model by Wogal-
ter [278].
The models by Wogalter and Cranor both present the human as having vast re-
sources in terms of time and effort that they can expend on making a decision. Their
decision maker resembles the maximiser who weighs all the options to make the op-
timal choice. However, as described in Section 2.1.2, researchers in the areas of psy-
chology and usable security have been identifying principles of human behaviour that
are simple heuristics that enable fast decision making. Cialdini identified principles
of influence [54], Gragg [98] spoke of psychological triggers, and Stajano and Wil-
son described the principles used in scams [240]. Recently, Ferreira et al. [75] made
an attempt to combine these principles and proposed a unified taxonomy. In an early
study [141], the author of this dissertation herself observed that participants were far
from being maximisers, they took the decision to heed or ignore a warning quickly and
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normally just relied on one cue, one heuristic, to make a choice. Trust was an impor-
tant cue, it was either trust towards the anti-virus software, trust towards the university
where the study took place or the lack of trust towards the warning and its issuer.
Compliance budget
Beautement et al. [20] proposed the idea that in an organisation employees have a
compliance budget meaning there is a certain amount of effort they can invest in taking
precautions to stay secure. Once this budget is exhausted, they become unwilling to
comply. The authors emphasise that employee effort has to be tracked and managed
wisely in order to “focus the effort available on key security tasks to maximize their
return on investment and avoid wasteful expenditure on less critical measures” [20,
p. 49].
Technology Acceptance Model
Although only peripherally thematised in usable security theory, effort has been named
as a factor in other related areas. The central idea in technology acceptance literature
is that perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness are key drivers in an individual’s
choice to use a piece of technology [62]. Davis defined ‘perceived ease of use’ as “the
degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would be free of ef-
fort” [62, p. 320]. Later theories in the field, for example by Venkatesh et al. [261],
suggested that four constructs have an impact on user acceptance of technology: per-
formance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence and facilitating conditions.
They defined ‘effort expectancy’ as “the degree of ease associated with the use of the
system” [261, p. 450].
2.2.2 Models of privacy decisions
Privacy model by Adams and Sasse
Adams and Sasse’s [4] created a privacy model which stresses that privacy is contex-
tual. This means individuals determine what they disclose based on the situation they
find themselves in. To give an example, they talk about their strengths and weakness
differently when talking to a future employer and when confiding in their best friend.
As shown in Figure 2.4, Adams and Sasse [4] specified that users make their decision
about disclosure based on how sensitive the piece of information is, who the informa-
tion receiver is, and how they will use this information.
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Figure 2.4: A model of factors and issues in privacy decisions by Adams and Sasse [4].
The first factor described by Adams and Sasse [4] was information sensitivity.
The authors stressed that individuals perceive the sensitivity of their information on a
spectrum rather than thinking of it as a binary – private versus non-private. Perceived
sensitivity depends on context and the authors emphasised that information users are
comfortable sharing in one context, they might be not fine with sharing in another.
Regardless of context, research has shown that there are general information categories
that users might perceive to be more sensitive than others – such as medical [2] and
financial information [184]. Information sensitivity and the need to adequately protect
it is also addressed by the law. The UK Data Protection Act (DPA) [44] specifies the
following data items are sensitive: race, ethnicity, politics, religion, trade union status,
health, sex life and criminal record.
Research has found that item sensitivity can be a determinant of disclosure. In
a study by Metzger [166], disclosure and falsification were positively correlated with
participants’ perceived sensitivity of data items. Participants who disclosed informa-
tion in the study were more likely to falsify sensitive information, in the given scenario
this was data that could be linked to financial or identity records. Similarly, Braunstein
et al. [42] demonstrated that users are more likely to limit the flow of personal data
items when these are more sensitive. Additionally, studies have also shown that users
are less likely to share information which would show them in a negative light [4].
The second factor described by Adams and Sasse [4] was information receiver.
Users’ decision as to whether to disclose a piece of information depends on who is
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going to receive it. Research has shown that users are comfortable with sharing infor-
mation with organisations they have a trusted relationship with [2].
Trust towards the information receiver is an important consideration when design-
ing privacy-related studies. In order to remove the trust bias that participants would
have towards university-based researchers collecting the information, researchers have
gone to great lengths in constructing a story around who the information receiver is.
Examples include pretending to be a credit card company [162] or an online retailer
(e.g., [235, 25]).
The third factor described by Adams and Sasse [4] was information usage. Users
base their decision whether to share their information on its expected use by the re-
ceiver. Relevance of the information in the given context matters. If a person considers
a piece of information not to be necessary in the given context, they will deem the re-
quest for it to be intrusive [115]. In the context of a credit card application, Malheiros
et al. [162] found that fairness played a role in participants’ decision to disclose infor-
mation. Fairness is understood as the users’ belief that the data is being collected and
used ethically and for the stated purpose.
Other studies have shown similar results. In a study by Metzger [166], participants
were found to provide truthful information if they thought the information query was
relevant in the given context. For example, they provided the correct shipping address
since they expected this data would be used to successfully deliver a product to them.
If users do not perceive the benefits of a disclosure to outweigh the costs, they can
engage in privacy protection behaviours by either denying answers or falsifying them
(e.g., [232, 58, 158, 173]).
Privacy concern
Research has repeatedly demonstrated a discrepancy between privacy preferences and
actual behaviours (e.g., [126, 24, 55]). This has led researchers and the media to speak
of a privacy paradox in that users say they are concerned about their privacy but share
information about themselves online. This discrepancy could be caused by several
factors, two possible explanations might be that (i) users seek immediate gratification
or (ii) that these phenomena are studied using different research methods. The expla-
nation related to immediate gratification could be framed in terms of “System 1” and
“System 2” thinking as described by Kahneman [128] (summarised in Section 2.1.2).
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An explanation for the privacy paradox could be that System 1 thinking is employed in
the actual decisions on the spot and System 2 thinking when participants reflect about
their values and attitudes when responding to surveys. What links to this is the fact that
human behaviour is goal-oriented and when immersed in a task, users tend to ignore
other concerns [141]. This will be further discussed in Section 2.4.1.
Expected benefit
Another fundamental motivator for the disclosure of information is the expected ben-
efit. Users disclose information based on the benefits they perceive they will receive
in return. The benefits can be considered as both (i) the service or goods they receive
or (ii) the compensation or discount they obtain. (i) Malheiros and Preibusch [161]
conducted a large-scale observational study of user behaviour in registration forms for
Google, Microsoft and Yahoo. They found that users were more likely to invest time
and effort in completing a registration process for websites that were offering them
more value, for example product download and activation services. (ii) Privacy re-
search has also attempted to put a price on the value of personal information. In a
field study selling cinema tickets [127], one third of users were willing to pay one
Euro in order not to provide their phone number. Studies have also compensated users
for disclosing information. In an experiment at the London School of Economics and
Political Science (LSE) [139], student participants received chocolate in exchange for
providing items of personal information. A total of 372 students completed the study:
91% disclosed their LSE username and 14% their LSE password.
Effort in privacy behaviours
For privacy, effort has been examined in the context of answering data requests. Hui
et al. [120] conducted a field experiment examining the impact of privacy statements
and seals on disclosure. Their findings showed that there was a negative association
between disclosure rates and the number of items requested. Other studies confirm
this – if a high number of data items is requested, users tend to perceive the transaction
as effortful and costly [13, 152]. Also the number of steps in providing information
matters. When a service provider includes a step of verifying a phone number as part
of their registration process, they can experience lower account creation rates than
services that do not have this step [161].
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Malheiros et al. [162] asked participants to rate the effort involved in answering
data requests. They found that gender, children count and marital status were con-
sidered the most effortless to answer. The items of information considered to be the
hardest were: weekly spending, childhood deaths and monthly income. The authors
speculate that this might be due to the fact that the answers potentially required calcu-
lations and explicit recall of information.
2.3 Research attitudes towards users
Information security has considered users as part of their work from its early days. In
1883, Auguste Kerckhoffs devised six principles for military cryptography. The final
principle stresses that systems “must be easy to use and must neither require stress
of mind nor the knowledge of a long series of rules” [131]. What he spoke about
can be interpreted as reducing cognitive effort that users have to expend in order to
successfully protect a system. Similarly, in their seminal work defining principles of
information security, Saltzer and Schroeder stressed “psychological acceptability” is
necessary for the functioning of security [215].
What these early works stressed was both respect for users as well as the acknowl-
edgement that systems cannot be secure if individuals cannot cope with the demands
placed on them. However, since the early days of usable security as a research area,
strands of academic work have been treating users in a condescending way speaking of
humans as the “weakest link” [230]. In one of the first papers in the discipline, Whit-
ten and Tygar [276] suggested users need to be educated about cryptography in order
to be able to use encrypted email. This suggestion ignores the fact that it is neither
feasible nor necessary for users to become security experts as it is neither necessary
nor feasible for every driver to understand in detail how exactly a car works. How-
ever, such research approaches persist and more recently studies have worked on how
to make users memorise randomly-assigned 56-bit codes [38] or how to force them to
pay attention to warnings [10].
The research in this dissertation takes a different stance, it takes an approach fo-
cused on protecting the human rather than on preserving the security of information
and assets. Security and privacy exist foremostly to protect and support humans in their
primary tasks. Humans are goal-oriented and prefer not spend time performing secu-
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rity and privacy tasks since they do not perceive them as enablers but as hurdles. Sasse
and Fle´chais [221] argued that often security mechanisms are chosen without consider-
ing their impact on users’ actual tasks which negatively affects the user and undermines
security. The research presented here embraces the user rather than “scaring and bul-
lying” them into security [216]. It speaks not of human limitations and frailty [203]
but of their capabilities and needs [23]. Following Herley [113], it stresses the fact that
human effort is a precious and limited resource and therefore it needs to be used with
great care.
2.4 Principles guiding security and privacy behaviours
Over the last two decades, research into usable security and privacy has identified sev-
eral principles that influence user behaviours. The main principles can be summarised
as follows.
2.4.1 Human behaviour is goal-oriented
Since human behaviour is goal-oriented (e.g., [46, 100]), asking users to perform a
security task diverts them from their intended workflow [217]. Staying secure online
can not only disrupt the interaction with a system or the use of a service but make it
difficult or even impossible to accomplish the primary task.
2.4.2 Security and privacy are secondary tasks
Users are online to accomplish a certain goal and security and privacy choices are just a
secondary task for them. Sasse et al. [220] explained that if something gets in the user’s
way of completing their actual task, they will attempt to circumvent it and they will
gradually develop an aversion to it: “the extra effort required will foster resentment in
users, and feed the perception that security is ‘not sensible’ because it interferes with
real work” [p. 128].
2.4.3 Security measures may cause more risky behaviour
Adams [5] introduced the concept of the risk thermostat stating that the introduction
of a security or safety measure is likely to produce more risky behaviour. One example
of this is the introduction of the mandatory wearing of seat belts in cars. Instead of
lowering the number of deaths caused by car accidents, it has been shown that drivers
felt more protected, drove faster, and this had the knock-on effect of creating more
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danger on the roads. This phenomenon has been described in economics under the term
moral hazard. A classic example is when companies engage in more risky behaviour
once they have purchased an insurance cover. In usable security research, a number
of participants in a study by Krol et al. [141] emphasised that they dared to engage in
more risky online behaviour because they believed their anti-virus would protect them.
2.4.4 No tangible reward for secure and privacy-preserving be-
haviour
Security and privacy are abstract concepts. There is no immediate reward for an action
in accordance with security procedures, the reward is that nothing bad happens [273].
While accessing a service or downloading a file gives immediate gratification, not
having done it because of security and privacy concerns gives no tangible reward and
can affect the completion of the primary task. Additionally, human behaviour is shaped
by positive and negative reinforcement. If someone is rewarded for ‘correct’ behaviour,
they are likely to repeat it. If they are punished for ‘wrong’ behaviour, they are less
likely to repeat it. In the context of security and privacy, the reward is problematic. The
reward for ‘correct’ security behaviour is the absence of negative consequences, there
is nothing additionally rewarding happening. At the same time, adverse consequences
hardly ever come immediately after a user’s action. They may come in days, weeks,
months or might never be visible to the user.
2.4.5 Involving users in decision making
There has been a debate around in how far users should be involved in security de-
cisions. Cranor [57] proposed a framework aiming to help system designers reason
about user involvement in securing these systems. The author proposed that humans
should be generally kept “out of the loop” but acknowledged that this was not always
feasible. She defined the following three strategies for creating user-friendly security
systems. First, it is important to create systems that do not require user involvement
in security-relevant decisions. Cranor stressed that it is best to keep users out of the
loop because they often lack the knowledge and motivation to perform security tasks.
Second, if some level of human involvement is required, designers should find ways
to make security tasks easy and intuitive to complete. Third, if human involvement is
unavoidable, users have to be taught to successfully protect systems through training.
30 Chapter 2. Literature review
Following Cranor, Egelman et al. [67] distinguished between three types of secu-
rity systems: first, mitigations that are not visible to the user; second, mitigations that
do something on behalf of the user and third, mitigations that communicate with the
user and suggest a course of action. In terms of effort, mitigations of the second and
third type require user attention and consume their effort, therefore, keeping the human
“out of the loop” would be more desirable. The authors conducted a study into users’
tolerance of security-related delays. Their results demonstrated that users were more
likely to cheat and disengage if they were given an explanation not related to security
or only mentioning security vaguely. The authors suggested that if a mitigation cannot
be made invisible, users should be provided with an explanation in order to ensure their
cooperation.
Wash et al.’s [268] conducted a range of studies into users’ perceptions and man-
agement of Windows updates. They collected qualitative and quantitative data through
interviews, surveys and actual logs which allowed them to compare perceptions of how
participants thought their computers were running updates with how they were actually
running updates. The researchers found that their participants had a range of misun-
derstandings around updates; not understanding the settings for automatic updates and
when their computer was being updated. The authors speculated that keeping users out
of the loop might have resulted in them not being able to understand the process and
configure their settings according to their preferences.
2.4.6 Impact of defaults and guidance
Despite extensive privacy controls, studies have shown that 87% of users have default
or permissive settings [97]. Research has demonstrated that existing defaults do not
lead users to secure choices [85]. To address this, more recent studies have made at-
tempts to guide or ‘nudge’ users towards secure choices. Turland et al. [253] created
and evaluated an application that aimed to lead users towards more secure Wi-Fi net-
works. They found that the use of colour and ordering impacted which network their
participants chose. Nudging has also been used in the field of privacy to guide users
away from privacy-invasive applications [53] or influence how they disclose informa-
tion on social media [265].
2.5. Specific areas of focus 31
2.4.7 Habituation and desensitisation
Confronted with security alarms that are clearly false positives, users gradually be-
come desensitised and develop the habit of ‘swatting away’ warnings. Krol et al. [141]
showed that almost 82% or participants ignored a security warning that stood in their
way of downloading a PDF file. Nearly half of the participants later explained they
did not believe the warning was accurate and saw it as a “routine thing”. Similarly,
Akhawe and Felt [8] showed that users who click through 47% of SSL warnings made
their decision within 1.5 seconds. Herley [112] emphasised the great effort users have
to put into staying secure online and stated that adopting unsafe online practices is a
rational rejection of security advice. He stressed that the effort is immense and the
benefits are small since the likelihood of being attacked remains relatively low. Faced
with ever-increasing warning fatigue, Sunshine et al. [247] suggested to block unsafe
connections and reduce the use of warnings in benign situations in order to prevent
desensitisation.
2.5 Specific areas of focus
2.5.1 Authentication
Today, most web users encounter security as authentication. Authentication refers
to the process of verifying a user has the necessary information, token or biometric
characteristic to prove they have the right to access a system. Traditionally, the user
can be verified based on what they know (e.g., password or PIN), what they have (a
token) and who they are (biometric characteristic).
Knowledge-based credentials
Knowledge-based credentials such as passwords and PINs have a long history and are
very widely deployed nowadays. From the point of view of effort, passwords require
unaided recall that is the user has to remember them exactly and be able to retrieve them
from memory when asked. Having to create and memorise high numbers of passwords
makes users re-use them for multiple accounts [81], write them down [3] or choose
passwords that are easy to remember. Studies have demonstrated that people do not
use the entire space of password creation possibilities but instead concentrate around a
relatively small number of predictable choices [33]. This has been demonstrated also
for graphical passwords [60, 260], PINs [37] and personal knowledge questions [35].
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Several password database hacks and leaks have shown that the most common pass-
words tend to be ‘password’ and ‘123456’ (e.g., [272, 33]).
With the emergence of touchscreen devices, there has been a shift away from a
traditional screen and keyboard set-up towards virtual keyboards. Password entry is
even more difficult on touchscreens because of screen size, the lack of familiar hap-
tic feedback known from physical keyboards, different key layouts and screen depths
used [99]. Previous studies have demonstrated that password entry on touchscreens
can be significantly more difficult and time-consuming [16, 99]. Schaub et al. [226]
investigated the usability and security of six types of virtual keyboards. They showed
that the keyboards differed in the usability of password entry (entry time, accuracy)
and susceptibility to shoulder-surfing. They found that keyboard designs with poor us-
ability were more resistant to shoulder-surfing. Moreover, research has demonstrated
that the entry method affects users’ password choice and security as users choose pass-
words that are easier to type [16, 282].
At the same time, passwords are becoming easier to crack as computing power
increases. In 1999, Schneier stressed that “password crackers can now break anything
that you can reasonably expect a user to memorize” [229]. More than 16 years later,
we largely still rely on users to memorise their passwords.
More and more websites offering services and goods ask users to create passwords
for accessing their products. Bonneau and Preibusch [36] consider the demand for
users to expend cognitive effort in terms of a tragedy of the commons. By asking users
to create passwords, the service providers are depleting the common good of human
memory. Also, being asked to create a password on every site makes users re-use
strong passwords which results in lowering the strength of that password as some sites
do not offer adequate protection. The work uncovers that the industry’s standards are
far from ideal, with many sites storing passwords in the clear.
Why are passwords still so common despite all their shortcomings? They tend to
be easy to deploy, no explanation or training is required on how to use them as their use
is wide-spread [34]. This has made passwords an easy one-size-fits-all solution that is
considered to be applicable in all sorts of scenarios, for all types of systems [36, 114].
In order to ease memorability, many alternative password schemes have been pro-
posed. One group of them is graphical passwords that seek to ease unaided recall by
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substituting it with recognition. Although they rely on a simplified understanding of
psychology [182], such schemes aim to tap into human visual memory, exploring the
so called “Picture Superiority Effect”. One such password scheme is called PassFaces1
and it aims to tap into humans’ unique ability to memorise and recognise faces. It falls
under the category of cognometrics where the user has to choose an image from a group
of distractors. For PassFaces, users are asked to remember an individual from a grid
of 3×3 faces in a sequence of three screens of faces. User studies of PassFaces have
shown the scheme is neither effortless nor secure. Brostoff and Sasse [46] found that
login frequencies decreased when PassFaces were used. Participants logged in with
one third of the frequency when they authenticated using a grid of PassFaces rather
than passwords, because the former took significantly longer. Thus, users took the
decision not to go through a login process that cost them time, cognitive and physical
effort if they were to spend only little time on the system. Also, having multiple pass-
words for this system would be difficult as they would likely interfere as demonstrated
in a study be Everitt et al. [73]. The security of PassFaces is also questionable since
guessability has been shown to be high. In a study by Davis et al. [60], participants
tended to choose faces based on their own ethnic background and the attractiveness of
the pictured individuals.
GrIDsure2 is another example of a graphical password and falls under the category
of drawmetrics that require the user to recreate a shape or a simple drawing. For
GrIDsure, users are asked to memorise a pattern and then when authenticating, they
receive a grid filled with digits and need to enter the digits that correspond to their
pattern. Brostoff et al. [45] studied the usability of GrIDsure and found that in nearly
18% of usages, participants were trying to enter the PIN on the grid directly instead of
typing it. This undermines the security property offered by the grid, namely resistance
to shoulder-surfing. Researcher have also studied the Android Pattern-Lock on mobile
devices. Uellenbeck et al. [256] found that users commonly start their patterns in the
upper left corner and choose a three-node straight line. Similarly, Andriotis et al. [12]
showed that users choose sequences of points that are easy to predict and over 50% of
participants started their pattern from the top left.
1http://passfaces.com/
2http://www.gridsure-security.co.uk/
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Token-based credentials
A common example of a token-based credential is an access badge that the user has
to swipe through or hold next to a reader in order to access a location. Other ex-
amples include RSA tokens (SecureID)3 that generate a one-time password (OTP) or
the proposed replacement for credentials – Pico4. While these are dedicated devices
called hardware tokens, there are also software tokens – programmes that can generate
a one-time password on a device such as a computer or a mobile phone.
In terms of user effort, possession-based credentials are considered to require less
cognitive effort as the user does need to create, memorise and recall a secret, but they
might be demanding physically as the user has to operate a token. However, from a
cognition point of view, the user might not need to remember a password but they need
to remember to have a token with them which might introduce mental strain leading to
frustration.
Token-based credentials have often been evaluated as a second factor in two-factor
authentication (e.g., [270, 271]) and there are only few studies that assessed them on
their own. Payne et al. [183] evaluated Pico which utilises a main device, Pico, and
multiple wearables, Picosiblings, to authenticate users to systems. They conducted
20 semi-structured interviews asking participants to handle prototypes created using
plasticine and Polymorph. Three main factors played a role in participants’ acceptance
of Pico: inconvenience, risk perception and responsibility. Inconvenience “was inti-
mately related to the effort that participants imagined they might have to expend on
using and remembering to carry a dedicated Pico device” [183, p. 7]. For this reason,
some participants suggested integrating Pico with another device or creating a Pico
smartphone app. An app would reduce the cognitive burden of remembering to take
a dedicated Pico device with them and the physical burden of carrying it. Apart from
the potential annoyance of having to carry around Pico devices, participants also felt
anxiety because of perceived risks. They worried about what they would need to do
to ensure Pico’s security was maintained and with this came a sense of responsibility.
Since Pico is a physical token, participants felt they would need to be responsible for
both keeping it secure and available (e.g., on their person when they needed it).
3https://www.rsa.com/en-us/products/identity-and-access-management
4http://mypico.org/
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Biometric-based credentials
Biometric-based systems authenticate individuals based on measuring an aspect of
their anatomy (e.g., facial features, fingerprint), some ingrained skill or behaviour (e.g.,
typing rhythm, handwritten signature) or a combination of the two (e.g., voice) [11].
In terms of user effort, biometrics have held the promise to solve many usability
issues since the user has to neither remember a password nor carry a token with them.
However, experiences of real-life deployments of biometric systems [218] have shown
that current biometric systems are not always accurate, take time to authenticate the
user and their use might be physically demanding due to poor design of user interfaces.
One of the problems identified by Sasse [218] was that enrolment and verification
were performed on different equipment which can be confusing for the user. Coventry
et al. [56] also stressed that the enrolment stage should be used as an educational
opportunity to familiarise the user with the technology as they showed that exposure
influences the acceptance of biometrics.
It is common to ask users to make adjustments rather than to adjust the technology
behind biometric interfaces. For example, users have to be instructed to provide their
fingerprints in a way that the scanner can read them. A study by Theofanos et al. [250]
showed that instructions helped improve the quality of fingerprints that participants
gave. Older women were able to give the best prints despite the fingerprints being the
least pronounced in this demographic. Although the authors find this result encourag-
ing, one could ask why users should compensate for the shortcomings of technologies
with their time, effort and frustration. In the case of unsuccessful authentication, bio-
metric systems can make users feel bad about themselves sending a message that they
are not within the range of a societal ‘norm’ [198]. For example, older users can feel
stigmatised because biometric features change over time and for fingerprints, the pap-
illary ridges on human fingers fade with age which makes it difficult for technologies
to capture them.
Trewin et al. [251] explored the demands placed on users – in terms of time,
effort, error and task disruption – of voice, face and gesture, in a within-subjects study.
Although biometrics were recorded as being faster than using passwords, none of the
mechanisms were considered usable. This is important as although a mechanism can
be regarded as better than others, its ‘absolute’ measure of usability may be poor.
36 Chapter 2. Literature review
A recent study by Bhagavatula et al. [27] explored usability and participant ex-
perience of both face and fingerprint-based verification for mobile devices, through a
lab study and structured survey. Both mechanisms were compared side-by-side with
more traditional PINs within subjects. The study scenarios were designed with physi-
cal settings in mind, such as using the mechanisms while in motion or in a dark room,
aiming to assess user and technology performance. The results show that participants
preferred unlocking devices with a fingerprint more than a PIN. Participants had more
problems with face unlock and many abandoned using it.
Heckle et al. [109] asked participants to role-play purchases in an online book-
store with role-played use of fingerprint technologies using simulated occurrence of
errors. Based on the results, the authors suggested that application contexts with more
apparent user benefits were seen as more usable and acceptable.
Evaluating authentication
Although several attempts have been made to assess different authentication schemes
(e.g., [177, 200, 43, 28]), the work by Bonneau et al. [34] is considered to be the most
comprehensive. The researchers evaluated 35 password-replacement schemes, com-
paring passwords with OAuth and OpenID, hardware and phone-based tokens. They
did not conduct a user study, but relied on a set of 25 subjective metrics falling under
three categories: security, deployability and usability. The following eight usability
properties were considered: Memorywise-Effortless (U1), Scalable-for-Users (U2),
Nothing-to-Carry (U3), Physically-Effortless (U4), Easy-to-Learn (U5), Efficient-to-
Use (U6), Infrequent-Errors (U7) and Easy-Recovery-from-Loss (U8). These usabil-
ity factors can be mapped onto different aspects of workload. While U1, U2 and U5
mostly relate to cognitive effort, U3 and U4 are associated with physical effort. U6 is
related to the relationship between time and effort while U7 and U8 refer to recovery
from errors and loss. Although the framework is an important staring point, the ratings
the schemes received need to be verified empirically through evaluations with actual
users. As the studies presented in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation will show, not
all authentication events are the same and all these usability factors are contextual de-
pending on both the user and the circumstances they are in; for example, frequency of
use, time pressure, value of the account and the device used.
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2.5.2 Two-factor authentication
A combination of two or more authentication factors has been referred to as two-factor
authentication (2FA). The goal of 2FA is to increase security by adding a one-time
password to prevent password database breaches or guessing attacks.
In 2006, Braz and Robert [43] compared 14 different authentication methods
based on their security and usability. They were among the first to discuss the us-
ability of 2FA and suggested that, by increasing redundancy, 2FA strengthens security
but may negatively impact the user experience. They considered biometrics as an ex-
ample of a second factor and address the problems of accessibility (i.e., iris recognition
might not work for every person), social acceptability and the effort involved in enrol-
ment. Although the authors drew on usability guidance, a significant drawback of their
work is that they did not conduct a study with actual users of 2FA.
Strouble et al. [245] analysed the effect on productivity of the Common Access
Card (CAC), a smart card and photo ID used by the employees of the US Department
of Defense (DoD). Out of 313 survey respondents, 35.5% answered that accessing
their emails while off-site was more difficult. One of their participants explained:
“The introduction of the CAC card for home use has decimated the communications
channels that our reserve unit has spent years developing. We are now looking at
going back to paper bulletins with stamps” [245, p. 198]. During the switch to the new
system, 2/3 of users forgot their card in their readers. The researchers estimated that
this equalled to the productivity loss of approximately 260+ person-years and the DoD
spent $10.4M on time lost.
Gunson et al. [102] investigated perceptions of security and usability in the con-
text of automated telephone banking. The researchers juxtaposed single and two-factor
authentication methods and asked 62 participants to rate their experience on a 22-item
questionnaire. When second factors of authentication were enforced, users felt more
secure than when using only passwords or PINs, but at the expense of usability. Partic-
ipants considered single-factor authentication to be more convenient and easier to use.
While the studies mentioned so far compared 2FA with passwords, another line
of work presented comparative studies of different 2FA mechanisms. Weir et al. [270]
investigated usability perceptions of three 2FA technologies (a push-button token, a
card-activated token, and a PIN-activated token). They asked 50 participants to use
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each option, share what they liked and disliked about them, suggest how they would
improve the technologies, and answer a short usability questionnaire. Users were then
asked to authenticate again with their preferred technology and fill out the usability
questionnaire once more. Authors found a strong correlation between preference and
perceived convenience, but only a weak correlation between perceived security and
perceived convenience/usability.
In a follow-up study, Weir et al. [271] compared the usability of password authen-
tication and two 2FA technologies, specifically OTPs generated by a token or received
via SMS. They performed a lab study involving 141 participants and a 30-question
survey. The researchers concluded that familiarity with a technology – rather than per-
ceived usability – affected user willingness to use that technology. Users perceived the
single factor method as being the most secure and most convenient option.
Both studies by Weir et al. had the drawback that participants interacted with
prototypes, performing artificial tasks. They did not log in to their own accounts and
they were not interacting with the authentication interface under real-life constraints
(e.g., time pressure).
De Cristofaro et al. [63] presented an exploratory quantitative analysis comparing
the usability of three different 2FA technologies, based on a survey completed by 219
US users recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The authors found that par-
ticipants were relatively pleased with the usability of 2FA, regardless of the specific
technology, and regardless of motivations or context of use. However, the perceived
usability was correlated with demographics as female and older people felt they ex-
pended more cognitive effort to use 2FA. Also, in contrast to previous studies, users’
perception of trustworthiness was not negatively correlated with ease of use and the
cognitive effort required.
In summary, prior work on 2FA usability used expert assessments, survey-based
studies, and studies on prototypes, incurring a number of shortcomings. Expert assess-
ments did not involve users, yielding findings that only rely on researchers’ judgement
and often without the benefit of a structured usability assessment technique, such as
GOMS, heuristic evaluation or cognitive walkthrough. Survey-based studies asked
participants to make hypothetical choices or report behaviours based on what they can
remember. Finally, studies with prototypes were performed in the absence of real-life
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constraints: without reference to a primary task – such as paying a bill – or context of
use – paying a bill from one’s office during lunch break or in a hotel room while trav-
elling. There has been a lack of studies focused on actual users of 2FA post-adoption,
which is crucial for understanding how people use different 2FA technologies and how
the effort required fits into their every-day activities.
2.5.3 CAPTCHA
CAPTCHAs (‘Completely Automated Public Turing tests to tell Computers and Hu-
mans Apart’) are tasks users are asked to solve before they are allowed to access re-
sources or make purchases. By deploying them, service providers want to prevent
automated access to their offerings that would result in for example spamming, mass
ticket buying or a denial of service. The CAPTCHA tasks, such as deciphering dis-
torted letters, are intended to be easy to solve by humans but difficult to solve by
computers.
Yan and Ahmed [281] defined a framework for assessing the usability of both text-
and audio-based CAPTCHAs. The usability properties they considered are distortion,
content and presentation. An evaluation by the authors, essentially as subject-matter
experts, systematically reviewed these dimensions, identifying a number of factors
which could reduce the solvability of a CAPTCHA for humans (e.g., use of unfa-
miliar character strings, use of colour). The approach taken by the authors is rather
technology-centric as they only consider user performance rather than their goals and
needs. The main usability issue of CAPTCHAs is the fact that they disrupt the primary
task and ask users to expend effort to compensate for the shortcoming of technologies.
Pogue [186] says users are together wasting 17 person-years every day on solving
CAPTCHAs, calling this immense effort “a disgraceful waste of our lives”. There are
technical solutions that could replace CAPTCHAs that would remove the need for user
effort, but they are difficult to implement and costly for the service operators [77].
Bursztein et al. [48] also exhibited a technology-centric approach by asking
“How good are humans at solving CAPTCHAs?” (p. 399). The authors conducted
a large-scale study where workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk and an underground
CAPTCHA breaking service solved more than 318,000 CAPTCHAs (from 12 image-
based and 8 audio-based schemes). The findings demonstrated that humans find
CAPTCHAs difficult with audio-based ones being particularly troublesome. The study
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is an interesting one in that real users were asked to solve CAPTCHAs. However par-
ticipants were motivated to do it by economic factors and they did not have an accom-
panying primary task as users do in real life.
There have also been attempts to expose users to CAPTCHAs in gamified ways.
Ho et al. [116] proposed metrics for quantifying the usability of CAPTCHAs, by way
of a game which tracks completion of CAPTCHAs as a measure of progress. Par-
ticipants are engaged through a game, rather than directly through surveys or similar
means, specifically as a way to manage study resourcing. The work posits that the
most appropriate way to assess CAPTCHA usability is to ask many people to solve
CAPTCHAs repeatedly. Metrics include completion time, typing error, and number of
abandoned CAPTCHA solving attempts.
Although studies often measure the time needed to complete a CAPTCHA, phys-
ical and cognitive effort is only rarely considered. Gossweiler et al. [95] evaluated
a CAPTCHA alternative based on image orientation, where users rotate 2D images
to an upright position. The authors stressed that “[u]sing CAPTCHAs, services can
distinguish legitimate users from computer bots while requiring minimal effort by the
human user” [p. 841]. The study presented in Section 5.3 will assess if the effort re-
quired of users is as minimal as the authors claim it is. The evaluation by Gossweiler
et al. included a “Happiness Study”, to determine participants’ preference for either a
traditional text-based CAPTCHA or the image-orientation variant. Participants were
asked to solve both types of CAPTCHA, five times each. They were then asked to
state directly which method they preferred (as a free-text response), where 11 of 16
participants preferred the image orientation variant. In terms of physical effort, the pa-
per noted that “many users [of the text-based CAPTCHA] referenced feeling like they
were at an eye exam while deciphering the text” [p. 849].
Belk et al. [21] investigated the link between users’ cognitive styles (by way
of a psychometric-based survey) and both performance with text- or picture-based
CAPTCHAs challenges as well as preference. The motivating observation was that
CAPTCHAs should minimise cognitive effort. Results are reported for 131 partici-
pants who chose to complete either a text- or picture-based CAPTCHA (where the
choice was recorded as a preference). Users overwhelmingly preferred text-based
CAPTCHAs, where this is attributed to users’ familiarity with text-based CAPTCHAs.
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Notably, the work implies that users can both exercise a choice and have individual
qualities informing that choice.
Reynaga et al. [205] compared nine CAPTCHA schemes on smartphones with al-
ternative input mechanisms that aimed to increase usability. It is very topical research
as touchscreens consume more physical effort, as outlined earlier in this chapter. The
researchers found that although participants considered traditional input mechanisms
to be error-prone, they preferred them due to familiarity. The study is notable for
capturing a variety of subjective user perceptions (e.g., ratings for memorability, pref-
erence) and free-text responses from participants. When discussing their findings, the
authors stressed that both correctness of solving a CAPTCHA and user perceptions
ought to be considered when evaluating verification mechanisms.
In summary, the overwhelming majority of existing research on the usability of
CAPTCHAs has examined how different types of CAPTCHAs compare in terms of
solvability. The usability of CAPTCHAs has been narrowly defined as users’ capabil-
ity to decipher “squiggly” characters. In some cases, qualities of user perception are
identified secondary to the laudable (but restricted) pursuit of less cognitively and phys-
ically effortful alternatives to CAPTCHAs. Studies aiming to evaluate the usability of
CAPTCHAs have often failed to assess them under realistic conditions. Participants
have almost always been invited to studies to solve CAPTCHAs which might be prim-
ing and in dissonance with reality where users go online to accomplish some primary
task (e.g., make a purchase, contribute to a forum).
2.5.4 Security and privacy indicators
This section discusses existing research on warnings and indicators for security and
privacy.
Passive versus active security indicators
Currently, security indicators can be divided into two groups: passive and active. Pas-
sive indicators are adjacent to the users’ task and do not get in their way, at the expense
of being overlooked at times. For instance, a passive indicator for a secure connection
is placed on the margins of a website highlighted through colour. On the other hand,
active indicators, such as pop-up warnings, seek to attract the user’s attention by in-
terrupting them in their primary task. The user has to then actively interact with the
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indicator, as they cannot continue with their primary task without acknowledging the
indicator and taking an action.
An example of a classic passive indicator is the padlock icon indicating an SSL
connection. Early studies showed that only few users notice it [68, 280]. Schechter
et al. [227] confirmed and expanded these findings. In their study, they asked partic-
ipants to perform some banking tasks and presented them with increasingly alarming
cues that the connection was compromised. They gradually removed HTTPS indica-
tors, the participant’s authentication image and finally replaced the login page with a
warning page. Passive indicators were not effective in preventing users from logging
in to a phishing site – no participant refused to enter their password when the HTTPS
indicators were absent and only 8% did so when their chosen authentication image was
absent. However, when a security warning page replaced the login page 64% (8 out of
22) participants refused to enter their credentials.
In their study on phishing, Wu et al. [280] showed that participants could be
tricked into submitting personal information 34% of the time. Instructing them to
focus on the toolbars in the browser did not make much difference since participants
reported assessing the legitimacy of the website by how it looked and felt. That is, the
locus of attention and the users’ strongest signal was the page itself, not the chrome
surrounding it. Participants appeared to be immersed in what they were doing; 45% of
them stressed they did not pay attention to the toolbar because they wanted to finish
their task. The authors conducted a follow-up study and demonstrated that pop-up
warnings that interrupted users were far more effective than passive warnings shown
in the toolbar. These pop-ups were not only active, but they were also displayed over
the webpage, that is in the area of the screen participants were already focusing on.
One weakness of the study is that due to implementation difficulty, participants did
not use their own details but these of a fictitious person called “John Smith”. It ques-
tions whether the results of the study have ecological validity since if participants are
not made to believe they are at risk, they might not behave in a natural way and their
reactions might not be generalisable to the real world [69].
Whalen and Inkpen [275] studied users’ visual attention to security details using
eye-tracking. They instructed their participants to first “browse normally” and then
browse paying particular attention to security. The authors admitted that they might
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have failed to reproduce normal browsing behaviour since the data participants were
asked to enter was not their own. During this phase, participants did not pay atten-
tion to security indicators which can either mean that they ignore them during normal
browsing or that they ignored them in the study as it put them in an artificial situation.
In the second phase, when participants were asked to pay attention to security, the au-
thors found that the padlock icon was the indicator checked most often (11/16) and
seven participants who also checked the padlock, also looked if the website was us-
ing HTTPS. Interestingly, two participants looked for the padlock in the wrong corner
of the screen and the authors suggest the icon should not be located in the periphery
and browsers should standardise its position. The study also found that participants
stopped checking security indicators after having logged in as they felt secure after
having authenticated. Also, no participant checked certificate information to establish
if the connection was secure. It appears that participants either did not think some
security indicators were interactive or did not believe they would be able to interpret
the information they provide correctly. Research by Biddle et al. [29] confirmed this.
In a study with 40 participants, the authors evaluated the standard certificate informa-
tion provided by Internet Explorer 7 and their redesign of the way the information is
displayed. They found that the traditional design was more difficult to interpret for the
participants due to the use of technical language.
Egelman et al. [68] juxtaposed passive and active browser phishing warnings.
Their results corroborated findings from previous studies. Of those confronted with the
active warnings, 79% closed the phishing website but only 13% did so when the passive
warnings were used. The authors found that passive indicators were not significantly
different from not providing any warning at all.
In a large-scale field study of SSL warnings, Akhawe and Felt [8] used telemetry
to investigate user warning behaviour (e.g., click-through rates). They found that users
hardly every click on explanatory links and thus, it is important to provide users with
sufficient information in the main text of the warning.
Privacy indicators
There is a number of privacy indicators available. However, they rarely come from
the browser and are more often add-ons or plug-ins created by researchers or open
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source developers. Privacy indicators tend to be passive, for example the Privacy Bird5
changes the colour and the content of its speech bubble depending on whether the
website’s privacy policy matches the user’s set privacy preferences.
There are also privacy indicators around cookies, the most popular of them is
Ghostery6. Ghostery displays a list of companies that are tracking the user when they
are visiting a particular website. This browser add-on provides the user with informa-
tion on the type of data being collected and offers the option to block certain cookies.
A purple bubble with a list of trackers in the top right corner of the screen, Ghostery
is a passive privacy indicator. Leon et al. [155] tested nine tools that were designed to
help users limit online behavioural advertising, one of which was Ghostery. The re-
searchers found that participants struggled to use the tools effectively due to confusing
interfaces, poor feedback and the use of technical jargon.
Strictly active privacy warnings have not been examined so far. There has been
little research on privacy warnings altogether. LaRose and Rifon [153] used the term
“privacy warning” but under closer examination this warning was not an active privacy
indicator since it did not respond to the users’ actions. For example, active security
warnings are triggered if a user attempts to download a file. Thus, it should be rather
considered a different way of displaying a privacy policy rather than a warning.
In summary, there is a paucity of empirical investigations into privacy indica-
tors. In particular, it remains under-explored whether the passive vs. active dichotomy
would also hold for privacy as it does for security. Although both warnings are aimed at
the threats arising from cyberspace interactions, one fundamental difference between
privacy and security warnings is the spectrum or duality of intended outcomes. Where
there is a universal agreement that more security is better, privacy indicators must cater
for diverse privacy preferences as individuals do not unanimously prefer revealing less
about themselves. Another important lesson from existing research is that passive in-
dicators tend to be overlooked; therefore, a way to calibrate the design of an indicator
could be by testing it in an active form so that participants have to act on it. Finally,
the summarised studies emphasised the importance of using clear language in the text
of indicators. If technical jargon is used, users will not be able to understand them and
take an informed decision.
5http://www.privacybird.org/
6https://www.ghostery.com/
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2.6 Conclusions for this doctoral research
The literature review has emphasised that effort is a basic driver of human behaviour
as humans aim to minimise how much time, cognitive and physical work they invest
to accomplish a goal. The reviewed psychological theories discussed the factors that
impact individuals’ readiness to adopt a certain behaviour. While the early theories
stressed that stronger intent would results in more willingness to expend effort, sub-
sequent theories tend to be more nuanced. They emphasise individual appreciation of
the threat and its impact (severity, susceptibility), and mention expected results and
self-efficacy as important factors. Effort is described as a cost which might act as a
barrier preventing an individual from taking an action.
Current research into usable security and privacy lacks a holistic approach to
studying the user perspective. It often fails to consider the fit between security and
privacy tasks and users’ every-day online activities. Little research has been conducted
that would examine the role effort plays in users’ security and privacy behaviours on-
line. This doctoral research aims to address this research gap. For security, it focuses
on authentication as it is the most common security ‘task’ that users encounter. Studies
so far have only taken a very reductive view of effort treating it as user performance
asking: “Can the user authenticate or verify using the mechanism?” They have failed
to take a holistic and realistic approach to how authentication/verification effort inter-
acts with the primary task and how it changes the ways in which users go about their
activities in the long run. The studies described in Chapter 4 will examine the user ex-
perience of authentication post-adoption and Chapter 5 will evaluate the effort needed
to use proposed authentication and verification mechanisms considering context of use.
For privacy, this doctoral research focuses on information disclosure as an exam-
ple of where users explicitly share information over the Internet. Existing literature has
identified a range of factors that influence how much users disclose online but effort
has only received limited attention. Privacy might have more tangible rewards than
security (discount today vs. maybe nothing bad will happen) and it might be the case
that monetary incentives and other motivations outweigh the effort the user needs to
expend. These hypotheses are tested in Section 6.2. To help enable informed disclo-
sure, active privacy indicators are evaluated in a follow-up experiment presented in
Section 6.3.

Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter outlines the methods chosen to conduct the research in this dissertation.
First, it classifies and discusses the different ways in which security and privacy mech-
anisms have been evaluated. Second, the methodology chosen for the studies in this
dissertation is described and justified. Third, the chapter discusses the concept of ef-
fort, the ways in which it can be assessed and concludes by elaborating on how effort
will be examined in this dissertation.
3.1 Research methods in usable security and privacy
Research methods can be divided into qualitative and quantitative ones. Qualitative
research methods focus on interpreting meaning, in-depth exploration and constructing
a rich picture [47]. A typical qualitative research method is interviewing where a
researcher asks a participant questions and engages with their responses to elicit their
perspective. Quantitative research methods investigate observable phenomena with
the use of statistical and mathematical methods [47]. A typical example of quantitative
methods are surveys with closed-ended questions and actual logs of user behaviours.
3.1.1 Evaluating mechanisms
When creating a usable security or privacy mechanism, user involvement is necessary
at each stage of the development cycle [96, 179]. This should range from requirements
gathering in the beginning to evaluating the mechanisms after deployment in order to
gather user feedback and learn about experiences of adoption. Evaluation methods
of designs, prototypes and functional mechanisms can be divided into two groups:
analytical and empirical.
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Analytical methods
In analytical assessment methods, an evaluator inspects a design and assesses usability
based on a set of rules and techniques. The classic methods are the heuristic evaluation
and the cognitive walkthrough [159]. An advantage of analytical methods is that they
can be applied quickly and on a low budget. A disadvantage is that no real users are
involved and methods such as GOMS explained below only approximate the use of a
system as a best case scenario.
GOMS (Goals, Operators, Methods and Selection rules) and KLM (Keystroke-
level Modelling) [49] decompose the interaction between a human and a computer to
basic physical and cognitive actions – such as recalling a password (GOMS) or click-
ing a button (KLM). Once a given task has been decomposed into steps, standard times
a practised user needs to complete each step are assigned. A GOMS-KLM analysis is
traditionally done as a paper-and-pencil analysis, but it can also be carried out auto-
matically using tools such as CogTool 1. CogTool takes screenshots of interfaces and a
specified path through them as input to produce an estimate for task time. The timings
that are assigned to actions are based on KLM but some real timings are calculated
based on for example, the distance to an object and size of the target according to
Fitts’ Law [80].
Empirical methods
When using empirical assessment methods, various measurements are taken while ac-
tual users interact with interfaces and complete tasks. Empirical user studies of authen-
tication mechanisms can be divided into studies conducted in a laboratory and studies
done in the wild.
Lab-based evaluations are currently the most common way of evaluating pro-
posed mechanisms. User evaluations are often conducted by the developers of tech-
nologies themselves. For example, Fujita et al. [84] developed and evaluated a verifi-
cation mechanism called Chimera CAPTCHA which asks users to recognise merged
objects. The study consisted of participants completing CAPTCHAs and then answer-
ing questions about their experience. The study seemingly assesses user experience
but is in fact just focused on user performance aiming to answer to question: “Can
the user successfully prove they are human?” As many other studies in the field, it
1http://cogtool.com/
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fails to ask questions around the acceptability of effort, the mechanism’s suitability to
various primary tasks and user preparedness to adopt it. The study suffers from fur-
ther methodological shortcomings as it is based on biased questions. Participants were
confronted with leading questions such as “Is it easy solving the CAPTCHA?” and “If
you choose 1 or 2 in Question 1, please write why you think that it is not.” (p. 54).
This is an example of biasing framing where the participant might choose a score of at
least 3 in order not to have to explain why they did not find the CAPTCHA easy. The
question also suggests the researchers are not interested in what made the CAPTCHA
easy for the participant. The effort considered here is perceived in terms of “being
easy” rather than eliciting what makes it easy or difficult. Also, no primary task is
given to the participants making them know exactly that their performance solving
CAPTCHAs is evaluated. The CAPTCHA is assessed in isolation as there is no elicita-
tion around the acceptability of the mechanism or how the effort required would impact
a primary task. Similarly, in an evaluation of video-based CAPTCHAs, Kluever and
Zanibbi [136] asked their participants: “Which task do you enjoy completing more?”
(p. 6) suggesting CAPTCHAs are there to be enjoyed. These examples illustrate a
wider phenomenon that asking users about their experience has failed to be balanced.
For example, asking open-ended questions enables learning about the user perspective
rather than just obtaining a confirmation of the results that the researchers are hoping
for.
Studies in the wild (or field studies) take place outside a research lab in the real
world and are thus considered to be a more realistic way of assessing mechanisms.
Studies in the wild often require the development of sophisticated methods of data
capture and/or the cooperation from service providers. Studies in the field can both
assess user reactions to currently deployed mechanisms as done by Felt et al. [8] for
browser warnings and they can also be used to assess the impact different proposed
designs might have on users [74]. In terms of capturing effort, studies in the wild
can offer data on timing, reactions and for authentication, statistics on successes and
failures to log in. There have been attempts to monitor and log authentication events
directly without user involvement [81], to avoid a bias introduced in for example au-
thentication diaries. Log data can be taken from the authentication server or data can
be collected in the user’s browser directly. An example of an analysis of data from an
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authentication server is Bonneau’s analysis of Yahoo passwords [33] or more recently
an analysis of password resets at a university by Parkin et al. [181]. To assess the over-
all authentication effort of individual users, their authentication events were logged in
their browser in a study by Floreˆncio and Herley [81]. Based on an idea by the au-
thor of this dissertation, Nikolai Vorkinn developed an ethical password monitoring
browser extension for Google Chrome as part of his MEng project in 2014-15 [263].
Future research plans are to create similar extensions to be able to collect passwords
and PINs on different devices and platforms users authenticate to (e.g., phones, service
terminals).
However, a major disadvantage of studies in the wild is that they rarely capture
the user perspective, for example participants’ explanation of what they thought had
happened. They also raise ethical issues as it is harder to obtain user consent and the
researcher is not there to provide reassurance in case of an emotional reaction. Thus,
studies analysing logs can be complemented by in-depth interviews with a smaller
subset of users to shed light on the their individual perspective and learn more about
the perceived effort [181].
An interesting alternative to self-reports and log data are diaries which aim to
address the shortcomings of both methods. In diary studies, participants are asked to
record events and experiences as they happen throughout their normal activities. Di-
aries are employed in research scenarios where it would be difficult for a researcher
to be present to make observations. They have the advantage that the time of capture
of event details is close to the event happening so there is less dependence on a par-
ticipant’s recall. However, this also brings a number of disadvantages in that diaries
might disrupt the natural flow of activities for the participant and they require time to
complete. In order to ensure reliability, participants might need training so that they
record events consistently [31]. As in the case of any self-reported data, the informa-
tion collected through diaries depends on participants’ accurate and truthful reporting.
Diaries also do not capture when a user had the intention to perform an action but gave
up on it [50].
Usable security research has used authentication diaries to understand authentica-
tion habits and usability issues. Inglesant and Sasse [122] introduced password diaries
to capture the details of authentication events happening ‘in the wild’ and found that
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frequent password changes were perceived as troublesome, that users did not change
passwords unless forced to, and that it was difficult for them to create memorable pass-
words adhering to the policy. Hayashi and Hong [107] also analysed two-week diaries
to derive the average number of passwords, frequency of use, recall strategies across
20 participants. Their participants recorded 1,500 events, with 8.6 online accounts per
person.
3.1.2 Self-reported data
Self-reports, for example in surveys and interviews, rely on participants’ recall and
their willingness to answer questions truthfully. The use of self-reported data is partic-
ularly difficult for exploring sensitive topics [32]. Security and privacy can be regarded
as sensitive topics and users might avoid giving truthful answers because they want to
have control over the image of themselves they convey. The reason for this might be
the social desirability bias, demand characteristics but also the fact that not behaving
securely can be a breach of contract in a work environment.
The author’s own study [141] also showed that self-reports are hardly any indica-
tor of users’ actual behaviour. The study investigated users’ reaction to two security
warnings – one phrased vaguely and one more specifically mentioning what the con-
sequences of downloading a file could be. It was a between-subjects design with 120
participants randomly assigned to two groups: 60 participants were confronted with a
generic warning and the other 60 with a specific one. The study consisted of an ex-
periment, where participants’ actual reactions were recorded and an interview. During
the interview, each participant was shown a set of four warnings: one of them was the
one they were confronted with in the experiment, another one the other experimental
group was confronted with and the remaining two were distractors. For the warning
the other group was confronted with, participants were asked what their reaction would
have been if they had seen that warning in the experiment. For the specific warning,
47 (77%) participants who were not exposed to it in the experiment stated they would
not have downloaded the file. In the experiment, however, only 14 (23%) participants
in the specific warning condition refused to download the file (Table 3.1).
Interviews are an example of a research method for collecting self-reports. In the
field of usable security, interviews have been widely used to study employee security
behaviours in organisations (e.g., [220, 201, 30]). In this context, interviews can be
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Download Refusal Total
Observed reaction 46 14 60
Hypothetical reaction 13 47 60
Table 3.1: Hypothetical and observed reactions to a specific security warning demonstrated in
a study by Krol et al. [141].
used as a diagnostic tool and the identified themes can help form a basis for more
quantitative studies such as a company-wide survey [19]. Interviews, often combined
with a debrief, can also be used to shed more light on participants’ reactions in an
experiment [141].
Surveys have many merits, they enable the researcher to reach a high sample size
and the wording of questions is kept consistent [154]. However, unless there is open-
ended questions (which actually produces qualitative data), the researcher can only find
as much as they asked for and respondents can only fit their answers into pre-defined
categories.
Despite all this, surveys and survey-like studies continue to be used for research
on users’ security and privacy choices. For that reason, it does not come as a surprise
that many studies appear to have provided exaggerated and sensationalist results. In a
UPI survey, 93% of users reported having concerns about the privacy of their health
records [257]. In a different study, 70% of users were found to be worried about
online tracking [254]. The bias is obvious when compared to real data. In a study
by Metzger [166], 33% of participants reported having seen the privacy policy but
actually only 18.6% clicked on the link to see it. Those who lied about having seen
the privacy policy had significantly more Internet experience. Similarly, a study by
Microsoft [167] asked “technologies elites” if they read privacy policies. Although
more than three quarters indicated that they read privacy policies before accepting
them, the actual logs showed that the number of users who read them was significantly
smaller.
For at least a decade, research has thrived where privacy choices were only simu-
lated and participants were presented with scenarios asking of them to make hypothet-
ical privacy choices. Ward et al. [266] asked their participants how happy they would
be about a membership in a bookstore where customers would receive discounts for
providing personal information. Wathieu and Friedman [269] asked participants to
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imagine an alumni association shared their personal information with a car insurance
company for a 30% discount. Castan˜eda and Montoro [51] made an attempt at recre-
ating a real-world experience by showing participants a mock-up of a website asking
about their willingness to make a purchase from that site. A different take on this are
studies where participants are presented with a number of scenarios and asked to rank
them in order of preference [105, 104]. There appear to be very few studies that ex-
plore users’ privacy choices through a real exchange [252, 25]. The experiment by Tsai
et al. [252]; however, was relatively coercive and did not leave participants the option
not to purchase anything and participants were obliged to buy a number of products.
Participants were also allowed to provide a fake shipping address which limits how
real the experience must have felt to them.
Surveys and studies examining users’ hypothetical choices have also been erro-
neously described as experiments. For example, Modic and Anderson [170] set to
study the effectiveness of a range of different security warnings. However, they asked
participants how they would behave when seeing a warning rather than observing an
actual reaction.
Another important issue is priming which refers to exposing participants to some
information that might influence how they subsequently behave in the study [148]. If
participants suspect that the real purpose of the study is to learn about their security and
privacy behaviour, they might act unnaturally due to for example the social desirability
bias. Although this is common knowledge and the use of deception is widespread in
psychology and usable security and privacy [69], there are still studies where partici-
pants are told exactly what the researchers are interested in finding out [280]. This can
seriously affect findings as participants might not behave as they would in real life.
3.2 Chosen approaches
3.2.1 Data collection
In face of the shortcomings of research methods relying on self-reports, the author
of this dissertation chose a mixed research methods approach, recording both actual
behaviours and the ways in which users make sense of them. The best approach is
always to triangulate research methods and all studies in this dissertation collect both
quantitative and qualitative data [64]. Another important goal of this research is to take
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a holistic view of effort not only assessing if a security or privacy task is doable but if
users find the effort appropriate and how it interacts with actual primary tasks.
The studies in this dissertation use experiments to capture participants’ reactions
when confronted with a stimulus. There are three experiments conducted here, the
first one captures participants’ interactions with verification mechanisms (Section 5.3)
and the other two focus on participants’ disclosure behaviours (Chapter 6). Interviews
are used in four studies in this dissertation to shed more light on the quantitative data
that was collected but never as a stand-alone method. In disclosure studies that were
conducted remotely on Amazon Mechanical Turk, free-text responses in the feedback
questionnaire after the experiment serve a similar purpose as interviews.
3.2.2 Analysis of qualitative data
While this work applies standard statistical tests to analyse quantitative data, there is
a number of ways to analyse qualitative data. Grounded Theory [244] is an estab-
lished method for analysing interview data in the social sciences. It has been applied
to research in usable security and privacy (e.g., [3, 243, 183]). Grounded Theory is
appropriate for studies where the researcher explores an uncharted territory and con-
structs a theory. The research in this dissertation, however, aims to gather evidence
based on lessons from existing research and the themes it identified. It is confirmatory
in nature and driven by hypotheses. Therefore, thematic analysis was chosen as a more
appropriate method to analyse the qualitative data in this dissertation. As described by
Braun and Clark [41], thematic analysis identifies themes in the data that relate to the
research question at hand. The researcher analyses the data by applying codes to the
transcripts and then aggregates these codes to create themes.
3.3 Assessing effort
For the purpose of this research, the author distinguishes between three ways of con-
sidering effort. (1) Actual effort is the type of effort that can ideally be objectively
measured. Since cognitive and physical effort are difficult to measure, actual effort is
easiest to capture in terms of time elapsed. (2) Users can also be asked about their per-
ceptions of effort. Perceived effort can be prospective and retrospective, depending on
if users are asked about their expectations of the amount of effort before a task or their
perception of effort after the task. In both cases, it is a subjective assessment of how
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much performing a task is going to or had cost the user. Like actual effort, perceived
effort is difficult to measure reliably. The assessment of effort is often an unconscious
process and asking participants for their assessment might distort the picture due to
cognitive mediation. (3) Effort can be modelled. Modelling using HCI techniques,
such as GOMS-KLM described in Section 3.1.1, can be used to establish a baseline
for how long a task would take.
3.3.1 Subjective measurement of effort
Subjective effort assessment focuses on asking the participant to rate the effort as they
perceive it. Proposed measurements include Eilers et al.’s [70] SEA-Skala and Reid
and Nygren’s SWAT which assesses mental workload [199] by treating it as a multidi-
mensional construct that is composed of three factors: time load, mental effort load and
psychological stress load. Vidulich [262] used judgment matrices for workload assess-
ment developing the SWORD technique. However, the most widely used technique
has been NASA Task Load Index (TLX), created by Hart and Staveland [106]. When
using NASA TLX, the user is asked to indicate the workload involved in completing
a task on six sub-scales: Mental Demand, Physical Demand, Temporal Demand, Per-
formance, Effort and Frustration. Participants are asked to indicate the level of work-
load for each dimension on a graphical scale with 100 points. Then they are asked to
make 15 pairwise comparisons of the six dimensions indicating which one of the two
aspects was more important to their perception of workload. NASA TLX has been pre-
viously used for assessing the workload involved in completing security-related tasks
(e.g., [202, 188, 181]).
3.3.2 Objective measurement of effort
In order to avoid cognitive mediation, physiological measurements have been em-
ployed to capture stress as a proxy for effort. Common indicators of stress are galvanic
skin response, heart rate and blood volume pulse [277]. Eye-tracking has been shown
to be a good indicator of people’s attention shifts [259] and pupil dilation can be treated
as an indicator of cognitive workload [187]. Physiological measurements have the dis-
advantage that the researchers cannot be sure what caused stress as it can be induced
by other factors than the ones studied. This problem is even more salient for security
and privacy which are secondary tasks. Taking physiological measurements of stress
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also requires the participant to wear specialist measuring equipment which might make
the interactions feel unnatural yielding less ecologically valid results. Thus, the studies
in this dissertation focus on the time elapsed as it is both an indicator of effort and of
the interruption to the primary task. NASA TLX is used to complement it and capture
the different aspects of workload including cognitive and physical demand as well as
frustration.
Chapter 4
Authentication diary studies
4.1 Overview
This dissertation investigates the role of effort in users’ security and privacy behaviours
online. The two studies described in this chapter examine user behaviours in relation
to managing their authentication effort. As the first studies of the dissertation, they aim
to diagnose the struggles users are facing and learn how to better design processes and
mechanisms to reduce the effort required.
The first study aims to understand how authentication fits into employees’ day at
a governmental organisation in the US. Employees of that organisation were asked to
keep an authentication diary of all their logins over the period of 24 hours and were
later interviewed about their experience. There was a discrepancy between actual and
perceived effort with some logins being habitual while others disruptive and poorly
integrated into work processes. Interviews painted a picture of authentication fatigue
caused by significant authentication effort that affected productivity and employee sat-
isfaction. This section identifies participants’ coping strategies and proposes a tax-
onomy of the ways in which employees seek to reduce the workload and disruption
created by authentication.
The second study examines the user experience of two-factor authentication (2FA)
for online banking in the UK. A three-stage study with two interviews and a period of
diary-keeping showed that, on the one hand, participants appreciated the convenience
of online banking but on the other hand, they found the use of 2FA tokens to be effortful
and frustrating. Also here participants reported on a range of coping strategies that
helped them manage their authentication effort and the taxonomy of coping strategies
developed for the first study was applied to categorise them. The high authentication
effort led to disengagement as participants started using a particular account less often
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or switched to a different bank entirely. In both studies, participants expressed doubts
if the level of security and the ensuing authentication effort was justified for the level
of risk they were facing.
4.2 Authentication in an organisation
4.2.1 Study aims
The main aim of the study was to examine employees’ overall authentication effort
in an organisational context. Security mechanisms have often been studied in an iso-
lated laboratory setting and they received a stamp of approval deeming them usable
and the effort required manageable. The study presented in this section examined the
authentication effort from the point of view of users rather than from the point of view
of technology. The study also had the goal of assessing mechanisms and processes
post-adoption, to see how users had appropriated mechanisms and devices in real-life
conditions. Further, the studies thematised the relationship between the effort required
by authentication and the primary task.
4.2.2 Method
Design
The study consisted of two stages, participants were asked to complete (1) diaries log-
ging all their authentication events over the period of 24 hours and (2) were later asked
to share their experiences of authentication and security in an hour-long interview.
Participants
Participants were recruited through a call for volunteers throughout the organisation
using email. Of the 25 employees who responded, 23 (14 male and 9 female) provided
their authentication diary data at the time requested and it was possible to interview
22 of them. Age of participants was: 20s (3), 30s (5), 40s (3) and 50+ (11). All
participants were knowledge workers, 13 were researchers with a computer science
related education or job. Three were researchers without a background in computer
science (but in physics, cognitive science etc.). Two were IT systems administrators.
The remaining two participants were administrative support staff.
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Materials
Quantitative data in the study was collected through diary forms. A page from the
authentication diary is shown in Appendix A. The layout and form fields were based on
a previous diary study by Inglesant and Sasse [122] and also NIST employees provided
their input to adjust it.
Procedure
In the first stage of the study, participants were asked to keep an authentication diary
for the duration of 24 hours in July 2011, all of them on the same day. Participants
received their form sheets in a briefing session before the diary day. In the second
stage of the study, each participant was interviewed within a month of the diary day.
The diary data served as a point of departure for the interview which explored the
participant’s individual perspective on authentication and security in general.
4.2.3 Diary results
In total, 23 participants recorded 528 authentication events during the 24-hour collec-
tion period. On average, they authenticated 23 times during that day (range: 4–40).
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Figure 4.1: Frequencies of types of credentials required for authentication.
Figure 4.1 shows the types of credentials required for authentication. The most
common credentials used to log in were passwords (47%) and usernames (33%). Pass-
words and usernames are almost always required together; however, the percentages
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for both are not equal since in some cases usernames were already entered for the user
(e.g., on lock-screens because of previous login). PINs (8%) and badges/PIV cards
(6%) were the next common credentials used across the authentication events. PIV
(Personal Identity Verification) cards are normally inserted to the computer to authen-
ticate using a PIN. At the time of the study, all employees at the organisation had a PIV
card with an associated 6-8 digit PIN. They can be used to log in in the same way as a
username and password.
Out of the total of 528 events, participants experienced authentication problems
in the case of 48 (9.1%). The most frequent sources of problems were mistyped (24
occurrences, 50%) and wrong passwords (7, 14.6%).
Of the 528 events reported in the study, 168 (31.8%) involved the use of some
memory aid. From the point of effort (cognitive, physical or both), the memory aids
can be divided into three groups:
1. Passwords are stored for the user.
(a) passwords are entered for the user (no physical entry required and no mental
effort of password recall): when stored in the client (e.g., in the browser, 13
mentions) or in a password manager (2 mentions);
(b) passwords have to be entered by the user but are stored either on paper (11) or
in a file (4) (physical entry required but no password recall).
2. Users create passwords to be memorable (physical effort required but mental effort
reduced), when
(a) a portion of a password stays the same as the previous one (1) or
(b) passwords are based on a memorable phrase (e.g., song lyrics) (1).
3. Password entry is replaced with a biometric fingerprint scan (4) (mental effort re-
moved and physical effort significantly reduced).
4.2.4 Interview results
The interview transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis [41]. The following
sections present the themes that emerged.
4.2. Authentication in an organisation 61
Areas of high effort
The analysis of the interviews showed that there were eight aspects of authentication
that required increased effort from participants which often led to frustration.
Frequent re-authentication. Participants reported struggling with re-authentication
after a time-out. The computers in the organisation are set to lock after 15 minutes
of inactivity to limit the window of opportunity for an attacker to exploit an unlocked
machine while the employee is away. P21 emphasised this was unnecessarily causing
stress: “You end up having to almost set a timer in your head to go back to the com-
puter and type something within every 10 minutes or so. And some minor studies of
productivity I’ve been involved with indicate that it’s better to be focused on a task as
opposed to have lots of interruptions throughout the day.”
Infrequently used passwords. Participants reported having problems recalling pass-
words they used rarely: “You have to think if you are going to be the responsible
person, then you have to think of different passwords for everything and it is very
frustrating. So when it gets to those infrequently used passwords, then I get really ir-
ritated.” (P11). P17 stressed: “Once again security has gotten in my way and it takes
me extra time because now I got to look that one up because I don’t use that one often
enough.”
Multiple passwords, their length and complexity. Participants reported struggling
with password creation due to different requirements for each system. P19 explained:
“It can be a pain. And when I’m here, everything I log into, the password policy is
completely different. So even if I wanted to, the password can’t be the same. Some of
them have to be eight characters, some of them have to be 12. So it can’t be anything
more than 12. So some passwords I have are 20 characters, some are 6. And it’s just
hard to remember everything, so I actually load a file on my computer that just has
every password listed so I can just copy and paste it.”
Different password expiry intervals. Apart from different password change intervals,
another obstacle to keeping one’s passwords synchronised across applications is that
some passwords expire at different intervals. To address both issues, many participants
who synchronised passwords to some degree also used the complementary strategy of
updating all their passwords at once.
Interruption of workflow. A number of participants emphasised the disruptive effect
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Figure 4.2: The wall of disruption authentication created (drawing by Dana Chisnell [242]).
authentication had on their work, they felt it had a negative effect on their productivity:
“And it gets in the way. It definitely takes way more time out of my day, both just time
having to deal with this and then the break in the flow of work.” (P19) Any authenti-
cation task that requires time and effort creates a “wall of disruption” (Fig. 4.2) that
affects productivity.
Similarly, it is evident from the analysis of diaries that most authentication events
occurred around 9am, that is at the start of the working day, with another peak in
authentication when participants came back from lunch after 2pm. P17 emphasised
how waiting at the gate to be checked by the guard was annoying because they could
not wait to start their working day: “It was annoying [. . . ] You’ve got to wind your
way into the building, because, in some way shape or form, we are in a secure building,
although there’s nothing secure about it, other than the fact that you’ve got this card
reader sitting out there.” Authentication and in general security was again a hurdle and
participants used the time when they were highly productive to comply with security
protocol that they believed to be unjustifiably strict.
Problems with tokens. Participants reported struggling with the usability of tokens.
They found the two-factor authentication device – the RSA token – hard to use because
(i) the display showing the six-digit code was too small and (ii) the change of number
every 60 seconds was making the reading and entering of digits a cumbersome task.
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At the organisation, RSA tokens are necessary for accessing the VPN (Virtual Private
Network) from outside the campus. To authenticate, the user has to enter their user-
name, PIN and a six-digit code given by the token, then their username and password.
There is a problem of the system needing a few seconds to process the credentials at
both stages and if the code expires before this is completed, the user has to start the
authentication process again. P21 pointed several drawbacks of the RSA token when
it comes to its physical usability: “These are very low-resolution. You have to have
bright light. It’s frequently misread. [. . . ] If you make a simple mistake, which it is
easy to do. Sevens can easily be ones. Sometimes twos look like eights. If you make
a mistake, then of course you’ve got to re-enter [. . . ] There aren’t clear signs on it to
indicate which way it ought to be held and viewed. It looks like it’s intended more to
be held with your left hand than right.” P12 also found their token was out-of-sync
and they sometimes needed up to three attempts to log in.
PIV cards posed some challenges to the participants. Only a relatively small num-
ber of participants used them on a regular basis, in part because they do not have the
card reader and middleware or operating system. Apart from authenticating to com-
puters, the card is also used to open doors, and P19 reported often leaving the card
in the computer, exiting the room and then being locked out: “So I would forget this
every single time. And I’ve been locked out of the building. I’ve been locked out of
the floor. I’ve been reprimanded for leaving this in the computer. And there’s nothing
I could have done other than somehow setting reminders every two minutes to don’t
forget this.”
Lack of integration. Four employees reported using a biometric fingerprint reader for
some logins. One of the participants had physical usability problems with it since they
needed to use a moisturiser to make their prints readable: “This is worse, because it
works by a biometric, and my finger doesn’t read very well. I have to smear it with
moisturizer, and then I forget what the actual password is. When it really just won’t
read my finger, I can’t unlock it and I can’t remember.” (P2). And in this organisa-
tion, the underlying infrastructure and policies had not been adjusted – the underlying
password – which users avoid by using the fingerprint reader – expires every 90 days.
When this happens, the user has to find their current password (often written on a piece
of paper kept in the drawer), change the old password, write the new one down, and
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enrol their fingerprint. This illustrates how the usability of authentication cannot be
assured by simply replacing the ‘front-end’ but keeping the underlying policies and
infrastructure the same.
Inadequate level of security. Throughout the interviews, there was a recurrent theme
of employees thinking the level of security in the organisation was too high for the type
of work that they were doing, P19 emphasised: “If you’re working for the CIA or a
hospital with patient records, maybe I could understand that. [. . . ] Nothing we do is
sensitive. Everything is public, so they can get it anyways. It doesn’t make any sense.”
P21 felt they were being punished because of high-profile security breaches: “Some
of the security requirements on laptops especially, especially when traveling – resulted
more from, I think, higher level screw-ups, people in upper level management having
their systems being broken into.”
P3 emphasised that the organisation’s approach to security has failed to consider
the user perspective: “I think that authentication effectiveness, the burden is placed on
the user. And that I think is an issue, because providers just say, well, we need a secure
wall, and they set it up. But I don’t think they’re doing usability studies before they
do it.”
Perceived effort
Participants frequently addressed the effort required to authenticate. Some anticipated
beforehand that the authentication effort would be greater than it actually was while
others stressed that the experience of keeping a diary made them aware of the effort
they had backgrounded due to habit and automation of the authentication process.
Foregrounding authentication. In the briefing meetings before data collection, some
participants requested more diary forms as they were expecting to authenticate more
often than the 40 events a standard set of forms could hold. After the diary day in the
interviews, participants were asked what the biggest surprise about their experience
was and seven out of 22 stated that they actually authenticated fewer times than they
had expected beforehand.
In the interviews, P3 complained about how the use of RSA tokens was making
authentication noticeable and disruptive: “So actually taking the time away from the
computer, I walk to get my bag. Someone else stops me in the hallway. I have a
conversation with them. Then soon I go back and I remember to login, but I’m like,
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“Oh.” The strong idea I had in my head of a message that I wanted to send might
have become a little more fuzzy, the idea of what I was doing. “Why did I open that
other new tab and not go to the. . . ?” So there’s the little things. I feel like those little
things really, when you have an idea of what you want to do next and then you have to
deviate from that, I think at least for my brain it throws you off a little bit.” Similarly,
P3 stated: “It’s that deliberate effortful, conscious. . . I˜ really have to stop what I’m
doing and think about it. Whereas if you’re just doing something from muscle memory,
you don’t really even have to think about that.”
Backgrounding authentication. There were seven participants (32%) who empha-
sised how some logins were so second nature to them that they hardly noticed authen-
ticating. This is an indication of habituation. Participants stressed that the passwords
for some systems are in their muscle memory and they do not have to focus to recall
and enter them.
Six participants stated that having to record their authentication events actually
made them aware of how frequently they log in without realising, P11 stated: “I was
actually quite surprised by the number of times that I authenticated. I did not realize
until I was asked to explicitly record and pay attention to these things that I was doing
it so frequently. And if it’s a password or whatever that I am very familiar with and
very comfortable with, I just don’t even think about it. I always get it right.”
Coping strategies
In the interviews, participants reported on numerous strategies for coping with unman-
ageable authentication effort. Figure 4.3 illustrates the stages leading to the emergence
of coping strategies. Starting from the top of the graph, the entry of credentials it-
self causes disruption which is even greater if credentials are mistyped or forgotten.
This affects the primary task leading employees to create coping strategies which are
workarounds that aim to keep the authentication effort at a manageable level. The cop-
ing strategies can be divided into two categories: participants either tried to manage
and be in control of their authentication effort, or to avoid authenticating, temporarily
or permanently.
Management: Trying to stay efficient
Centralising. Most participants attempted to reduce their authentication effort by
employing password managers or synchronising passwords across multiple systems:
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Figure 4.3: The emergence of coping strategies.
“centralizing it and creating the strongest password for centrally possible has been my
tactic. Try to get it all in one bucket.” (P3) Most had no awareness of the potential risks
of doing so, others were aware but felt they had no choice – it was this, or constantly
floundering when a password was needed. Another strategy was to employ a password
manager (such as LastPass or KeyPass).
Proactive authentication. Participants also reported planning ahead and authenticat-
ing in advance if they expected a message or file they needed for their work, so they
could access it without being delayed by authentication.
Avoidance: Deferring or removing authentication effort
Two types of avoidance behaviours were identified: employees either temporarily
avoided authentication deferring it to when it was more convenient or they removed
the need to authenticate more permanently.
Temporary avoidance
Preventing log-out. Participants reported reducing the frequency of authentication by
preventing a logout. Often, they kept the screen active by moving their mouse.
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Logging in less frequently. Participants also mentioned that they would turn around
their email faster if it were not for the authentication burden. They reported that they
particularly reduced the frequency with which they logged in remotely (e.g., from
home), because this required additional security steps and the use of an RSA token.
Permanent avoidance
Giving up on devices. A number of participants reported that they coped with authen-
tication by limiting the number of devices they authenticate to; P19 stated: “If I had a
laptop I would have to log in twice, once when you turn it on because the hard drive’s
encrypted, and then again to actually get into Windows or the operating system. [. . . ]
So I never wanted an agency laptop for that reason. I don’t want to have to log in more
times than I need to. That goes to the whole password security policy that we have
here, is everything that leaves the agency has to be encrypted.” Those participants
who refused to have an agency laptop were then incommunicado during business trips,
meaning colleagues had to wait several days for responses required to complete their
own work.
4.2.5 Discussion
One of the main lessons from this study is that not all logins are the same. With fre-
quent logins, participants often reported having their passwords in their muscle mem-
ory. For more infrequent logins, they stated that having to recall or look up up their
password was disruptive and they often developed coping strategies to reduce this dis-
ruption to their work. There were mentions of authentication affecting productivity as
cumbersome login procedures prevented participants from logging in off-site and after
hours. Participants also expressed frustration with logins they perceived as unneces-
sary or unjustifiably cumbersome for the level of security that they felt the organisation
needed. High authentication effort led participants to develop coping strategies which
helped them keep authentication at a manageable level and permit it at times when
it was least disruptive. Participants shared their vision of a future workplace where
authentication is implicit and thus well integrated into the work processes.
Perceptions of effort
The results of the study show a high level of frustration with authentication. The
majority of participants estimated that they logged in more often than they actually
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did. This might be an indication that they perceived authentication as a burden and a
nuisance. Clifford Nass, from Stanford, an expert on multitasking and task switching
commented on this finding saying: “I suspect that unlike multitasking, in which the
task switching is voluntary and hence people have an incentive to downplay the costs,
authentication is not voluntary, thereby making people aware of the cognitive cost.”
(Personal communication, October 2011). Other research confirms that task-switching
has a ‘ripple effect’ on focus, concentration and efficacy – not only on the next task,
but any task for the next 20 to 30 minutes (e.g., [171]).
The frustration over the disruptive effect of authentication could be attributed to
the Zeigarnik effect [283] which states that humans are more likely to remember tasks
that were interrupted and left unfinished. Research has shown that the lack of closure
that stems from an interrupted and unfinished primary task can promote some contin-
ued task-related cognitive effort which might impact the secondary task of recalling a
password [228].
Participants also thought that the amount of effort expected of them was unjusti-
fied for the level of risk they felt they were facing. They struggled with infrequently
used passwords where similar problems have been documented in previous research.
In a study conducted in the context of two organisations, Adams and Sasse [3] recom-
mended that infrequently used passwords should be changed less frequently. Despite
the study being over 16 years old, it appears little has changed in systems design to
incorporate this suggestion.
Quantifying workload
Participants in the study developed a range of coping strategies to consolidate the ef-
fort associated with security, and minimise disruption of the primary tasks. To under-
stand the workload they faced, the researcher conducted an analytical assessment of the
workload certain authentication events would pose using the GOMS-KLM modelling
technique. GOMS-KLM and CogTool were used to calculate how long authentication
tasks would take (for examples, see Appendix A). Authentication with the username
and policy-compliant password would take around 10 seconds. Using LastPass reduces
this time to around 4 seconds. This number may not appear to be a huge time saving,
but using LastPass posed significantly less of a disruption to the primary task – which
means the cost associated with re-starting the primary task was significantly lower.
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Participants said they preferred to keep a piece of paper with the password written
on, even if it took several minutes to locate, rather than try to recall their password.
This shows a fundamental truth from the field of HCI – users prefer extra physical to
extra cognitive effort [174]. In the specific case of authentication, authentication is a
hurdle dropped in the path of task completion. If the authentication task requires cog-
nitive resources, it can interfere with the cognitive effort of the primary task. Several
participants reported having authenticated, only to find they could not recall what they
wanted to do – and needing significant time to backtrack in the task and resume work.
A GOMS-KLM prediction shows the password manager minimises disruption caused
by password recall and entry. A study by Trewin et al. [251] shows how participants
were more likely to remember primary task-related information if the authentication
task uses less cognitive resources.
The impact of authentication effort
Coping strategies. The study uncovered a range of coping strategies which can be
divided into two categories: facing and avoiding authentication. These two main cate-
gories reflect the adaptive and maladaptive coping strategies in the protection motiva-
tion theory [208].
The transition when participants abandon an adaptive coping strategy and opt for
a maladaptive one could also be framed in term of the compliance budget [20]. At
a certain point, employee willingness to expend effort reaches a limit and they start
avoiding tasks or technologies because of the associated authentication effort.
Productivity loss. Several participants said they had reduced the amount of addi-
tional work they did outside of regular office hours because of the authentication bur-
den. Staff avoided logging in or did so less frequently from home or when travelling:
“Things get put off until when it’s, ‘OK, I have a block of time. It’s worth it for me to
get the token, to log in and to sit there and do like an hour’s worth of work or half an
hour or something like that.” [. . . ] But if it’s for like fleeting little, ‘Oh, I have this
great idea’ or ‘I want to send this e-mail’ or something, then I’m more likely to put it
off until I have that sort of block of time where a log in is worth it. [. . . ] especially
if it’s something that wasn’t actually due. It’s after hours. You’ve already put in your
nine hours or however many hours you’re doing and then you think of something at
home, it definitely is less likely that you’re going to get online to actually do that thing
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that you’re thinking of. You’re just going to wait until the next day.” (P11) This can
make colleagues and customers wait for information or assistance, which in turn is
likely to hold up their work, and that great idea might have been forgotten by the next
time the participant logged in.
Previous studies have similarly shown how authentication can affect productivity.
Strouble et al. [245] who studied the Common Access Card (CaC) used at the US
Department of Defense (DoD), found that employees stopped checking emails from
home (due to the unavailability of card readers) and that many employees accidentally
left their card in the reader. The authors estimated that the DoD lost more than $10M
worth of time as a result of deploying the CAC. Similarly, a study by Inglesant and
Sasse [122] found that staff re-organised their work to minimise authentication effort.
The study presented here provides further examples of long-term consequences: some
participants reported returning devices or avoiding logins when working off-site.
Embarrassment. Participants expressed worry that their organisation’s security policy
would cause them embarrassment, P23 emphasised it could even undermine the secu-
rity of their accounts: “everybody around me gets to watch me type my 12-character
password in 15 times during the conference because it times out every 15 minutes. [. . . ]
somebody sitting next to me at the conference, by the end of the conference there’s a
good chance they can get in my computer easier than I can.” P17 described the fear of
being embarrassed in front of customers and peers: “I’d have 150 people waiting for
a presentation. I’m waiting for 15 minutes for that sucker to boot up, so I can actually
use it. Then, because I’m not admin and I can’t change any setting on that box, when
the screensaver kicks in, then I’ve got to log in all over again and reinitialize every-
thing and start my presentation all over again and figure out where I was in the 120
slides that I use and make my way there. All the time the audience is right? That’s a
combination of security and other miscellaneous things. But, like I said, it gets in the
way. You’re trying to do something, which should be straightforward, but you can’t.”
The fear of embarrassment caused by authentication has been mentioned in previ-
ous research. Beautement et al. [20] found that employees who were giving a presen-
tation off-site took a copy of their presentation slides on an unencrypted USB device
instead of an encrypted one because an encrypted one would require a password they
might forget.
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Limitations. The study was conducted in a US governmental organisation with em-
ployees who are knowledge workers and the findings might not be generalisable to
organisation doing different types of work. Although authentication diaries were used
to ground interviews in actual authentication events, the study relied on self-reports
which are subject to a number of biases such as selective memory, exaggeration, de-
mand characteristics etc.
4.3 Two-factor authentication in online banking
4.3.1 Background
This section summarises the 2FA landscape for online and mobile banking in the
United Kingdom. All information provided is as of August 2014 when the research
was conducted. The section contains an overview of authentication mechanisms for
login purposes, setting up a new payee and using mobile banking functionality for
11 UK banks the participants in the study used: Barclays, Co-operative, First Direct,
Halifax, HSBC Bank, Lloyds, Nationwide, NatWest, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS),
Santander and Ulster.
All 11 banks follow a two-step authentication process to log in to the online bank-
ing websites. In the first step, users provide an identifier and, only with Lloyds/Halifax,
one authentication factor. Then, if the first step is successful, they are asked to au-
thenticate by providing two authentication factors (one with Halifax and Lloyds). Ta-
ble B.1 (Appendix B) shows the different credentials needed to authenticate to accounts
for different UK banks.
During the identification step (i.e., entering username), banks usually provide
users with a ‘remember me’ option: if selected, users do not have to re-enter their
identifier when logging in from the same device and browser, unless they clear the
cookies. In the second step, some banks display to the user a previously selected pic-
ture and/or text, aiming to provide some visual confirmation that the user is not on a
phishing site.
Eight out of 11 banks rely on hardware tokens to generate the second authentica-
tion factor, giving a one-time password (OTPs). Some devices require the user to insert
their debit card and enter the card’s PIN (e.g., Barclay’s PINsentry or NatWest’s Card-
Reader), while with other devices (HSBC and First Direct’s Secure Key) users only
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(a) Secure Key
(HSBC)
(b) Card Reader
(NatWest)
(c) PINsentry
(Barclays)
(d) Mobile PIN-
sentry
(Barclays)
Figure 4.4: Examples of two-factor authentication technologies.
OTP Source Bank Label
Secure Key HSBC, First Direct SK
Card reader Barclays, Nationwide, NatWest, CR
RBS, Ulster
SMS Santander SMS
Mobile phone app Barclays, HSBC, First Direct M
Phone call Lloyds, Halifax P
Table 4.1: Technologies used to generate OTPs for different UK banks. The labels in the
rightmost column will be used next to participant numbers to indicate which tech-
nologies they were using.
need to enter a previously selected PIN. Figure 4.4 (a, b, c) presents three examples of
hardware tokens used by UK banks.
When setting up a new payment (e.g., to pay a bill or issue a money transfer to a
new payee), all banks require an additional authentication step (besides those needed
for login). Most banks require an OTP authenticating the specific transaction, amount,
and/or payee (depending on the bank). Table 4.1 provides a summary of the different
technologies used to generate OTPs across different banks.
All banks in the sample also support mobile banking, via smartphone apps (on
iPhone and Android), allowing their customers to check their balance and issue pay-
ments. Table B.2 shows the authentication login enforced by each bank’s application.
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4.3.2 Study aims
The main aim of the study was to learn about the user experience of two-factor au-
thentication (2FA) for UK online banking. This research examined it post-adoption to
establish how users had learned to manage the increased effort caused by the use of
2FA.
4.3.3 Method
Design
The study consisted of three stages: preliminary open-ended interviews, authentication
diaries and final follow-up interviews.
Participants
The research was advertised as a user study on online banking. Participants were
invited to take the pre-screening questionnaire using flyposting in the local area, social
media and the UCL Psychology Subject Pool1. The pre-screening asked for basic
demographic information (age, gender, level of education) and whether or not they
had previously used online banking and with which banks. Out of 66 individuals who
responded, 21 participants were selected as described below.
Sampling and participant demographics. In order to maximise the diversity of the
sample, potential participants were divided into five groups, one for each category
of OTP generator, that is: Secure Key, card reader, OTP delivered via SMS, OTP
generated by a smartphone app, and phone-based authentication. Within each category,
participants were selected to achieve an even split between genders and a variance of
ages.
The final sample consisted of 11 female and 10 male participants. Age of partic-
ipants was: under 20 (1), 20s (9), 30s (6), 40s (4), 50 (0) and 60s (1). Mean age was
32.4 (range: 19–69, SD = 10.87). Out of the 21 participants, 10 had a postgraduate
degree (a Masters or a PhD), seven an undergraduate degree, two had A-Levels, one
had some undergraduate education with no completed degree, and one participant had
completed vocational training. A total of five participants had an account with one
bank, 14 with two banks, and two with three banks. Also, eight were customers of
HSBC, six of Barclays, six of NatWest, five of Santander, four of Lloyds, three of Hal-
1https://uclpsychology.sona-systems.com/
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ifax, and two of RBS. First Direct, Nationwide, the Co-operative Bank, Ulster Bank,
and Citigroup all had one customer each. Finally, 43% of participants used Secure
Key, 76% card readers, 24% OTP via SMS, 14% OTP via smartphone app, and 21%
authentication through a phone call.
Materials
During the preliminary interviews, each participant was provided with an authentica-
tion diary which was a 20-page booklet where each page was designed to capture infor-
mation for one authentication event. The design of the diary was informed by previous
studies [122, 242]. A page from the diary is shown in Appendix B.1. On each page,
participants were asked to write down the date and time for each authentication event,
name of the bank, their location, the device from which they authenticated, what au-
thentication factor(s) they used, and their reason to authenticate. They were also asked
for how satisfied they were with the authentication process. They could also report on
any problems they encountered (and if/how they were solved), they were asked to give
a rating of their satisfaction with the authentication process and finally, there was space
for any other comments.
Procedure
Preliminary interviews. In the first stage of the study, semi-structured interviews
were conducted in a lab setting with one researcher and one participant at a time. In-
terviews lasted 30 minutes on average, and involved a total of 21 participants. The
goal of these interviews was twofold: (i) eliciting a better understanding of banking
preferences (e.g., online vs. offline), attitudes towards online banking, frequency of
use of online and mobile banking services, and (ii) exploring attitudes towards authen-
tication technologies deployed by the banks, aiming to identify sources of common
errors, misconceptions, and frustration. Interviews were structured around a basic set
of open-ended questions allowing users to talk about their authentication habits and
experience. At the end, participants were briefed on the next stage – the authentication
diary and received £5 for their participation in this part of the study.
Authentication diaries. Participants were asked to maintain a banking authentication
diary for a period of approximately 11 days starting immediately after the first inter-
view. Participation in the final interview, as well as remuneration, was independent of
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whether or not participants completed the diary. Participants were asked to keep their
ordinary Internet banking habits and not try to log in more or less than normally.
Final interviews. The last stage of the study involved 17 participants (80% of the
initial sample), as four participants were unavailable to come for an interview within
the set time frame. The second round of semi-structured interviews also lasted 30
minutes on average, again they were conducted in a lab setting with one researcher and
one participant at a time. In the beginning of the debrief interviews, participants were
asked about the experience of keeping an authentication diary, their authentication
routine and some of their diary entries. Next, participants were asked to talk about
other authentication systems they were familiar with, besides the context of online
banking, placing more emphasis on systems that they enjoy interacting with, allowing
participants to convey what elements they consider vital for a successful authentication
process. Finally, the interview explored participants’ perceptions regarding the notion
of implicit authentication by explaining the concept and giving examples of how such
a system would work. At the end of the session, participants received £10 for their
participation in this final part of the study.
Ethics
The study design and protocol, along with all materials used, was reviewed and ap-
proved by UCL’s Research Ethics Committee (approval number: 6010/001).
4.3.4 Diary results
The 17 participants who returned for the final interviews kept an authentication di-
ary for an average of 11 days (SD = 4.06), starting from the day they had their first
interview. A total of 90 entries were obtained from the diaries, with an average of
5.29 entries per person (range: 1–15, SD = 3.9). Out of 90 events, participants re-
ported having had problems on 12 occasions (13.3%). The most frequent problems
were mistyped credentials with five occurrences and misplaced tokens with two. The
following problems were mentioned once: wrong memorable answer entered, wrong
sequence of steps when using the token, a forgotten username, a frozen browser session
and a slow Internet connection.
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OTP generation
Participants could indicate their satisfaction with each login event on a five-point Likert
scale (1 – very dissatisfied, 5 – very satisfied). From the 90 recorded events, 11 were
missing a satisfaction rating (two participants provided no rating for one of their events
and one participant did not provide any ratings at all). Satisfaction ratings for authen-
tication events were compared for events with and without OTP generation (30 and
60 events respectively). Participant satisfaction was significantly higher when they did
not generate an OTP to authenticate (U = 1119, p < 0.001, two-tailed Mann-Whitney
test).
Number of credentials required
On average, each authentication instance required 2.44 pieces of information, ranging
from 1 to 5 (e.g., 5 pieces of information were: surname, account number, last 4 digits
of card, OTP, PIN for token). This quantity and satisfaction were negatively corre-
lated (ρ =−0.48, p < 0.001): the more pieces of information were needed, the lower
participant satisfaction was.
Time of day
For analysis, the events were divided in four times of the day: morning (6am-12pm),
afternoon (12pm-6pm), evening (6pm-12am) and night (12am-6am). Out of 90 events,
24 took place in the morning, 32 in the afternoon, 30 in the evening, and 4 during
the night. Morning events had a higher satisfaction score than events at other times
of the day (4.51 vs. 4.07), this difference is statistically significant (U = 978, p <
0.01, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test). Participants experienced 8 problems (out of 30
authentication events occurring in the evening) versus 4 problems (out of 60 events
during the rest of the day). This difference is statistically significant (p = 0.0175,
two-tailed Fisher’s exact test).
Type of hardware token
Satisfaction levels for banks using two different types of hardware tokens were also
compared: events with banks using a card reader had significantly higher satisfac-
tion than events with banks using Secure Key (U = 203, p = 0.001, two-tailed Mann-
Whitney test).
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4.3.5 Interview results
This section presents the results of a thematic analysis conducted on both preliminary
and final interviews.
Struggling with hardware tokens
The study protocol for the study was such that the researcher avoided priming partici-
pants about authentication, this was reflected both in the recruitment process and also
in the interview structure and the order of questions. The first questions participants
were asked were around banking preferences and the user experience of online bank-
ing. Nevertheless, participants mentioned authentication and 2FA tokens long before
there were asked any explicit questions about them. This can be seen an indicator of
how strongly authentication impacts the user experience of online banking.
When talking about their experience with hardware tokens, participants discussed
both what they perceived as advantages and disadvantages (e.g., compared to other 2FA
forms), with negative feedback being predominant. Only four out of 20 participants
found that the hardware token was “easy to use”, “portable” or “easy to incorporate
into everyday life.” Seven participants complained that they had to remember to bring
it with them, while four found the use of a hardware token to be frustrating. Some
found it superfluous (2 mentions), unconvincing (2) and not thought-through (2).
Effort seen as unjustified. Five participants emphasised the effort required to use the
token and questioned the necessity for it. P19 (SK, CR)2 summarised their attitude
towards the token as follows: “I don’t think it was really thought-through. I kind of
wonder who they consulted in the beginning. [. . . ] It’s impractical to be constantly
having that on you because if you lost your bag/keys/purse it would be very difficult to
then log on or ask for another one. [. . . ] It feels a bit long-winded at times, especially
if I am in a rush or I forgot that I had to pay someone. So I find myself in the situation
where I often have to order new card readers because I always tend to lose them and
then find them. At the moment, I am trying to keep one in my bag and one at home. I’ve
probably have about 10 or something because I keep losing them and finding them.”
Other participants felt that their account was secure enough before the introduc-
tion of the hardware token, as they had never experienced any fraud and/or felt that
2With each participant quote comes an indication in brackets what type of OTP generation technol-
ogy they use, as per Table 4.1.
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their password was hard to guess anyway. P19 (SK, CR) found the online banking
authentication procedures to be excessive compared to offline transactions where only
a four-digit PIN is needed to authorise a card payment and even no PIN is required
for contactless payments under a certain threshold. Participants often disliked the ex-
tra step that the use of the hardware token introduced to their authentication task and
found it irritating (3) or inconvenient (5). This seemed to be tied in with the fact that
only one out of these eight participants reported using the hardware token to issue bank
transfers, which probably contributed to the feeling of superfluousness.
Five participants stressed they thought a particular bank was more secure because
it required using hardware tokens more often (e.g., not only for payment setup but also
for login). Four participants (including two from the previous category) said they pre-
ferred a bank that used the token less, or did not use it at all. In fact, three participants
reported changing banks or logging into their account less frequently because of the
hardware token. P19 (SK, CR) said: “Initially, I had an account with HSBC [. . . ] and
that was before they brought in the horrible key ring thing that you have to carry with
you at all times to log in [. . . ] With NatWest you have to remember passwords and stuff
but you don’t have to bring anything physically with you unless you’re changing like
payments and transfers [. . . ] That’s why I’m with NatWest, just because I find their
online banking system [. . . ] compared to HSBC, it’s the most simple.”
P19 (SK, CR) was also disillusioned as to the reasons why the token was intro-
duced in the first place: “I’ve been using Internet 15 years now, and I’ve used it for
a long time. I think people older than me should be using it as well and kind of be
more afraid of it. . . and been told by their banks online banking is more convenient but
then found the whole process not really secure. So I think it was about trust issues. It
was the idea of having something more tangible similar to the machines in branch or
a cash machine.”
The introduction of hardware tokens also affected participants’ usual ways of
working and brought an embarrassment factor. P11 (CR, P) reported that they stopped
checking their balance and recent transaction while at work, since the login procedure
makes it obvious to co-workers they are not working: “It’s OK when I am at home, but
when you are at work and you are pretending you are actually doing work when you
are actually checking on your account, then you have to bring out this calculator thing
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and it’s kind of obvious you are not doing work. I’d rather have something where I am
just on the screen and it’s lot quicker.”
Struggling with credentials
Authentication terminology. Another important issue related to confusing terminol-
ogy used inconsistently across different banks. For instance, P8 (CR, SMS, M) re-
ported: “Is it a passphrase or passcode or key phrase what they need? [chuckling] I
think it is slightly confusing. Although I’m experienced [. . . ], it’s frustrating.”
In fact, there is an astonishing number of different terms used to denote a few
different forms of credentials: membership number, customer number, username, user
ID; password, passcode, passphrase; memorable word, memorable answer, memorable
information etc. (see Table B.1). As a result, participants complained they not only had
to remember the actual credentials but also what they were called. P18 (SK, CR, SMS)
explained: “One of them was called a ‘passcode’ and the other one was ‘ID’, and I
never knew which one is which [. . . ] For the cases I forgot them, it was very confusing
for me because when I was to recover my credentials it was difficult to know which I
forgot!”
Providing selected characters. Participants reported a few coping strategies when
asked to enter selected characters from their credentials (e.g., the third and the sixth
character), including repeating the password (or memorable word) in their head, whis-
pering it, counting letters on their fingers, or writing it down and counting letters on
paper.
Several banks even ask for the characters to be entered out of order, which makes
the process significantly harder. For P17 (CR, M, P) providing characters out of order
meant more effort and time: “If I don’t even bother to remember the password, I will
first have to look for it, then do the math. . . I mean it’s not that difficult but “Oh!
This one is the fifth letter”, I repeat it multiple times in my head.” Also, the methods
of entering the characters seemed to matter to the participants. P11 (CR, P) stated:
“Actually when you are accessing it from a PC it is a box, when you access it from a
mobile phone it’s a drop down list. I prefer the box, it’s just easier. I don’t have to
scroll up and down and try to find it.”
The researchers examined more closely the use of drop-down lists, such as those
used by Barclays (both on the desktop and mobile devices) to let users enter selected
80 Chapter 4. Authentication diary studies
characters of their “memorable word.” It could be assumed that their purpose was
to reduce the risks of key-loggers installed on the user’s device. However, with the
exception of some versions of Internet Explorer, one can still type the corresponding
characters from the keyboard (i.e., upon pressing a key, the correct character from the
drop-down list is selected), thus users are actually still vulnerable. Also the charac-
ters are not hidden once they are selected from the menu, which makes them more
vulnerable to shoulder-surfing.
Memorable answer. Beside usernames and passwords, customers of UK banks are
asked to provide a “memorable answer” (e.g., to a question like “What was the name
of your first pet?”). In general, participants did not report problems providing their
memorable answers but three of them said they were often unsure how they had spelled
them. P15 (SK, P) also complained that one of their banks was asking for their mem-
orable answer but did not say what the question was: “HSBC gives you prompts for
the memorable information. The Lloyds one just asks you to enter the memorable
information but it doesn’t give you prompts about what it was.”
Three participants were concerned with the fact that their answers were easily
guessable by their relatives and friends. They questioned how memorable answers
actually added security to their account. P17 (CR, M, P) reported: “This information
is everywhere [. . . ] It’s just a waste of authentication, and a waste of time.”
Assigned usernames. The majority of UK banks assign usernames (that cannot be
changed) – which often makes it harder for users to remember them. Participants in the
study reported two main coping strategies: eight of them said they were writing their
usernames down, while seven had their browsers remember them. Five participants
reported that not being able to remember their usernames prevented them from logging
in from other computers than their own. P2 (SK, CR) stated: “For NatWest and HSBC,
if I go somewhere else and I use another computer [. . . ] then I cannot remember it and
I cannot even get through the first step.”
Participants also stressed they found their username to be an unrelatable string
of numbers, unlike their usernames for other services which they were able to pick
themselves.
Passwords. When asked to create a password, three participants stated they re-used
an existing password and nine that they partially re-used it. P7 (CR, P) said: “I use
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one password for everything, and I vary it a bit I add a number an exclamation mark,
a hashtag, but the core password is the same for all websites.” Seven participants said
they created participants to be highly memorable (to facilitate their recall) and other
seven reported writing their passwords down. P21 (SK, SMS) struggled with creating
a valid password for their bank since the instructions (describing length and type of
characters) did not match what the system actually accepted, driving P21 to use a trial-
and-error strategy in order to generate an acceptable password.
Credential recovery. Five participants reported that they had to reset their credentials
at some point, describing the process as cumbersome. P12 (CR) reported: “You have
a number of times you can repeat the process before they lock you out. And then you
have to phone them up and go through the whole thing and get them to reset it and
it takes 24 hours. So you need to be very very careful [. . . ] And I always get a bit
nervous – the last thing you want to do is be locked out from your account. It’s really
frustrating as well because you could mistype m instead of n.”
Participants that went through a reset process reported they started to choose
easier-to-remember credentials and to focus more during logins to prevent mistakes.
P11 (CR, P) said they “learned” from their experience: “It’s quite a big deal after-
wards. To reset the whole thing, you have to call them and they have to verify things. . .
I chose easier information so that I am sure I will remember it and not have to go
through the process again.”
Mental models of authentication tokens
During both interviews, three participants were particularly intrigued by their hardware
token and they made speculations on how it was operating.
Where do the codes come from? Three participants were curious about how a card
reader generated codes that were accepted by the website and wondered if it was con-
nected to the Internet. A participant thought that the bank and the token have a list of
codes and as soon as the customer uses one of them, it gets “crossed out” from the list.
This belief could have been influenced by the fact that banking authentication in some
European countries used to rely on this system. In fact, P10 (CR, M, P) mentioned
having used this system back when they lived in Germany: “I used to live in Germany,
I really liked the way they do it there, my bank there was Deutsche Bank. It gives slips
of paper where you have OTPs which are easy to replicate. . . For me, it’s convenient
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to have both in the office and at home. It feels safe even if someone sees it because
even if they see the code, they wouldn’t know which one they would be using.”
Do I need to protect the token? Two participants emphasised the token was valuable
and some stated they were protective of it hiding it out of plain sight. P11 (CR, P)
was worried about what kind of information related to their account could be collected
from the card reader if stolen: “With regards to this device, I mean, it’s meant to be
secure I would imagine, because you are supposed to be the only person that should
have possession of it. But if you lose it what happens? What kind of information can
be taken off it? . . . You know relating to your account, I am not quite sure how secure
that is to be honest.”
In some of the interviews, it became apparent that participants did not realise the
card readers were interchangeable between banks. When asked if it would be possible
to use a card reader from one bank to log in to another (which is the case for several
banks), P7 (CR, P) expressed doubts: “Well, Nationwide sent it to me so I assume it’s
unique for Nationwide, I don’t think I can use it for other banks. [. . . ] I think the
number is unique for the debit card and the PIN, so if someone stole the reader they
can’t access the reader, they need to slot in the credit card. It’s to make sure no one
else has access to my account. To get the number, it has to be my debit card and they
have to know my PIN – so it is very unlikely. . . unless they have the credit card, the
PIN and the reader.”
The study also uncovered some misconceptions regarding authentication, as
P12 (CR) commented on how authentication in the morning is faster than in the
evening: “I think the process itself can be quite slow. I think this is because the server
is quite busy and because they don’t have enough staff to check this kind of stuff and
that can be a problem. Especially in the evenings it seems to take longer. One day I
was at home, I wanted to pay council tax 10 in the morning and it went through so
fast. It was incredible. Whereas in the evening there’s more people on and maybe they
don’t have a lot of staff at the other end checking this stuff and so this takes longer
and if you are in a rush this can be frustrating.” After a couple of clarifying questions
from the interviewer, it became apparent that the participant thought verification of cre-
dentials happens manually with members of staff checking the usernames, passwords,
memorable answers and OTPs customers enter online are correct.
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Rituals that make users feel secure
Throughout the interviews, participants reported on their strategies for staying secure
while banking. Although one might argue that some of them do not necessarily add
real security, participants felt more secure by employing them, thus, they can be called
‘security rituals’. P7 (CR, P) elaborated what made them secure: “There is always a
small chance, of a virus or people can steal your bank account details. That’s always
a small concern and I do as much I can to prevent that. On Windows, you can have
a firewall, I have Avast Antivirus, they do regular virus definition checks. I have a
password, it’s not an easy password and it’s also memorable information. I change
them every six months and if I log in from a friend’s computer or a library computer, I
don’t ask the computer to remember my username. I don’t do that.”
Motivation for online banking
During the first interviews, participants were asked to discuss their preferred ways of
banking. Out of the 21 participants, 17 reported they preferred online banking, with
11 participants appreciating its convenience, six its ease of use, and seven the fact that
online banking was less time-consuming than other forms of banking. Obviously, this
strong preference might result from the fact that the recruitment materials focused on
online banking. Participants also highlighted several reasons why they prefer not to go
to bank branches, including long queues and/or distance to the nearest branch, whereas,
four of them reported preferring in-person banking due to faster/better resolution of
queries and having face-to-face contact with members of staff.
Ideal authentication
As part of the second round of interviews, participants were asked what an ideal au-
thentication procedure for online banking would look like. They provided the follow-
ing suggestions.
Biometrics. Authentication using biometrics was the most frequently proposed idea.
Some participants mentioned it already in the first interview, before the researcher even
asked this question. For example, P6 (CR, SMS, P), after discussing their struggle with
username, password, and token based authentication, said: “If you could be in an ideal
world where you wouldn’t have to use your card reader, type in your password. . . you
know I think, in a few 100 years from now you’ll just put your finger on a machine
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and it reads your fingerprint. Today, it’s slow – you know fast is good! The faster the
better.” P17 (CR, M, P) also said they would like a camera-based biometric system, as
long as the process would be fast: “Maybe through the camera, webcam looks at me
and verifies it’s me entering the five-digit code[. . . ] I would be willing to change my
position and stay still until the scan finishes – I still don’t need to remember anything.
[. . . ] I think 5 seconds or 10 maximum, not beyond 10 seconds – I’d freak out – I’d
prefer to remember.”
Reducing cognitive effort. Six participants emphasised they would like an authenti-
cation system that minimises the need to remember anything. Seven participants also
emphasised they needed to concentrate to log in. They stressed that especially when
tired or in a rush, they needed to stop what they were doing and focus. P14 (SMS)
stressed they needed to make a conscious attention switch: “If I am in a rush, I maybe
misspell my surname or I do not enter the card number correctly. If there’s any delays,
it usually is one of those two. The device itself, I don’t think I ever had problems with
that stage, it’s always been the first one. I’ll have to get myself together mentally and
let’s say ‘Focus! Whatever is in your mind, forget it.’ ”
Reducing physical effort. Participants expressed their desire for an authentication
mechanism that would reduce the physical effort they need to make – by avoiding the
need to enter multiple pieces of information (5 mentions), or to carry additional devices
with them (4).
Fast and simple. Reducing the cognitive and physical burden would lead to faster
and simpler authentication procedures. In general, participants preferred fewer steps,
as some of them suggested they should be logged in based on their actions, passively,
rather than actively needing to enter their credentials. For instance, P6 (CR, SMS, P),
while suggesting the use of biometrics, said: “We have our unique fingerprint no one
can replicate at the moment, and you just put your finger on the screen and that’s it,
a one-step process.” Interestingly, three participants said they preferred one bank to
another because the login process was faster.
Portable. Two participants also highlighted the need for “authentication portability”.
They thought logins should be for more than just one system – for example, when
using their fingerprint to access their computer, this should already log them in to their
bank and also to other accounts.
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Implicit authentication
At the end of the second round of interviews, participants were also asked about their
views on implicit authentication since this suggestion was made in the previous study.
The experimenter explained the basic idea of how an implicit authentication mecha-
nism works, that it authenticates users by constantly monitoring some aspects of their
online activity and their behaviour (e.g., their typing rhythm). Participants voiced two
kinds of reservations about this type of authentication. First, five participants said
the system would need to be highly accurate as they did not want to find themselves
locked out of their machines. They raised concerns if the system would authenticate
them even if they were tired or did not follow their usual patterns. They said they
would feel more in control entering a password since if an implicit authentication sys-
tem decided they were not a legitimate user, there would be nothing they would be
able to do. Second, six participants voiced privacy concerns saying they might find
it intrusive and could feel uncomfortable knowing their behaviour was being tracked.
They also stressed they would want to know who was storing their data and how it was
being used. P10 (CR, M, P) stressed: “I could see implicit working but you’ll probably
run to privacy issues about that: Who’s doing the software? How’s the monitoring
done? Who gets the information from the monitoring? blah blah blah. That would be
the real issue.”
4.3.6 Discussion
This section presented an in-depth user study of the usability of two-factor authen-
tication (2FA) in the context of online banking. It consisted of two series of semi-
structured interviews, a period of keeping an authentication diary providing both qual-
itatively and quantitatively data.
Participants reported using 2FA without too many mistakes or lockouts, which
is not surprising as the participants were banking customers accustomed to 2FA and
online banking. However, the study uncovered a number of issues with credentials
in general and, in particular, with hardware tokens. The study showed that the effort
expected of banking customers is high with some participants considering it unjus-
tified. The demands placed on users, such as the need to produce and remember a
wide range of different credentials (often with confusing nomenclatures), or having to
carry around and operate extra devices, have affected participants’ banking routines.
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Figure 4.5: Examples of coping strategies adopted by the participants categorised using the
taxonomy developed in Section 4.2.4.
They have changed how often, from where, and how, they access their accounts. The
findings from the study reflect the results obtained by Gunson et al. [102] who found
that two-factor authentication was perceived as less usable than single-factor authen-
tication. Like in the study described in this chapter, Gunson et al.’s participants were
confused by the terminology used for credentials. They were asked to enter a secret
number and an access code after one another and both credentials were six digits long.
In order to avoid confusion, the authors recommended to avoid credentials with such
similarity in real-life deployments of two-factor authentication systems.
Interviews, as well as the analysis of authentication diaries, showed that partic-
ipants’ satisfaction dropped when extra effort was required, that is when they had to
provide multiple pieces of information and use hardware tokens. Again, habit mattered
and several users were not happy with these as they could not automate the authenti-
cation process and their primary task was disrupted by having to stop and shift their
focus onto authentication. One participant actually switched banks to avoid having
to use hardware tokens, others used accounts requiring effortful login procedures less
often.
Throughout the interviews, participants reported on a number of coping strategies
they were using to manage their authentication effort. Figure 4.5 shows a categori-
sation of coping strategies participants reported employing based on the taxonomy
established in Section 4.2.4.
Several participants proposed biometric-based authentication as an ideal solution
that would require less effort (nothing to carry or to remember). Implicit authentication
was also a well-received idea, but participants stressed it would need to be highly
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accurate and respectful of their privacy. Participants asserted, on several occasions,
they knew what kind of level of security was required for them and took measures to
obtain it. If participants found that their memorable answer was easy to guess, they
used a password instead. They also found authentication procedures to be excessive
compared to offline transactions where only a four-digit PIN is needed to authorise a
card payment or nothing at all for contactless payments under a certain value. Anti-
viruses and firewalls gave them a sense of “doing the right thing.” Some also reported
being careful with keeping the hardware token secure, even if it could not be operated
without their debit card (as with Barclays’ PINsentry).
Prompted by the findings from the US governmental organisation, participants
were asked what they thought about logging in implicitly using behavioural biometrics.
While participants very much liked the idea of biometrics and frequently suggested it to
us as the ultimate solution where all authentication was headed, they raised privacy and
reliability concerns with regard to behavioural biometrics. These participants worried
what this data would reveal about them and who would be able to access it.
The diary data showed that the more effort was required, the lower participant
satisfaction was. Also time of day mattered which could be used to optimise what is
asked of participants and when, in a contextual way.
Recommendations
Reducing the number of steps required for online banking authentication was crucial
for the participants. For most of them, an ideal authentication process would involve
fewer steps and would not require them to carry tokens. This highlights the need to
reduce the number of steps throughout the authentication process, and to minimise
the use of the hardware token. As participants have different capabilities, needs and
preferences, banks should consider providing customers with a choice of which 2FA
method they can use. In the study, some participants exercised this choice themselves
and moved their banking to a different account to be able to use their preferred authen-
tication method.
Since this study, banks have been increasingly encouraging their customers to
switch to smartphone banking applications. For the users, this reduces the burden
of carrying a dedicated device while for the banks, it removes the need to provide
OTP generating devices. The question arises if a smartphone app offers an equivalent
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level of security to that of a dedicated token. For example, security concerns were
raised after it was announced that RBS and NatWest would allow their customers to
access their banking apps using a fingerprint scan (Apple’s Touch ID) instead of a
PIN [196, 157].
In a short-term perspective, the study also yields a few immediately actionable
suggestions. In order to minimise confusion, UK banks should unify the wording for
credentials (which now includes: password, passcode, passphrase, memorable word,
memorable information). The use of different authentication terminology by each bank
was a particular burden for participants who had accounts with more than one bank
(16/21 in the sample). This highlights the need for banks not to consider authenti-
cation in isolation, but the actual tasks and contexts of use that their customers face,
and how design of the mechanism impacts the lived experience of their customers. It
could be argued that banks should remove features that do not add any real security but
actually negatively affect the user experience by increasing disruption or time needed
to authenticate. For instance, some banks, aiming to thwart key-logging attacks, force
users to enter selected password characters by choosing from drop-down menus. How-
ever, this is cumbersome for many users and not really effective as one can still type the
corresponding characters from the keyboard. Also, the characters are not hidden once
they are selected from the menu, which makes them vulnerable to shoulder-surfing.
Limitations and future directions
Firstly, the participant sample in the study was small and consisted of well-educated,
highly computer literate and relatively young individuals. One might argue that this is
representative of those who currently adopt online banking but given that this group
of participants struggled, it is likely that older and less technology-savvy user groups
are discouraged from online banking by the lack of usability which is an accessibility
problem. For banks, it is a missed commercial opportunity as they are looking to
close down branches and lower transaction costs. Secondly, the study mostly relied on
self-reported data, which might be subject to exaggeration, selective memory and the
social desirability bias. The findings from the study can be tested in a future, larger
online study. Objective empirical data about success and failure, password resets, and
customers leaving can only be obtained from the banks themselves who are reluctant
to share such information based on grounds of commercial sensitivity.
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4.4 Conclusions
The two studies described in this chapter examined the role of effort in user authen-
tication behaviours in different context – in an organisation and for personal online
banking. Despite the different contexts, both participant groups raised similar issues.
They struggled with hardware tokens finding them inconvenient and they thought the
level of security was too high for the level of risk they were facing.
In both studies, participants emphasised the disruptive effect of authentication
which led them to develop coping strategies to reduce the effort required to an accept-
able level at a given point in time. Participants demonstrated a desire to control their
effort moving it to when it was convenient and least affected their productivity. The
type of coping strategies show what kind of effort is acceptable and when. For ex-
ample, physical effort was preferred when participants were immersed in intellectual
work. Often, they did not access the accounts that authentication guarded access to
when their primary task required it but when they could handle the authentication ef-
fort. This had an effect on their productivity and satisfaction as numerous examples
showed.
Both participant groups appeared to have some tolerance towards the increased
effort that authentication required of them. In an organisation, they felt the obligation
to keep the organisation secure and they might have considered it to be part of their
contract. For online banking, 2FA is mandatory for some banks and participants ratio-
nalised the effort by saying they did not have to physically go to a branch and could do
banking from their computer. Having said that, there was a small proportion of partici-
pants who gave up accounts or devices if they felt the effort required was unreasonable,
especially if they considered the effort to be too high for the level of security they felt
they needed. In both cases, there is evidence that systems were not designed with the
users in mind and users are asked to expend effort to compensate for the shortcomings
of the systems and procedures which fail to support them in their tasks.
While the studies in this chapter investigated how participants cope with au-
thentication effort as part of their every-day lives, the focus of the next chapter is
on two mechanisms that have been proposed but not yet introduced. The studies are
laboratory-based user evaluations of the effort required to use them and their accept-
ability in different contexts.

Chapter 5
Authentication and verification
mechanisms
5.1 Overview
This chapter focuses on different authentication and verification mechanisms to exam-
ine the actual time taken, the perceived effort and participants’ acceptance of them.
In the first study, participants performed logins through the Vernitski Authentication
Grid (VAG). It is a 6× 6 grid reshuffled on each login making the entry more diffi-
cult but potentially allowing the user to have a simple memorable password. In the
second study, participants verified using reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot as part of
a ticket-purchasing task. NoBot holds the promise of being effortless since the user
does not need to decipher characters or drag and drop elements as is the case for re-
CAPTCHA and PlayThru. Both studies consisted of two parts – participants first tried
the mechanisms and were then asked to reflect on their experience. Both studies show
that participants considered security and privacy very contextually, elaborating on in
what situations using the given mechanism would be appropriate. In both studies, there
is a comparison of the usability of the mechanisms on a physical and on a virtual key-
board showing that authentication using the VAG was faster on a virtual keyboard but
verification using NoBot took longer on a tablet. The results show that participants
are willing to use a mechanism that requires effort if they believe it would make them
more secure, especially for high-value and infrequent logins and transactions.
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5.2 Vernitski Authentication Grid
5.2.1 Background
The Vernitski Authentication Grid (VAG) was named after its inventor the mathemati-
cian Alexei Vernitski. Users choose a password consisting of an even number of letters
and/or digits. The entry of this password is through a 6× 6 grid (Fig. 5.1) with the
position of characters being random and reshuffled on each authentication. The user
needs to enter the characters of their password in pairs. They need to find the row that
contains the first character and the column that contains the second character and enter
the letter/digit that is in their intersection. Then this is repeated for each next pair of
characters until the end of the password.
The VAG is not a graphical password since there is no graphical element, such as
a picture or a pattern, that the user would need to remember. Instead, they are asked
to remember a password and then enter it using a grid. The mechanism is a form
of challenge-response (C-R) authentication. The aim of the grid is to guard against
shoulder-surfing and key-logging. It can protect the password at three stages: (1) at
entry in a case when the interface cannot be trusted, for example, when using an un-
known computer, (2) at entry when the physical environment is hostile, for example,
in the presence of a potential shoulder-surfer and (3) in transit when communication
can be eavesdropped on. Capture of the secret password shared between user and sys-
tem is made by the characters in the grid being reshuffled each time. If the attacker
has a key-logger installed on the users’ computer, all they receive will be a set of
random-looking characters. A statistical security analysis of the VAG was conducted
by Papanicolaou [180].
Another potential use case for the grid would be as back-up or very infrequent
authentication – such as annual tax returns. Long periods of not recalling a password
or backup credential result in high failure rates. To increase memorability of the shared
secret, users could choose a password with high personal entropy [71] – a word or
phrase that is hard to guess, but meaningful to the user, and strongly embedded in
biographical memory (using episodic memory).
In terms of effort, using the grid with a simple highly memorable password could
potentially be easier than memorising and recalling a complex password. The ability
to use a grid is stored in procedural memory which is a type of implicit memory and
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after repeated use, it could become habitual and unconscious. In contrast, a password
would be stored in semantic memory and it requires uncued recall.
5.2.2 Study aims and hypotheses
The goal of the study was to assess the usability and user acceptance of the VAG. As
users struggle to remember passwords, for the grid they could have a simple password
but the entry would be through a 6× 6 grid with characters and digits reshuffled on
each login. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the user experience of the VAG
both quantitatively and qualitatively. The study was meant to be a preliminary evalu-
ation, assessing the effort required to use the grid, the learning curve and participants’
perceptions of the grid. This often led to a more generally discussion of participants’
experiences of authentication, their expectations and preferences.
The following hypotheses were devised to answer the research question:
H1: There will be a difference in the time that users take to enter a password on a PC
using a physical keyboard and a tablet using a virtual keyboard.
H2: The time of entry will decrease with practice.
H3: Authentication speed will depend on users’ individual characteristics such as age,
computer literacy and experience with touchscreens.
5.2.3 Method
Design
The study was conducted in a laboratory with one experimenter and one participant
at a time. There were two groups of participants: first one with 31 and the second
one with 5 participants. The first stage was the same for both. After being introduced
to the scheme, participants were asked to perform six logins. While the first group
authenticated six times during one lab session, the second group was asked to return
for another session a week later where they were asked to perform another six logins.
Participants
Participants were recruited through the UCL Psychology Subject Pool. There was no
pre-screening for the study and there were no restrictions on who could participate,
apart from the standard requirement that they had to be at least 18 years of age. Par-
ticipants were paid £6 for their participation which took about 30 minutes. Overall,
there were 36 participants in the study, 19 male and 17 female. Mean age was 26.9
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Figure 5.1: A screenshot of the implementation of the VAG used in the study.
years (range: 20–49, SD = 7.2). In terms of education, 28 participants had completed
a university degree and seven had A-Levels.
Apparatus
The implementation of the idea was done by Constantinos Papanicolaou as part of his
MSc project in the academic year 2012-13. The prototype of the VAG used in the
study (Fig. 5.1) was programmed in Java (using JSP/Servlet technology) and linked to
a MySQL database. The JQuery framework was also used to enhance the interactivity
of the prototype and provide a better user experience. The study was performed on
a PC and a tablet. The PC was running Windows XP and had a 22′′ monitor with
a resolution of 1920×1080 pixels. Participants used a standard QWERTY keyboard
with a UK layout. The tablet was a 9.7′′ iPad 2 with a resolution of 1024×768 with an
on-screen virtual keyboard with a UK layout.
Procedure
Upon arrival, the participant received an explanation of what the study involved and
the experimenter answered any questions they had. They were asked to read an infor-
mation sheet and sign a consent form. The workings of the grid were then explained
to them by the experimenter who used a laminated sheet of paper with a grid on it and
a marker pen. The participant was then asked to enrol by setting up a username and a
password. Once they completed the enrolment, they were asked to perform six logins:
three on a PC and three on a tablet (order counterbalanced). After having performed
these logins, the participant was interviewed about their experience and then asked
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to complete a brief questionnaire asking for demographic information, their computer
literacy and cyberthreat exposure.
Ethics
The research was approved by the Head of Department in the Department of Computer
Science and exempted from a full review by UCL’s Research Ethics Committee on the
grounds of minimal risk.
5.2.4 Quantitative results
Overall, across all participants, devices and trials, a login attempt (regardless of if
successful or not) took 63.7 s. However, in real life failed attempts to authenticate
add to the time needed to access a system, therefore the following analyses consider
the cumulative time needed for a successful login, which encompasses the times of
failed attempts too. The cumulative average time for a login using the VAG across
all participants, devices and trials was therefore 88.6 s (median=32.5). This average
is skewed by some trials requiring several attempts. Therefore, to illustrate it better,
45% of logins took under half a minute, 70% under 1 minute, 79% under 1.5 minutes
and 85% under 2 minutes. Figure 5.2 shows login times across different trials and
treatments. Each participant had to successfully log in six times and the number of
attempts needed ranged from the required 6 to 14 (M = 8.16, SD = 2.11). On average,
1.4 attempts were needed for a successful login (SD = 0.8). Passwords chosen by
participants were on average 6.7 characters long (SD = 1.24, range: 4–10). Out of
36 participants, 22 chose a 6-digit password, presumably influenced by the example
password (zebra1) given by the experimenter which had 6 characters.
A 2 (Device: PC, Tablet) × 6 (Trials) × 2 (Order: PC first, Tablet first) repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted on the time needed to log in. There were significant
main effects of Device (F(1,34)= 12.6, p= 0.001), Trial (F(2,33)= 9.74, p= 0.001)
and Order (F(1,34) = 9.8, p = 0.004). There was a significant Device × Order inter-
action (F(1,34) = 5.24, p = 0.028) and Device × Trial interaction (F(2,33) = 3.35,
p = 0.041). There Trial × Order interaction was not significant (F(1,34) = 2.49,
p = 0.091). The three-way Device × Trial × Order interaction was non-significant
(F < 1).
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H1. Device type
It was hypothesised that there would be a difference between how long participants
would take on a PC using a physical keyboard and on a tablet using a virtual key-
board. On average, participants needed 118.8 s to log in on a PC and 58.4 s on a tablet
(Fig. 5.2). The ANOVA test described earlier showed a significant main effect of De-
vice indicating that participants were faster to log in on a tablet than on a PC. Post-hoc
effects indicated this difference is statistically significant (U = 319.5, p = 0.02). H1 is
therefore supported.
H2. Time
It was hypothesised that login times would decrease with practice. The login times
reflected a learning curve as participants were authenticating faster with each trial.
They took longer to log in at the first trial but became faster by the third trial. Upon
switching to the other device, the login time was longer at first trial but decreased again
with practice (Fig. 5.2). Participants who started on a PC were slower in their first trial
than those who started on a tablet (U = 39, p = 0.008). After switching to the other
device, participants who used a tablet first and switched to a PC were marginally faster
than those who switched from a PC to a tablet but this difference was not statistically
significant. The group that started with a tablet was on average authenticating faster
than the group that started on a PC (U = 3931, p< 0.001). Assignment to these groups
was random and there were no significant differences between the two groups.
For the smaller sample of five participants who authenticated on two occasions, it
was hypothesised that they would be faster in their second authentication session. For
the first session, the average authentication time was 54.4 s and for the second 39.9 s.
Each participant authenticated faster in the second session by an average of 14.6 s.
Despite this trend, there was no statistically significant difference there (p = 0.4). A
larger sample of participants would be needed to be able to show a possible effect.
H3. Individual characteristics
It was hypothesised that age, computer literacy and experience with touchscreens
would influence the speed with which participants authenticated. The analysis showed
a strong positive correlation between age and authentication time (r = 0.42, p = 0.01):
the older the participants were, the slower they authenticated. There was a moderate
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Figure 5.2: Average time, measured in seconds, for participants to log in using the Vernitski
Authentication Grid on a PC and a tablet.
negative correlation between computer literacy and authentication time (r = −0.36,
p = 0.03): the more computer literate a participant, the faster they authenticated. Fi-
nally, there was no statistically significant correlation between authentication speed on
a tablet and experience with touchscreen devices (p = 0.095).
While the system recorded the time taken and numbers of attempts, the exper-
imenter in the lab conducted structured observations of participant behaviour while
they authenticated. Out of 36 participants, 31 pointed at the grid with their fingers
or mouse while they were trying to find the row and the column where the characters
of their passwords were. Three participants wanted to write their password down to
facilitate breaking it down into pairs of characters.
5.2.5 Qualitative results
After having performed six successful logins, participants were asked to share their
experiences. The interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed. The following
results emerged from a thematic analysis.
Effort
Out of 31 participants, 16 emphasised the authentication scheme was complicated.
Eight participants said it required mental effort with P2 saying it was “too taxing on
the mind”. P31 explained: “You do have to give full attention to it, so you can’t be
doing any other stuff. You can’t be on the phone and be like: ‘Wait a minute I will just
check my email. Oh, I have to login, hold for 5 minutes.’ ” As this quote suggests, par-
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ticipants also found the scheme time-consuming to use with 13 interviewees stressing
it required more time than traditional passwords. P7 emphasised that authentication
should be fast especially if it guards access to a critical task: “If someone is going
into cardiac arrest and those seconds matter, you need a procedure that’s going to be
as quick as possible, not something that’s going to complicate things and, potentially,
lose a life. I mean I realise logging on a system isn’t life and death, but sometimes
it is that crucial that you get in as quickly as possible.” Both effort and time needed
contributed to the feeling of frustration in some participants. Six of them stressed they
found the grid frustrating, P7 explained: “It just seems like just the password itself is
just far easier to remember and quicker to type in than having to find all these different
letters and matching up and stuff. Like, if this was a real login for a site that I was
on, and especially, you know, a business site or a professional site, it would drive me
absolutely up the wall. I mean it would waste a lot of valuable time. So, like I don’t
understand the purpose of it actually. It’s a big time waster.”
Out of 31 participants, 10 emphasised the learning curve for the practice of how
to use the grid. They mentioned using the grid became easier with time which is con-
firmed by the quantitative data described in Section 5.2.4. Nevertheless, P31 stressed
that using the grid would never be as easy as entering a password since it could not be
automated: “Because you have to look at, I mean it’s not something you can just mem-
orise. If you just want to check email you memorise a password, or you check in some
password, like I memorise the key strokes on my keyboard, that’s fine. I hate logging
in using tablets and stuff but you know like, it’s usually like if I was checking email it’s
usually just yeah, the pass code and a mobile and everything is there. But there is only
your computer that can memorise your keyboard strokes, so you are like whatever, it’s
muscle memory, you know your password. So that is like, oh no, you actually have to
be awake and you have to do like puzzle type thing and then it’s annoying to do on
an iPad, like say if you’ve just woken up or are really tired, then you can’t log in.”
The difficulty P31 described is that a login using the grid requires thinking and focus
whereas standard password entry can be done out of muscle memory and there is no
attention switch from the primary task.
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High-value accounts
When asked if they would use this authentication scheme to log in in real life, partici-
pants generally gave varied responses. P15 responded: “If I had to, yeah.” This might
indicate that the participant had been forced to use mechanisms which required effort
in the past and they had to get used to it because of the lack of alternatives. Out of 31
participants, 15 stressed their willingness to use the grid would depend on the context
of its deployment. In 10 cases, participants emphasised it depended on what type of
account they were trying to protect. Participants mentioned that better security would
be needed for systems that hold sensitive or confidential information or that could lead
to money loss as with access to online banking. P18 explained they would be more
likely to use the VAG “for websites for banks and stock exchanges and all, where the
real money is involved and your interest is at stake”. However, participants were not
unanimous on this, four of them stressed their banking was secure enough already,
P31 emphasised: “I’m fine with my bank account I think because I have a key and I
have to press one number and then it gives you a number and I do that, so it’s not like I
have additional mental stress. So, I wouldn’t use it for my bank. And anyway my bank
is really good because I have had fraud twice and they return it, they block it when
I have had fraud, so I am fine.” Nevertheless, P24 stressed they would prefer to use
the grid since it did not require carrying an additional device with them: “Definitely
this one is easier for my bank account than my token because I have to have my token
everywhere I go. This way I can do it anywhere in the world, any platform, yeah. So
in terms of easier sign-in, it’s easier for bank account but in terms of security, I don’t
know.”
Frequency of use
Overall, nine participants stated their willingness to adopt the VAG depended on the
frequency of use of the account it would protect. In four cases, participants made
a link between frequency of use and account importance. They said they logged in
to important accounts, like banking, less often than to their email, thus they would
be more willing to put the effort into logging in for something that is high-value and
infrequent. P23 explained: “Logging in to like my email, because I do it so frequently,
I probably wouldn’t want to go through the hassle of that. But if it’s something more
secure, I probably would.” P25 expressed a similar view saying: “I think that would
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take too long given how often I log into my email account.” Perceptions of effort can
change with repeated use as P07 explained: “I found it quite enjoyable because I knew
it was a different thing but I know if I had to do that every time I might enjoy it less.”
Security
Overall, ten participants stressed the authentication grid was more secure than pass-
words. Five of them stressed the complexity made it more secure, P26 explained it is
difficult to use for the user, so it must be for the attacker too: “It sounds like it’s safer
yes, because it’s so complex, even for the user themselves.”
Experience of fraud
Related to security was prior experience of fraud which also influenced participants’
stated willingness to adopt the VAG. P23 stressed: “If you could choose, so I would
probably want something like this for like my bank account or actually just recently my
iTunes password was hacked, someone in Canada got my iTunes password so I had to
close my account and cancel my credit card.” Conversely, P24 stressed they did not
feel the need to strengthen their authentication through the use of a grid since they had
not experienced fraud: “I might feel more receptive to taking this up if I had ever been
a victim of password fraud before, but I haven’t. So, let’s say if I’d had my account
hacked into before, I would probably be much more receptive to using this one.”
5.2.6 Discussion
The study described in this section was a preliminary laboratory evaluation of the Ver-
nitski Authentication Grid. A login took 88.6 s on average. The more practice the par-
ticipants had, the faster they authenticated. Younger participants and those with higher
computer literacy authenticated faster as well. There was no statistically significant
relationship between experience with touchscreen devices and authentication speed on
a tablet. Interestingly, participants authenticated faster on a tablet and subsequently
faster on a PC. Previous research has shown that authentication on touchscreens poses
many usability challenges [16, 99] and it is surprising to see that a login to the VAG
was faster on a tablet than a PC.
Interestingly, in theory this authentication scheme was meant to guard against
shoulder-surfing but actual user behaviour undermined this as participants pointed at
the screen which might reveal to an attacker what the characters of their password are.
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In terms of qualitative feedback, half of the participants thought the authentication
grid was complex and over one third described it as time-consuming. Interestingly,
when asked about their willingness to use it in the future, 19 participants made their
decision dependent on the context where it would be deployed. They thought the grid
could add extra security for systems holding important and sensitive information like
banking and systems that they do not access as frequently. They emphasised the notion
that for frequent accounts the password is in their muscle memory and they can enter it
fast without much thinking. In such a situation, the use of the grid would not be suitable
as it requires focus, effort and time. Especially since activities like email or Facebook
are quick, users log in for a few minutes just to check if there has been anything new
they need to attend to. This is in line with findings from previous studies. Brostoff
and Sasse [46] found that if a login procedure was elaborate and time-consuming,
participants logged in less often and once they logged in, they worked on the system
for longer than those who logged in just using passwords.
The differentiation that participants made in terms of account importance and
frequency of use is very interesting. Passwords were invented for a certain purpose
(administering a shared computer), then introduced to various other systems regardless
of context as a one-size-fits-all solution and nowadays virtually any website offering
some service requires users to register with a username and password. Context of use is
a fundamental HCI concept [246]; however, it is often forgotten by security researchers
who do not account for differences between individuals and contextual factors such as
account type or frequency of use [221].
Participants’ stated willingness to use the VAG was associated with their risk
perception. A participant who had experienced fraud stated they would be more likely
to use it than a participant who had not. This is in line with previous studies where
participants’ exposure to cyberthreats made them more cautious in subsequent online
interactions [141]. Interestingly, a proportion of participants inferred that the grid must
be more secure than passwords because it is more difficult to use. This might be related
to the “effort heuristic” as discussed in Chapter 2.1.2. In a study by Kruger et al. [150],
participants assessed the quality of artwork as being higher when the effort put into it
was greater. Participants relied on effort more if it was difficult to ascertain the quality
of the artwork being evaluated. Similarly here, participants could have applied the
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effort heuristic when they used the VAG. It cost them more effort, so they concluded it
must offer better security.
Moreover, participants frequently compared using the VAG with entering tradi-
tional passwords. With an authentication time of 88.6 s, the grid performed poorly
in this comparison. To put this number into perspective, Roth et al. [211] tested sev-
eral types of cognitive trapdoor games, that is PIN-entry methods offering resilience
to shoulder-surfing. The longest average entry time for these was around 25 s. To
give another example, a standard login where the user has to enter a username and a
password (both eight characters long) was analytically predicted to take approximately
14.8 s [242]. Additionally, participants emphasised that using the grid required their
undivided attention and they could not enter their password from muscle memory. It is
a general problem with one-time credentials that their entry cannot be automated. As
noted by one participant logging in with the grid could be enjoyable as it breaks the
routine but this might be a short-lived effect.
Limitations
The study was a preliminary laboratory evaluation of a new authentication mechanism.
Such evaluations are multi-stage processes starting with a lab study, through a real-life
deployment to an assessment post-adoption. Being the first stage in a long process
of evaluation, the study had a range of limitations. Participants knew what was being
studied what might have made them behave in an unnatural way (due to demand char-
acteristics). Also, in real life a login is a gateway to some primary task and users’ focus
is not on security but on that primary task. This is something that could not have been
recreated in this study since the explanation of the workings of the VAG needed to be
quite elaborate and hiding the fact that the study was evaluating the grid was not possi-
ble. Finally, due to recruitment through a university participant pool, the study suffers
from a volunteer bias and the sample consists of relatively young and well-educated
individuals.
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5.3 Human verification mechanisms
5.3.1 Background
The second study presented in this chapter evaluated three human verification mech-
anisms: reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot. reCAPTCHA (v 1.0)1 is a text-based
CAPTCHA from Google that requires the user to decipher distorted characters and
enter them into a textfield. PlayThru2 asks the user to drag and drop elements based
on instructions (e.g., putting fish in the ocean as in Fig. 5.3). NoBot3 verifies the user
is human by making their screen flash different coloured lights and capturing images
of the user’s face with their device’s camera. Although initially designed as an authen-
tication mechanism, here NoBot is evaluated solely as a human verification mecha-
nism. Verifying using NoBot does not explicitly require cognitive (solving a puzzle)
and physical effort (entering characters, dragging and dropping elements), but requires
that the user position their face in view of the camera. Visually, NoBot starts off as
a widget like reCAPTCHA and PlayThru but then fills the whole screen by display-
ing instructions and then flashing lights. The idea for the study was conceived when
the author’s research team was approached by NoBot’s creators. They asserted NoBot
was effortless to verify and authenticate with and they wanted the team to conduct a
usability study to test this empirically. Note that the study was designed and partially
conducted before the introduction of reCAPTCHA v 2.0 that only requires a tick from
the user [94].
5.3.2 Study aims and hypotheses
The study aimed to assess the time and perceived effort needed to verify using three
verification mechanisms: reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot. Since in the previous
study, participants voiced in what contexts they would find it appropriate to use the
authentication grid, this study formalised it by asking participants to indicate in which
every-day situations they would find it suitable to use a given verification mechanism.
Since in real life security is not a user’s primary task, in the study participants were
tasked with buying three event tickets and completing three distinct verifications as part
of that. There were three experimental conditions in the study. In the first condition,
1https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/old/intro
2http://areyouahuman.com/demo-playthru
3The developer did not commercialise this product and wishes not to be named.
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participants were asked to complete three ticket purchases with a NoBot verification on
each occasion, using a laptop (condition denoted as NBlap). In the second condition,
participants completed the same tasks but on a tablet (NBtab). In the third condition,
participants also made three purchases, but used a different verification mechanism
each time (denoted as C3mix): reCAPTCHA (reCmix), PlayThru (PTmix) and NoBot
(NBmix) with the order of the mechanisms being randomised each time.
The following hypotheses were devised to assess the time and workload required
to verify using the three mechanisms.
Time. It is hypothesised that (H1) there will be a difference in how fast users
will verify between the three mechanisms used: reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot.
(H2) There will be a difference in the time that users take to verify using NoBot on
a laptop and a tablet. (H3) The time needed to verify using NoBot will decrease the
more practice users have.
Workload. It is hypothesised that (H4) there will be a difference in perceived
workload between different human verification mechanisms. (H5) There will be a dif-
ference in perceived workload between verifying using NoBot on a laptop and a tablet.
5.3.3 Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through the UCL Psychology Subject Pool. Mean age was
25.5 years (range: 18–53, SD = 6.8). Out of 87 participants, 57 were female and
30 were male. Four participants had A-Levels, 29 some undergraduate education (no
completed degree), 27 an undergraduate degree, 26 a postgraduate degree (Masters or
PhD) and one person had vocational training. There were 27 participants in condition
C3mix, 31 in NBlap and 29 in NBtab.
Apparatus and materials
The ticket purchasing website. A ticket purchasing site called “SimTikats” was cre-
ated for the purpose of the study. It offered different tickets for a variety of events
ranging from concerts to football matches.
The devices. Depending on condition, participants either completed the study on a
Dell laptop E5540 with a screen size of 15′′ or a Nexus 7 (2013 model) tablet with a
screen size of 7′′.
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Recordings. While participants were purchasing each ticket, the time it took them
to complete the verification process was recorded. A voice recorder was used to cap-
ture participants’ reactions to the mechanisms and their responses in the interviews.
Participants’ interactions with the devices were video-taped over their shoulder. For
participants in the mixed condition where there were questionnaires between the dif-
ferent mechanisms, the camera was switched off for these and switched back on for
the next purchase.
Questionnaires. Participants were asked to fill in the following post-task question-
naires. (1) NASA TLX tool [106] was used to assess participants’ perceptions of the
workload involved in the human verification process. A pen and paper version of
NASA TLX was chosen since Noyes and Bruneau [175] found that it required less
cognitive effort than processing the information on a screen. Participants were asked
to complete the full NASA TLX with cards for pairwise comparisons of the different
aspects of workload, to capture perceived importance of the workload factors. (2) Par-
ticipants were asked to pick three adjectives from a list of 24 different adjectives that
best described their interaction with the mechanism. The population of the adjective
list was informed in part by the work of Benedek and Miner [22], and partly by the
adjectives suggested in the pilot study. As shown in Appendix C, the adjectives were
displayed in two columns – positive on the left and negative on the right – to shorten
the reading time that was needed. (3) Since effort and acceptance are contextual, par-
ticipants were asked to indicate in which context they would be willing to use the
mechanism. There was a list of seven different contexts (Table 5.5) which were taken
from real-life uses of CAPTCHAs. For each, participants could choose from three op-
tions: “Sure, no problem.”, “No, no way.” or “I don’t do this.” if they never engaged in
an activity (e.g., had never contributed to an online forum). (4) Finally, an instantiated
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) questionnaire [61] was given to participants to
gauge how acceptant they were of the three mechanisms.
Procedure
Upon participant’s arrival to the laboratory, the study was briefly explained to them
by the experimenter. The experimenter stressed that none of the technologies tested in
the study were created by the researchers themselves but by external companies and
the researchers were acting as independent assessors. The participant was asked if they
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were sensitive to flashing lights as the NoBot verification process involves shining light
on the user’s face. If no sensitivity was reported, they were then asked to read through
the information sheet, encouraged to raise any questions they might have, after which
they would sign a consent form. Once this was completed, the experimenter switched
on the voice recorder and the video-camera and the participant was asked to make three
ticket purchases.
When on the mock-up site, there were three steps: (i) selecting a ticket for an event
of the participant’s choice, (ii) completing one of the human verification processes,
and then (iii) entering the details (e.g., name, address) of a fictitious person named
Adam/Anne Johnson at the checkout to complete the transaction.
The experimenter stayed in the room throughout the session, taking notes and
reacting to any comments raised by the participant, where responses were kept to an
absolute minimum. After the purchase of the third ticket, the experimenter switched
the camera off. The participant was then asked about their experience with the mech-
anism they had just used, and encouraged to voice any speculations about its purpose.
The real purpose – if not deduced already – would be revealed by saying it was to re-
place CAPTCHAs and a print-out with various CAPTCHAs was shown to make sure
the participant knew what was meant.
A brief interview followed where the participant was asked to elaborate on their
experience with NoBot and text-based CAPTCHAs. After that, they were asked to
complete a NASA Task Load Index (TLX) questionnaire, select three adjectives that
described their experience with NoBot, indicate in what situations they would use it
and fill in an instantiated Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) questionnaire. Af-
terwards, they were encouraged to voice their final impressions of NoBot, both the
advantages and disadvantages of using the mechanism. Then, they were asked if they
would like the company to keep or delete the images of their face taken in the study.
Finally, they were thanked for participating in the study and received £10 in cash.
In the third condition where participants tried all three mechanisms (C3mix), they
were briefly interviewed and asked to fill in the questionnaires after each ticket pur-
chase (i.e., after having experienced each mechanism). In addition to the question-
naires used in the other two conditions, they were also asked to rank the mechanisms
in order of preference.
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Ethics
The study design and protocol were reviewed and approved by UCL’s Research Ethics
Committee (approval number: 3615/004). The Committee requested that participants
are told in the information sheet that one of the mechanisms will take images of their
face and that they are asked if they are sensitive to flashing lights. Both changes were
subsequently implemented. Several measures were taken to protect the participants in
the study. There was a written agreement put in place with NoBot’s developers that if
requested by the participant, they will delete the images of the participant’s face taken
in the study. During the study, participants were asked to enter the details of a persona
rather than their own. Participants’ interactions with the interfaces were video-taped
over their shoulder in order not to record their faces.
5.3.4 Quantitative results
Figure 5.3: A page from the study website showing PlayThru.
Time
The set-up of the website used for the experiment was such that the verification was on
a separate page, participants had to verify using reCAPTCHA, PlayThru or NoBot and
then click the ‘Continue’ button underneath as can be seen in Figure 5.3. This set-up
mimics the one encountered on real ticket purchasing sites where the CAPTCHA is
either on a separate page or as an overlay (e.g., Ticketmaster UK). When establish-
ing how long participants took to verify, the entire time how long they spent on the
verification webpage was considered.
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Three mechanisms. In the mixed condition where participants tried all three mecha-
nisms once, it took them on average 20.2 seconds (SD = 13.4) to solve a reCAPTCHA,
28.7 seconds (SD = 13.9) to complete a PlayThru game and 70.1 seconds (SD = 50.7)
to verify using NoBot (Fig. 5.4). A repeated measures ANOVA determined that
the time taken to use each mechanism differed statistically significantly (F(1.23,
35.681) = 27.076, p < 0.0001). There were no significant order effects. H1 is there-
fore supported.
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Figure 5.4: Average time, measured in seconds, for participants to verify using reCAPTCHA,
PlayThru and NoBot on a laptop.
NoBot: laptop vs. tablet. Figure 5.5 shows the time needed to verify using NoBot
across devices and verifications. On average, across the three verifications participants
took 42.2 seconds on a laptop and 54.4 seconds on a tablet, this difference is statisti-
cally significant (p = 0.022, two-tailed t-test). H2 is therefore supported.
Practice. A repeated measures ANOVA determined that the time taken to ver-
ify on a laptop (NBlap) differed significantly between verifications using NoBot
(F(1.964,54.986) = 5.673, p = 0.006). Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correc-
tion revealed that participants’ verification time dropped with practice from the first to
second verification (50.3 vs. 41.2), which was not statistically significant (p = 0.131).
Again, time to verify using NoBot dropped between the second and the third verifica-
tion (41.2 vs. 35) but this difference was not statistically significant either (p = 0.549).
However, there was a statistically significant difference between the first and the third
verification (p = 0.011). A repeated measures ANOVA determined that the time taken
to verify on a tablet (NBtab) differed significantly between different attempts to verify
using NoBot (F(1.983,53.528) = 4.686, p = 0.014). Post-hoc tests using the Bon-
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ferroni correction revealed that participants’ verification time dropped with practice
from the first to second verification (78.7 vs. 44.7), which was statistically significant
(p = 0.003). Again, time to verify using NoBot dropped between the second and the
third verification (44.7 vs. 40.9) but this difference was not statistically significant.
However, there was a statistically significant difference between the first and the third
verification (p = 0.009). It is worth noting that the time for the verification process is
impacted by the speed of the machine’s Internet connection, the reliability of that con-
nection, and any need to repeat the process (e.g., failures due to not being positioned
in view of the camera). H3 is therefore supported.
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Figure 5.5: Average time, measured in seconds, for participants to verify using NoBot across
devices and verifications.
Workload (NASA TLX)
Table 5.1 shows NASA TLX scores for using reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot.
Frustration was the only aspect of workload where there was a significant difference
between the three mechanisms F(1.93, 54.036) = 7.132, p = 0.002). Post-hoc tests
using the Bonferroni correction revealed that participants reported a frustration of 8.73
for reCAPTCHA and 6.31 for PlayThru, which was not statistically significant (p =
0.167). The difference between reCAPTCHA and NoBot (8.73 vs. 11.7) was not
significant either (p = 0.27). However, there was a statistically significant difference
between PlayThru and NoBot (6.31 vs. 11.7) (p = 0.002). H4 is therefore partially
supported.
Table 5.2 presents the NASA TLX scores for using NoBot on a laptop and a
tablet. Although the scores tended to be higher for the tablet, the difference was only
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TLX aspect reCAP PlayThru NoBot P-value
Mental Demand 10.75 9.24 8.89 0.62, n.s.
Physical Demand 4.33 8.45 8.34 0.64, n.s.
Temporal Demand 4.62 3.08 6.47 0.59, n.s.
Performance 3.62 5.46 5.51 0.38, n.s.
Effort 8.12 8.21 6.46 0.71, n.s.
Frustration 8.73 6.31 11.7 0.002**
Overall workload 48.4 37 46.7 0.19, n.s.
Table 5.1: Comparison of NASA TLX scores for reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot.
significant for Physical Demand. While the physical demand of using NoBot on a
laptop had an average score of 2.9, using the mechanism on a tablet had an average
score of 7.2 (p = 0.004). H5 is therefore partially supported.
TLX aspect Laptop Tablet P-value
Mental Demand 4.2 4.8 0.13, n.s.
Physical Demand 2.9 7.2 0.004**
Temporal Demand 5.6 5.1 0.85, n.s.
Performance 7.2 7.9 0.5, n.s.
Effort 5.4 7 0.18, n.s.
Frustration 5.4 5.4 0.4, n.s.
Overall workload 29.9 37.4 0.13, n.s.
Table 5.2: Comparison of NASA TLX scores for verifying using NoBot on a laptop and tablet.
Adjectives
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the top six adjectives participants selected to describe the
mechanism(s) they used.
Laptop Tablet
effortless 13 effortless 11
fast 9 intuitive 10
intuitive 8 slow 9
weird 7 easy to use 8
easy to use 6 acceptable 8
exciting 3 fast 7
Table 5.3: The top six adjectives participants chose to describe verifying using NoBot on a
laptop and tablet. The numbers refer to the number of participants who chose these
adjectives. Each participant was asked to choose three adjectives to describe NoBot.
On both devices, participants found NoBot “effortless”, “intuitive” and “easy to
use”. However, the perceptions of speed differed. For ‘fast’, nine participants chose
this adjective to describe verifying using NoBot on a laptop and seven participants on
the tablet. For ‘slow’, one participant picked the adjective to describe verifying using
5.3. Human verification mechanisms 111
NoBot on the laptop and nine participants on the tablet. This difference is statistically
significant (p = 0.037, Fisher’s exact test.)
reCAPTCHA PlayThru NoBot
normal 14 acceptable 14 unpredictable 9
acceptable 13 exciting 9 weird 9
effortful 9 effortless 7 creepy 8
easy to use 8 intuitive 7 fast 8
predictable 7 great 8 effortful 6
fast 6 easy to use 5 untrustworthy 6
Table 5.4: The top six adjectives participants chose to describe reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and
NoBot. The numbers refer to the number of participants who chose these adjectives.
Each participant was asked to choose three adjectives for each mechanism they
tried.
However, participants were far less positive about NoBot in the mixed condition.
While they found reCAPTCHA and PlayThru to be “normal” and “acceptable”, NoBot
was “unpredictable”, “weird” and “creepy”. The only positive adjective about NoBot
that made it to the top six was “fast”.
Different contexts
Table 5.5 shows the percentages of participants willing to use the three mechanisms
in different contexts. Conditions NBlap and NBtab were combined into NBl+t since
there was no statistically significant difference between them. Overall, participants
indicated they were most willing to use the mechanisms for ticket purchasing which is
no surprise since this was the scenario used in the study.
Context NBl+t reCmix PTmix NBmix
Contributing to an online forum 16 59 15 24
Buying tickets online 76 93 79 55
Browsing for plane tickets 50 76 55 45
Checking in for flights online 62 86 54 52
Topping up your Oyster online 52 66 69 31
Bidding on items on eBay 38 66 69 31
Logging in to Facebook from a different computer 47 66 66 34
Table 5.5: Percentages of participants willing to use reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot in
different contexts.
Participants were least willing to verify when contributing to a forum using
PlayThru and NoBot. For PlayThru, some of them explained the game was not se-
rious enough in the context of a serious activity. For NoBot, six participants stressed
that the nature of forums is that one wants to stay anonymous. This reveals a com-
112 Chapter 5. Authentication and verification mechanisms
mon perception that the service provider or other users would see the pictures taken by
NoBot which is not the intention of the company.
Frequency of use mattered too, PM034 stated: “Topping up my Oyster5 is a small
task so why do you have to get my picture? Because I top up like every month or every
week so I don’t want to do it, it gets in the way.” Similarly PM05 stated frequency
of use and value of the transaction mattered in the different contexts, “For Oyster, I
felt it’s such a basic thing where you’re not going to be spending that much money, it
doesn’t make that much sense. For bidding on eBay, it would slow everything down, it
wouldn’t work. I spend a lot of time on eBay so that just wouldn’t be a thing.”
TAM
To gauge participants’ acceptance of the three mechanisms, they were asked to com-
plete an instantiated TAM questionnaire.
Statement reCAP PlayThru NoBot
1. Using this product increases the security of my online activities. 5.3 5 4.48
2. Using this product gives my greater protection of my online activities. 5 5 4
3. This product enables me to accomplish tasks more quickly. 3 3.6 3.3
4. This product supports critical aspects. 4.2 4.2 3.6
5. This product increases my productivity. 3.2 3.4 2.8
6. This product encourages me to conduct more activities online. 3.4 3.6 2.5
7. This product allows me to finish tasks quicker and more securely. 3.7 4.4 3.2
8. This product enhances my effectiveness in protecting my online activities. 4.8 4.3 3.8
9. This product makes it more secure to do my activities online. 5.1 4.8 3.8
10. Overall, I find this product useful for my online activities. 4.9 4.5 3.3
Table 5.6: Statements for an instantiated Technology Acceptance Model and an average score
of in how far participants agreed with them on a seven-point Likert scale.
Table 5.6 presents the statements used and average scores of in how far partic-
ipants agreed with them on a seven-point Likert scale (1 – strongly disagree, 7 –
strongly agree). An ANOVA and then post-hoc tests were conducted on the mean
scores for each mechanism and any significant differences are highlighted. Where
table cells are shaded there was a statistically significant difference between mecha-
nisms, with the darker cell being the lower value in each pair. For conditions NBlap
and NBtab, there were no statistically significant differences between the scores that
participants gave. In the comparison C3mix, the differences in average scores between
reCAPTCHA and PlayThru were small and not statistically significant. NoBot re-
4The first letter of the participant number indicates which condition they were in: “M”–C3mix, “L”–
NBlap and “T”–NBtab.
5An Oyster card is a payment card for London’s public transport.
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ceived the lowest ratings of all mechanisms for all statements that were statistically
significant. Participants rated NoBot as offering them not as great protection of their
online activities, less encouraging them to conduct more activities online and overall,
being less useful for their online activities.
The lower scores for protection and security are interesting here since in the in-
terviews ten participants considered NoBot to be more secure than other mechanisms.
An explanation for this apparent discrepancy could be that our participants perceived
security more broadly, considering not just the protection of the website from bots but
also the security of their own user account and associated data. Looking at participants’
comments, 17 of them imagined myriad attacks that could be performed on NoBot and
32 worried about the implications of a compromise of the NoBot image database.
Ranking
Towards the end of the study session, participants were asked to rank the mechanisms
in order of their preference. There were five choices: reCAPTCHA, PlayThru, NoBot,
no CAPTCHA-like mechanism and a different mechanism. Figure 5.6 shows how
many participants ranked the mechanisms on each position.
0 10 20 30
No CAPTCHA-like mechanism
NoBot
Different mechanism
PlayThru
reCAPTCHA
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Figure 5.6: Numbers of participants in C3mix providing rankings for each mechanism and hy-
pothetical alternatives. Mechanisms are ordered from highest to lowest average
rank.
reCAPTCHA had the highest average rank followed by PlayThru, a different
mechanism and NoBot. “No CAPTCHA-like mechanism” seemed to be the least de-
sirable choice, it had the lowest average rank and was never ranked as the top choice.
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PM06 motivated their choice of ranking it low by saying: “I expect there is probably
some benefit to all of us to having some kind of a security mechanism on some websites
and some purchasing processes. I definitely wouldn’t want to get rid of it altogether,
not that I know in much detail what benefits they have.”
PM00 explained their ranking: “I have always being using that, and it’s a habit
although it’s sometimes quite difficult to read the letters but I feel cool with it. The
PlayThru, it’s like a game, it’s not very serious so I don’t. . . but I still quite like it
though. If we don’t have the reCAPTCHA, I’m OK with the PlayThru. [Why?] It’s
easy, it’s fun and then you don’t really put effort to doing that.” Similarly, PM03
stressed the importance of being used to reCAPTCHA: “It [PlayThru] disturbed my
usual routine, it required some kind of effort which actually I didn’t exhort that much,
I just guessed through it and it was correct what I did. If not I imagine, it would have
been very frustrating. So this one [reCAPTCHA] is fine and I’m more comfortable
with doing it.”
5.3.5 Qualitative results
Any comments participants made about the mechanisms tested were transcribed and
coded by two researchers. Each researcher coded half of the transcripts and both coded
a subset of six transcripts (two from each condition) and they discussed any differences.
The following sections present the results of the thematic analysis of the data.
Experiences with text-based CAPTCHAs
Throughout the study sessions, participants discussed their experiences with text-based
CAPTCHAs, which were overwhelmingly negative. “Annoying” (44 mentions), “frus-
trating” (20) and “hate” (10) were the most common words participants used to de-
scribe their experiences with CAPTCHAs. Out of 87 participants, 64 stressed they
found CAPTCHAs to be hard to read. 28 participants stated their coping strategy for
reCAPTCHAs was just to press the ‘refresh’ button and try another one. PL27 called
for an alternative: “[CAPTCHAs] are just annoying, they should find a better system.”
These negative experiences were a confirmation that users to get used to expending
effort on security mechanisms if they have no choice but this does not mean they will
start liking it but would rather consider them a necessary evil.
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Perceptions of time and effort
In the interviews, participants often made comments about the speed of the mecha-
nisms, sometimes saying which one was faster or slower. There was an observable
discrepancy between actual and perceived length of the verification processes. To in-
vestigate this, the actual timings of mechanism use were compared with comments
about mechanism speed as made by participants in the comparative condition. To il-
lustrate, PM10 stated “for me I’d want to do things much quicker, so I’d prefer NoBot
as it’s faster so I can get the tickets I want”. This participant’s actual timings were
43 seconds for reCAPTCHA, 19 for PlayThru and 53 for NoBot meaning NoBot was
actually the slowest. Overall, six such discrepancies were identified. In four cases,
NoBot was perceived to be faster than it actually was. One can speculate why this is
the case, PM14 explained: “[PlayThru] was quick but it didn’t really matter because
it was a game, it was nice, you could get sidetracked a little bit but it’s nice.” It seems
one does not notice the passage of time when the activity is entertaining.
What might explain this difference in perceptions could be the fact that the effort
expended was coloured by the type of effort required, for NoBot there was less physical
and cognitive effort and mostly time. PM01 stated: “It’s the first time the screen just
recognises my face and don’t need to do anything, just stay here, effortless.” The par-
ticipants further explained what made this experience so fast, saying: “[For PlayThru]
I still need to read the sentence to know what they want me to do. I need to think and
for NoBot, I just stay here and it’s done.”
Participants had the tendency to rationalise why the verification effort required
of them was justified. Some stressed by completing CAPTCHAs, they contributed
to the services remaining available online, otherwise they would need to physically
go to a box office to purchase their tickets. The inconvenience of CAPTCHAs was
perceived as small relative to the convenience of being able to buy tickets over the
Internet. Additionally, two participants stressed CAPTCHAs were a good thing for
society since they were used to digitise books.
Participants also had a good feeling about contributing to overall Internet secu-
rity. When asked why they ranked “no CAPTCHA-like mechanism” the lowest, PM05
explained: “I guess there was a reason why they had these in place. That is I may not
appreciate but it probably saves a lot time compared to when a lot of machines would
116 Chapter 5. Authentication and verification mechanisms
be entering stuff. If there was no verification process at all, it would probably take
longer to filter through what’s simulated and what’s real.”
Some participants also expressed the view that CAPTCHAs had to be hard to
give them a sense of security, PM02 explained: “The chess one [PlayThru] was a bit
simple, it feels like anyone can do it, it feels actually less secure, although I guess
it’s just checking if you are human. [. . . ] And PlayThru might actually be the best
out of the three because reCAPTCHA still requires a bit more effort than PlayThru,
I think [. . . ] I think it’s quite easy to use so I feel like everyone and anyone could
use it whereas with reCAPTCHA you have to go through some effort and NoBot, you
have to fit your face. But PlayThru, because it’s so easy and accessible, I feel like it’s
too easy in a way.” The experimenter then asked why CAPTCHAs had to be hard,
and the participant explained that a hard CAPTCHA gave them time to think through
whether they wanted to complete a transaction: “Let’s say if you’re buying something
and it’s too easy, you’d just got through with it and if you want to change your mind or
something, it’s kind of too late.”
Apart from giving participants a sense of security or a moment longer to
re-consider the transaction, some participants also over-attributed the security that
CAPTCHAs gave them, assigning them “powers” they do not have. When asked
why they rated “no CAPTCHA-like mechanism”, PM04 stated “If my information
was stolen, my credit card and there was nothing to check that it wasn’t me making
the purchase. [Do reCAPTCHAs help with this?] But it helps fight spam bots too. If
someone stole my password, my information was say Ticketmaster UK, if it was hacked
and my information was stored, someone can buy a ticket. If someone can hack Sony,
they can hack Ticketmaster.”
Security
When asked about their experience with the mechanisms, participants often expressed
views on their security, rather than just usability or acceptability. Interestingly, they
perceived the security of the mechanisms not based on how difficult they were for bots
to solve and how well they protected the site, but they spoke about how well their
transaction details were protected and how their images were stored. 32 participants
described scenarios where the security of their images would be compromised, for
example if the company was hacked. Also, rather than thinking of these mechanisms
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as black boxes, many participants actively deliberated how the mechanisms operated,
with 17 participants actively questioning their resilience against attacks and thinking
of ways to break them, for example through the use of pictures or masks.
PT28 explained they were not sure if CAPTCHAs were providing any security at
all: “I really really hate them, they give you a hurdle to jump over and you’ve been
onto that site 100 times, I find them really infuriating, I don’t even know if they work, I
can’t see the point of them. I can’t read them, they’re too close or the letters are at an
angle, or they have these dots which sometimes you can’t see.” The CAPTCHA hurdle
is even more frustrating if the user is under time pressure, PM07 shared their story:
“A couple of months ago, I was ready half an hour before they [the tickets] even went
online, I had everything ready, my information. And then I like got through and I got
the ticket and it had this thing that. . . CAPTCHA box, it’s called. And the laptop that I
was on had an ad blocker or something, every time that I typed the word that was in it,
it wouldn’t allow it and I was so panicking, I had to get that ticket. . . I didn’t realise I
had to turn it. . . that I had to change some settings to allow it or it was or I genuinely
couldn’t read it, so I tried to play the audio but that was confusing and I oh. . . then I
ended up losing the ticket. Basically, I did get another one but it was pretty stressful.”
Five participants were disillusioned with human verification mechanisms in gen-
eral saying they were protecting the businesses rather than the users. PL15 talked
about NoBot: “I’m even less inclined for people to use my photo, you know, just for
the company’s benefit. That is something that fully identifies you and it’s actually for
the company’s benefit more than even my own. OK, it’s security of buying my own
ticket, so probably I would be even less inclined actually. Especially for what it’s ask-
ing for to protect a company, no! [. . . ] It’s being sold to me that it’s actually for my
protection but it’s not.”
Privacy
Often after their first encounter with NoBot, participants speculated that the mecha-
nism was there for identification rather than verification that they were human. This
is not surprising since the technology is using a biometric solution. Because of the
scenario of a ticket-buying website, 18 participants thought that a picture of them was
taken, to check if it was really them when they arrived at the event venue with the ticket
they purchased online.
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Throughout the study sessions participants raised privacy concerns with NoBot
capturing and storing images of their faces. A total of 29 participants did not like the
fact that someone could see their picture, and within this group, they either worried
about the service provider such as the ticket purchasing site seeing their images, or
other parties such as NoBot’s developer or other users of the website (such as other
forum members or bidders on eBay). Ten participants emphasised that they did not
like the possibility that a company capturing personal images might store the images
and not delete them.
When asked about what specifically invoked privacy concerns, eight participants
stressed that a human face is special, by which they meant it was unique and identi-
fying. Participants also elaborated on what kind of reassurance they would need to be
able to use NoBot confidently. Ten participants would have liked a confirmation that
images will be kept securely or deleted. Nine participants would have welcomed a pri-
vacy statement and two the display of security certificates. Interestingly, seven people
stressed they would be more confident using NoBot if they saw that other people were
using it too. Related to this, 20 participants emphasised that the technology was novel
and in turn that they needed to develop a trust relationship with it.
There were also participants who said they were too ignorant to care, PM03 ex-
plained: “Maybe some persons are not comfortable with showing their face. [What
about you?] I am comfortable with doing that. When you are ignorant about computer
systems, what they do with your data and all that, it’s easier for you to give informa-
tion. I’m kind of like that person so I don’t really mind giving my face. I can trust the
privacy statements that they give.”
PM05 noted that there might be a trade-off between privacy and convenience: “I
prefer the two to NoBot because they are less invasive but equally there was a little bit
more effort than the reCAPTCHA.”
Context
Throughout the study sessions, participants specified situations where they believed it
would be appropriate to use the different mechanisms. This was in part prompted by
them being asked to indicate their willingness to use mechanism in different contexts
for which the results are described in Section 5.3.5, but even before being prompted
participants elaborated on when they would or would not use it and why. Six par-
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ticipants stressed that using NoBot would be more suitable for high-value purchases
where there is more money at stake, PM06 explained: “I guess if someone is buying
something more expensive, there is kind of more risk of fraud, using someone else’s
details. In that case, it might be a lot more beneficial but other than that I don’t think
it’s necessary for small amounts of money or like logging in to things, it’s definitely a
bit extreme.” Because online contexts vary, nine participants emphasised they would
like to be given choice which mechanism they would like to use to verify.
Some participants also explained that they would not like for the image of their
face to be associated with what they were buying, PM05 explained: “I liked it less
because I don’t like putting my face on the Internet; taking a picture of me and who
knows what I’m buying.” This again had to do with participants’ perceptions of NoBot
as an identification mechanism that shares the images with the service provider.
26 participants stated that NoBot was too invasive or heavy-handed for simply
checking if the user was human. PM04 explained: “I’m trying to buy a ticket and not
getting into a governmental building. It seems a bit much.” They further elaborated:
“I do support some sort of verification but I prefer getting less of myself, as in my face,
facial recognition if I have to. Obviously, if that was part of my job or my livelihood,
I wouldn’t have a problem with NoBot, the visual confirmation, personal recognition
but for purchasing tickets it’s a bit too much.”. Other participants stressed that the gain
in security was not worth the loss in privacy, PM06 explained: “I can see why it would
sometimes be useful in terms of fraudulent activity and purchasing things but I still
don’t think it’s worth the breach of privacy to store an image of anyone ever who buys
anything online or tried to log in to a website.”
Control
There was a recurring theme amongst participants of not feeling in control when using
NoBot, because the outcome of the verification process depended on many factors that
were outside of their influence. PM04 stressed: “You’re kind of held hostage to the
quality of the camera”. Participants emphasised that they felt more in control with
reCAPTCHA because it was for them to read and enter the characters and they could
always ‘try harder’ if the system did not accept their submission. With NoBot, they
could only do as much as positioning themselves in front of the camera, and if the
system decided they were not human, there was little more that they could do at that
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time to change the outcome. PT26 explained: “[About reCAPTCHA] I really don’t
mind having several attempts actually it’s not something that is annoying and it’s easy
to do. This [NoBot] can have similar potential problems, my picture couldn’t be taken
properly, had to try several times, three times that was annoying and I’m not sure why,
could be the flashes, really testing my patience, perhaps that’s no fault of my own. With
CAPTCHA, I know it was somehow my fault, because I didn’t interpret the [letters] and
numbers correctly, the [letters] are there, I might have misread it, it works better next
time around, I’ve a certain amount of control [over] the CAPTCHA system compared
to this NoBot system. . . ”
Similarly, PL11 said they would not rely on NoBot for critical activities because
they considered verifying using a text-based CAPTCHA to be more reliable: “like
checking in for flights, I would not use NoBot because there might be some error and
I could not check in for my flight. Then I would use the traditional because it’s easier,
I can refresh the images and try again, so I think it would be faster. So if there is
something urgent, I would not use it [NoBot]. But for every-day uses, I would advocate
this.”
Similarly, PL16 expressed being worried about system failure: “I’d be concerned
that just because you know computers and machines and that have been proven to be
imperfect, I’d be a little bit concerned about it being maybe not able to accurately
read my face. It’s just the squiggly words, CAPTCHAs, it’s just the way these words
sometimes, the letters are undecipherable which is a kind of quality imperfection, if
you will. I’d be concerned that someday, one of these websites wouldn’t be able to
read my face and I can’t get in. And if it’s an important one, let’s say self-assessment
[tax submission] or checking in online or something, then I’m really screwed because
of a system failure.”
Worries over NoBot’s reliability also revealed participants’ mental models of se-
curity, PL17 elaborated: “I wouldn’t really use it though personally because I’ve had
fraud on my debit card before so I don’t trust this kind of thing anymore. I would
rather do it myself using the CAPTCHA or get it from the tickets’ case, I’d just get it
from some office and do it. Then I know I properly get it myself and then there is no
fraud in it. Whereas with the face thing, no.” PL18 expressed they had a low level of
tolerance for the inaccuracy of security measures: “If something is to guard me, protect
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me and if it’s not accurate, it pisses me off, you know. It’s like having a guard at a gate
who is a drunk.”
PL14 stressed that they would not like to be photographed when buying some-
thing sensitive but they would see the advantage of storing a picture in case a criminal
successfully completed a transaction in their name: “I’m actually not sure about the
picture though, yeah. Because I wouldn’t want them to know, if it’s for verification
purchases, then why do you need to store the picture? [. . . ] Sometimes I think it’s use-
ful to store pictures though. Let’s say some criminal wants to buy some. . . purchase
something online and then the police can find out who bought that thing online and
they can use that image to find the criminal. I don’t know. But what are the chances of
this happening?”
5.3.6 Discussion
The study described in this section examined the time, perceived effort and suitability
of three human verification mechanisms: reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot. Out
of 87 participants, 29 used all three mechanisms once, 27 used NoBot three times
in succession on a laptop, and 31 similarly used NoBot on a tablet. The results show
that participants were on average the fastest verifying using reCAPTCHA, followed by
PlayThru and NoBot. Although practice reduced verification times, participants took
longer verifying using NoBot on a tablet than on a laptop finding it more physically
demanding on a tablet. Further, they were the most frustrated by NoBot and the least
by PlayThru.
Familiarity
Several participants emphasised that it was hard to compare reCAPTCHA with the
other two mechanisms, due to their familiarity with text-based CAPTCHAs. This
is supported by the quantitative data where “normal” and “acceptable” were the top
adjectives chosen to describe reCAPTCHA. Participants were largely annoyed by tra-
ditional CAPTCHAs but emphasised they understood they were there to add security,
although they were not always clear about how this security advantage was afforded.
reCAPTCHA also had the advantage of having been around for longer which was a
source of trust, PM26 explained: “the fact that it already exists, is pre-existing, some-
body approved it somewhere, it’s been around a while. . . that seems fairly safe”. The
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fact that participants ranked no CAPTCHA-like mechanism as the least favourable
option indicates that security was seen as important.
Participants were used to reCAPTCHAs so they did not question the effort that
was demanded of them, they were in a habit of solving them and they had developed
coping strategies. They were fine with the increased effort of trying to decipher them
and re-trying was seen as a normal part of the process.
Perceptions of effort
In the mixed condition, there were discrepancies between actual and perceived time
to verify. Perceptions of time could have been coloured by the entertainment factor
of PlayThru and NoBot, as well as their novelty. In future work, one could examine
if perceptions would change as a person becomes familiar with the technology. The
NoBot face capture mechanism does not require explicit effort, but preparation disrupts
the flow of the primary task (positioning the face in front of the device camera and
remaining still, etc.). NoBot was the most time-consuming of the mechanisms, which
might have led to increased user frustration.
Participants were more critical of NoBot in the mixed condition, calling it “unpre-
dictable”, “weird” and “creepy” rather than “effortless”, “fast” and “intuitive” as when
used in isolation. It is important to be careful not to draw any far-reaching conclusions
from this since two factors varied between the conditions: repeated vs. single use, and
having direct comparison with other mechanisms and having only one mechanism.
One can only speculate that repeated use might have made participants more accepting
of the technology. Coventry et al. [56] showed that participants were more acceptant
of a technology after having tried it. It might also be the case that direct comparison
may have encouraged participants to be more critical. This would confirm an impor-
tant design rule, that when asked to evaluate a technology users should – where there
are alternatives – be shown more than one design, to be able to compare and better
articulate their needs and preferences through relative assessment.
NoBot, as a biometric mechanism, was perceived to be the most frustrating for
users, where taking pictures of their faces was regarded as invasive, and its implicit
nature left users feeling outside of control. Responses also suggested that if the ac-
tions of a technology are not adequately explained, this can lead to the development of
incorrect mental models – in the case of NoBot, participants thought the mechanism
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was used to singularly identify them or capture a photo that would appear on their
ticket (for the purposes of security and convenience at the venue). Participants also
worried about who would process and store the images. There was additional concern
at potentially having photos of their face linked with purchases that they had made.
Context
Participants reported they would make the decision of whether to use NoBot based
on the context of use. They found NoBot too heavy-handed for more frequent and
low-value transactions yet more appropriate for high-value purchases. This is similar
to the findings from the study on the VAG described in Section 5.2.5 where partici-
pants believed that a more time-consuming mechanism should be used for infrequent
and high-value transactions. This can be related to CAPTCHAs, in that a number of
participants believed that security should be difficult.
Participants disliked reCAPTCHAs but saw them as a necessary evil, trusting
that they were there for the right reasons. Participants using PlayThru thought the
entertainment factor made it unsuitable for serious online activities and “too easy” to
provide enough protection. For NoBot, participants did not notice the passage of time
when verifying using NoBot but they objected to the collection and storage of their
images.
The study with its holistic approach stands out from previous research of
CAPTCHAs and usability of CAPTCHAs in several ways. Prior studies examined
how the difficulty of human verification is pushed to users, without fully capturing the
user’s perspective. Here, humans are not seen as CAPTCHA solving machines but
as individuals who consider the effort of security in terms of their goals and expec-
tations [113]. Another challenge is to afford effortless security that strikes the right
balance between providing reassurance and demanding effort, as users recognise a
need for security.
Limitations
The study was a laboratory-based evaluation and as such it suffers from a number of
shortcomings. Although participants were given a primary task, it might not have been
a realistic one since participants were in an unfamiliar environment using unfamiliar
devices and mock buying tickets. Another limitation is that that the mechanisms were
124 Chapter 5. Authentication and verification mechanisms
tested on a sample of participants who were relatively young and well-educated, which
might limit the generalisability of the results.
5.4 Conclusions
In both studies, proposed mechanisms were tested in a preliminary lab evaluation that
assessed the time needed, the perceived effort and participants’ acceptance. Partici-
pants used the mechanisms repeatedly, also between-subjects on devices with a phys-
ical and a virtual keyboard. The studies considered effort and usability broadly, they
did not evaluate how fast participants were to examine ‘user performance’ but aimed
to learn more about the context of how the authentication effort would fit in with their
primary tasks.
The first study, a preliminary evaluation of the Vernitski Authentication Grid,
showed that authenticating using the mechanism was perceived to be effortful and
time-consuming. Participants stated they would only find it acceptable for infrequent
and high-value transactions. The second study examined three human verification
mechanisms: reCAPTCHA, PlayThru and NoBot in more detail. The findings show
that users were the fastest verifying using reCAPTCHA and it was their preferred
mechanism, with familiarity playing a role. NoBot was considered privacy-invasive
due to the capture of users’ pictures. Although especially in the first study, the context
of use provided was limited, the results show that participants saw authentication and
verification very contextually. They considered frequency of use, value of the account
and level of security required. Participants translated high level of effort required to
log in or verify into thinking that it would offer them better protection as completing
effortful security tasks gave them reassurance. The case of NoBot shows that users
want to be in control of the verification process and might not trust a technology that
keeps the process hidden away from them.
Both studies looked at technologies deployed “in a brownfield”, meaning the
VAG, PlayThru and NoBot were designed to replace existing security mechanisms –
passwords and CAPTCHAs. The results showed that participants had a preference for
incumbent technologies due to familiarity and acceptability. To be adopted, a replace-
ment technology not only needs to be better than its predecessor but users also need to
be motivated enough to make the switch and abandon the use of the existing one.
Chapter 6
Disclosure in webforms
6.1 Overview
Webforms are the primary way in which data is explicitly collected from users online.
Webforms stand in the users’ way of achieving a goal and designers have developed
ways to minimise the user effort required in completing them. The studies presented
in this chapter investigated how users fill in webforms and what motivates them to
disclose information about themselves.
The first study showed a high prevalence of deliberate and unpaid over-disclosure
of personal information. Careful experimental design ensured that participants under-
stood that additional data disclosure was voluntary. Participants regularly completed
more form fields than required, even providing more details than requested. Making
some fields mandatory jeopardised voluntary completion of the remaining optional
fields. Conversely, monetary incentives for disclosing those same fields brought a pos-
itive spillover by increasing completion for other optional fields.
The second study was designed to explore what could help users better manage in-
formation disclosure. It aimed to assess the effectiveness of privacy-enhancing warning
messages and to explore the design space in a search towards more usable interfaces. A
range of eight warnings was trialled which alerted users that they have completed non-
mandatory fields. The results show that the warnings successfully allowed participants
to limit the submission of optional, personal information in the webform. Interestingly,
participants preferred the warning that left them most in control over which informa-
tion they submit by allowing manual reconfiguration. Against the principle of least
effort, the warning that required minimal effort from the user by deleting all optional
data for them was least preferred.
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6.2 Quantifying disclosure
6.2.1 Background
Introduced into the HTML standard twenty years ago [26], webforms are now part of
users’ daily web browsing routine. The form is the primary mechanism for collecting
personal information from users, who type in personal details such as their name, date
of birth or address to complete online transactions.
Design to lower completion effort
Completing webforms is time-consuming and users are often confronted with them
when they are about to perform a transaction meaning they are a hurdle to completing
a primary task. For instance, even major service providers see conversion rates as low
as 10% on their account registration pages [161]. Thus, web designers and researchers
have been trying to find ways to ease the completion of a webform. This strand of
research focuses on lowering the cognitive and physical effort of completing forms:
label positioning (above the textfield, on the left, below) and formatting, the mecha-
nism for indicating mandatory fields (e.g., with a red asterisk) and unified text field to
reduce tabbing and mouse-keyboard switching [14]. Although some practitioners have
strong opinions – for instance on label formatting – it does not seem to matter as long
as the user experience is consistent [124].
Autocompletion
One way to reduce the effort associated with the completion of webforms is to automat-
ically fill in fields for the user. The autocompletion of webforms was first introduced
in IE4 in 1997 as ‘Form AutoFill’. The browser uses a combination of cues, includ-
ing commonly used field names and names of previously completed fields, to match
them across websites. The browser can then suggest values for formfields it has seen
before, reducing the need to type the same information again. Today, autocompletion
is limited to values typed into text fields. For one-time or sensitive entries, such as
payment authorisation codes, webform creators often prevent automatic form filling,
thereby mandating manual completion of fields. Users can configure their browsers not
to store and suggest form values and delete individual values from their autocomplete
suggestions.
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Autocompletion vs. security and privacy
In the early 2000s, despite built-in browser support for the autocomplete feature, there
was also demand for third-party tools, such as FormWhiz [185] and Gator eWallet.
Gator eWallet called itself “the smart online companion” [86] and was marketed as
enabling the user to “fill in FORMS with no typing”. In addition to reducing the
effort to complete forms, it also transmitted the user’s data to the GAIN Publishing
advertising network to optimise the adverts displayed to the user until it was shut down
in July 2006 [87].
The emergence of the autocomplete feature led consumers to question whether
their privacy might be violated. For example, PC Magazine in 1999 asked “What’s
to stop a hacker from stealing your personal data [that] is popping up in the Auto
Complete window”? [212, p. 108]. Despite previously entered form data being stored
locally in an encrypted file, researchers were able to read out the autocomplete sug-
gestions [101]. In summary, web developers were encouraged to use autocomplete
because it can “collect demographic data more easily” and faster [83], the common as-
sumption being that the form itself is a nuisance or a “pain” [279]. Yet, there does not
seem to be any thorough study or analysis demonstrating the extent to which the use of
autocomplete encourages data entry on webforms. Seemingly obvious assumptions re-
garding webform completion have shown surprising results before. In the economics
of privacy, it is regularly assumed that monetary or other incentives would encour-
age users to ignore their privacy concerns when filling out webforms [248]. Yet, recent
research has found that consumers show no preference for merchants with less privacy-
invasive web order forms even when product and price are equal [25].
6.2.2 Study aims and hypotheses
Webforms are ubiquitous on the Internet, they are the primary way in which data is
collected from users online. Filling in a webform is a classic secondary task that stands
in the way of completing a primary task. Practitioners have looked into ways in which
completing forms could be made easier but true empirical evidence is missing. The
aim of this study was to establish how users disclose information through webforms,
what motivates them to do so and what role effort and time play in the process.
H1: Effort. Users will fill in the minimum amount of information required to receive
payment.
128 Chapter 6. Disclosure in webforms
H2: Mandatoriness. Making some fields mandatory will increase completion rates
for those fields.
H3: Bonus. Providing a bonus for filling in certain fields will increase completion
rates for those fields.
6.2.3 Method
The study was conducted on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) platform, it con-
sisted of an experiment and a follow-up questionnaire. In the experiment, participants
were given a 12-question webform (Fig. 6.1). In the follow-up questionnaire, partic-
ipants were asked about their experience with the form, perceived effort and reasons
for disclosing information.
Design
The study was a between-subjects design. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the five
experimental conditions. A 2× 2 experimental design varied the payment: either
$0.25 (denoted T25) or $0.50 (T50), and the number of mandatory fields: either just
check questions (T?) or check questions and favourite colour and weather (T?). In the
fifth condition (TB25), only the two check questions were mandatory, but participants
were awarded a bonus of $0.25 if they answered the questions on favourite colour and
weather.
data requirement compensation
minimum extra $0.25 $0.50
high — T25: 209 T50: 445
low — T25: 202 T50: 216
low bonus for high TB25: 181
Table 6.1: Experimental conditions with numbers of valid entries.
Participants
Participants were workers on the mTurk platform, all recruited to be based in the
United States. Neither the webform nor the follow-up questionnaire asked partici-
pants for demographics. All the same, age and gender may be inferred for those who
provided their date of birth and first name. The median year of birth was 1981, cor-
responding to an age of about 30 years at the time of the experiment, after outlier
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correction. The cohort of the 1980s accounted for 41% of the sample. To estab-
lish participants’ gender, the first names they provided were matched against the list
of common first names from the 1990 US census1. For ambiguous names, the most
prevalent gender was chosen. According to this inference, 34% of participants were
male and 33% female. For the remainder, the first name was not given or could not be
found in the census name files.
Apparatus
Experiment. Figure 6.1 shows a screenshot of the form participants were asked to
complete. The form was simply headed “About yourself”. There was no cover story
for the experiment and no explicit indication of the purpose for data collection. The
form was designed to ensure that everything took place on a single page, making it
clear to participants that submitting the form also finished the task. To avoid a trust
bias, the form itself did not mention any university affiliation in words or pictures.
The form contained questions of varying levels of sensitivity ranging from date
of birth (DOB) in Q11 to favourite colour in Q3. In the middle of the form, check
questions were placed to ensure that participants have read and understood the instruc-
tions (Q5 & Q6). These questions did not stand out visually. They also had no visual
indicator, such as an asterisk, to show they were mandatory.
All information was collected using text fields. Participants could enter data in
any format they wished. For instance, the field asking for DOB did not require the
participant to enter data in a specific way, making partial input of day, month and/or
year possible. The questions were phrased to make them of comparable length so that
none of them stands out. In order to obtain a homogeneous population, the study was
restricted to participants based in the US. Thus, the questions used American English
spelling (e.g., “favorite color”) and US currency (e.g., $100).
Follow-up questionnaire. At least one day after completing the experimental web-
form, participants were invited to fill in a feedback questionnaire for an additional
payment of $0.65. There was a response rate of 74%.
At the beginning of the questionnaire, participants were reminded of the original
form they completed with a small screenshot, and then asked a series of twelve ques-
tions regarding their motives for participating, time spent, enjoyment, and willingness
1http://www.census.gov/genealogy/www/data/1990surnames/names files.html
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Figure 6.1: A screenshot of the webform used in the study as it appeared in conditions T?.
to participate in a similar study. Finally, they were asked whether they had revealed
any personal or sensitive information, and if so, which data items they considered to
be sensitive. Depending on their disclosure on the original form, participants were also
asked about their motives for (not) providing their DOB.
Ethics
Both studies described in this chapter were conducted after successfully having gone
through an ethics review at the University of Cambridge where the author’s collabora-
tors were based as outlined in Section 1.4.
6.2.4 Experiment results
Figure 6.2 shows the disclosure rates for the ten items of information collected across
different conditions. Overall, date of birth was the data item omitted most often. Of all
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received submissions, 57% of participants included full details (i.e., day, month, year)
and 68% provided parts of their DOB. Full DOB was submitted significantly less often
than the second- and third-most often omitted data items, which were spending and first
name (p = 0.005 and p < 0.0001, two-tailed paired t-tests). The DOB can thus be con-
sidered the most sensitive item on the form. Spending had a relatively low completion
rate, one could speculate that this could be due to it being a sensitive finance-related
information or participants not being able to recall their last major purchase. Answers
concerning weather and favourite colour were included most frequently.
Figure 6.2: Disclosure rates for each of the ten items across four treatments.
As outlined in Section 6.2.3, age and gender of participants were inferred based
on the information they provided. There was a significant (p < 0001, two-tailed t-test)
trend that older participants answered fewer questions. However, age only explains 2%
of the variance in completion rates and the effect size is minute. On average, the older
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half provided 0.18 items less than the younger half of participants (r2 = 0.024). There
was no significant difference in completion rates between men and women (p = 0.22,
two-tailed t-test).
Effort
Measured effort. It was hypothesised that in order to minimise effort, participants
would fill in the minimum required information to receive payment. Completing op-
tional fields requires time, cognitive effort of coming up with responses and physical
effort of typing them in. Not surprisingly, those participants who completed all instead
of none of the optional fields took significantly longer (p < 0.0001, t-test). A regres-
sion analysis reveals that participants spent around 57 seconds reading the form plus
additional 3.5 seconds per field completed (p < 0.0001). Figure 6.3 shows the time
participants took to complete the form fields.
Figure 6.3: Average time spent on completing the form and the number of fields completed on
top of the check questions.
Participants who over-disclose also have to type more. The minimum number
of characters typed in total increases linearly in the number of fields completed at a
rate of 4.0 characters per field (p < 0.0001, t-test on the regression coefficients; outlier
detection based on inter-quartile range; 98% variance explained). However, the median
number of characters typed in total increases quadratically in the number of fields
completed (99% variance explained). A special case of over-disclosure are overly
verbose answers to simple questions. Examples of overly verbose responses include:
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“No. It’s currently cloudy and rainy”2 (P21) or “no, its cloudy and snowing” (P504)
when asked about if the weather was sunny, and “last week on textbooks” (P526) or
“buying oakley sunglasses last summer” (P1096) when asked when they last spent
over $100. 6% of all participants answering the weather questions provided details
that were not asked for; 14% of those indicating the time of their $100+ purchase also
indicated the purpose of spending. In both cases, the prevalence of overly detailed
answers is significant (p < 0.0001, Fisher’s exact test). H1 is therefore rejected.
Perceived effort. The actual time it took each participant to complete the form was
compared with the estimate they provided in the follow-up questionnaire. Most partic-
ipants largely overestimated the time spent on the form – 86% of participants had an
estimate of the time spent that exceeded the actual time. For 13% of the participants,
their estimate was more than 10 times higher than the actual time.
Making fields mandatory
It was hypothesised that making some fields mandatory would increase completion
rates for those fields. Data disclosure in conditions T? and T? was compared to es-
tablish if the mandatory revelation level makes a difference for the disclosure of the
remaining, optional fields. In T?, weather and favourite colour were mandatory; they
are the two data items revealed voluntarily most often in T?.
Making two low-sensitivity fields mandatory decreased the revelation ratio for
the high sensitivity item date of birth (p < 0.02, G-test) as well as for the medium
sensitivity item of being a good person (p < 0.04, G-test).
Only participants who provided answers to questions 3 and 7 are considered for
this analysis, regardless of whether they were in a condition where these questions were
mandatory or optional. Within this group, disclosure behaviour for the remaining fields
depended on whether questions 3 and 7 were marked as mandatory or optional. The
average number of fields completed when questions 3 and 7 were marked as mandatory
is reduced by about 1.3 fields in T? compared to T? (p< 0.0001, two-tailed t-test). The
data therefore suggests that as the number of mandatory fields in the form increased,
the total number of completed fields decreased. Also negatively affected is the revela-
tion ratio for date of birth: fewer participants were willing to disclose it in T? than in
T? (p < 0.0001, G-test).
2All quotes in this chapter are reproduced as they were written by participants, no [sic] is used.
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Providing a bonus
It was hypothesised that providing a bonus for filling in certain fields would increase
completion rates for those fields. Providing a bonus for certain fields yields the same
disclosure ratio as mandatoriness (p = 0.55, Fisher’s exact test). A bonus improves
disclosure for fields that are optional (TB25 vs. T?: p < 0.0001, Fisher’s exact test). A
comparison between TB25 and T50 shows that incentives for disclosing low sensitivity
data also increase disclosure for the remaining, optional, medium, and high sensitivity
fields on the same form (good person: p = 0.002, DOB: p < 0.001; Fisher’s exact
test). H3 is therefore supported.
6.2.5 Questionnaire results
Reasons for completing the form
Using an open-ended question, participants were asked in the follow-up questionnaire
why they had completed the form. The free-text answers were coded into up to three
reasons for each participant.
54% of participants stated they participated for the money. This comes as no
surprise for study conducted on a crowd-sourcing platform. 30% said they completed
the form as it looked easy. 15% indicated they had participated out of joy while 25%
because it was interesting. Original responses include: “I enjoy filling out surveys”
(P1022), “I enjoy doing surveys as a way to destress” (P48) or “It looked interesting,
fun and easy to do” (P3). This is opposed to the received wisdom that form-filling is a
nuisance. To have their opinion heard or to help research was named by 3% and 8% of
the follow-up participants respectively. Exemplary answers include: “I think it’s really
cool to be part of a statistic analysis, to contribute my thoughts and experiences to a
collective body of information” (P67), “the opportunity to present an underrepresented
demographic (conservatives, mothers) in surveys” (P163) or “I like taking surveys to
get my opinions heard” (P232). Those being motivated by helping research named
both the researcher and research per se, such as: “I enjoy helping researchers” (P83),
“Any help I can be for research, I am glad to do” (P520) or “I appreciate helping
(even if only a little) with research” (P90).
These motives work towards completing specific fields in the form (e.g., for opin-
ion shaping) and completing more fields on the form (e.g., when wanting to help re-
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search). They can be understood as antecedents for over-disclosure. There is a high
proportion of participants motivated by the base reward or the form itself, combined
with the low proportion of those who used the form to express opinions (2%), or were
motivated by trust in the university (4%). This is promising as it hints that the results
might have more general validity. A G-test for each condition individually and for all
conditions together indicates that over-disclosing date of birth, being a good person
and favourite colour, does not depend on whether participants were motivated by a fi-
nancial incentive. Participants who provided more data items (nine or ten versus eight
and below completed fields) also enjoyed the form more (approaching significance:
p = 0.06, G-test).
Reasons for disclosing DOB
In the follow-up questionnaire, participants were asked about the reasons why they
provided or did not provide their DOB. The group that provided their DOB on the
original form and answered this question in the follow-up questionnaire had 455 par-
ticipants. A thematic analysis of the free-text responses identified four main reasons
why participants provided their DOB: (i) they felt it was not a sensitive piece of infor-
mation, (ii) they wanted to be helpful, (iii) they had the habit of submitting a complete
form, and (iv) they hoped for future rewards.
First, 207 participants (45.5%) explained that they did not mind sharing their DOB
as it was not a sensitive piece of information. P1021 stated: “That doesn’t bother me
- it’s not really personal.”, similarly P24 added: “I didn’t feel like it was personal or
sensitive.” P712 explained this information was already available out there: “It does
not bother me to share my date of birth (I study astrology, so that information tends
to be more public than for most people).” Second, 108 (23.7%) participants stated
they wanted to help research, P5 explained: “I wanted to complete the survey with
all the information that was asked of me, to further help any research that was neces-
sary.” Third, 61 (13.4%) participants felt the urge to complete every field of the form:
“I feel a certain obligation to completely fill out surveys” (P437), “A completionist
instinct I guess. I didn’t feel like leaving any fields blank.” (P370), “Completeness”
(P609), “i felt that i should complete all aspets” (P557), “I like to fully comply with
requests” (P63). Participants were habituated to fill in forms. The following responses
were given: “Force of habit” (P794) and “I probably automatically put it down without
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thinking” (P856). Some participants reported they did not know, if they had provided
their date of birth, which indicates the lack of a conscious decision which might be
an indication that they filled in the form habitually. P341 stated their first instinct was
just to fill in the blanks: “I had filled out all the boxes at first, until I realized it wasn’t
required”. Fourth, 36 (7.9%) participants anticipated future payoffs and intended to
improve their social capital on the platform. P744 stated they participated “to boost
my mturk hit approval rate” and P44 responded saying: “Even though it was optional,
I thought that if I did not disclose the information, you would be unable to classify me
for future HITs and I would miss out on the opportunities.” Additionally to the four
groups of reasons, there were also cases of extroversion, P292 stated “I have a unique
birthday, it being on christmas, so i just wanted to share.”
Reasons for not disclosing DOB
The group that did not provide their DOB on the original form and answered the
question about their motivation in the follow-up questionnaire had 363 participants.
They named different reasons for not having provided their DOB and these can be
grouped into the following categories: (i) participants found the DOB to be too per-
sonal, (ii) they stressed it was optional, (iii) they worried about potential misuse of this
information or (iv) could not remember.
First, 138 (38%) participants stated this information was either personal and/or
identifying, P1016 stated: “It’s private and could potentially identify me.” Second,
111 (30.6%) participants responded saying that this information was optional. P851
explained that DOB was not among the required questions: “You didn’t ask for it in
questions 5 and 6.” Third, 47 (13%) participants mentioned the possibility that the
information could be misused, voicing both security (“DoB is a key piece of infor-
mation for identity thieves.” – P146) and privacy concerns (targeting for marketing).
Fourth, 36 (9.9%) participants could not remember. While some could not remember
being asked (“I don’t remember being asked for it. Apparently I missed a question.”
– P622), others could not remember the reason why they did not provide it (“I’m not
sure why I didn’t to be honest.” – P1139). Out of these 36 participants, three actually
provided their date of birth as a response to the question why they did not provide their
date of birth. For example, P410 wrote: “I did not realize I did not give mt date of
birth, its 11/27/75.”
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6.2.6 Discussion
This section reports on a study conducted with around 1,500 on Amazon Mechanical
Turk asking them to fill in a form with 10 items of personal information. There were
five experimental conditions varying the payment and mandatoriness of fields. Par-
ticipants largely over-disclosed providing information that was not required to receive
payment, even filling in additional details that were not requested. Once certain fields
were mandatory, the disclosure for the remaining optional fields dropped. Conversely,
once there was a bonus for some fields, the disclosure for the remaining fields went
up. In terms of effort, the analysis of participants’ questionnaire responses gave four
interrelated reasons. Participants wanted to be helpful, they filled in the form out of
habit, they did not want to leave any fields blank and they took satisfaction from being
compliant.
Each new field that a participant completed cost them time, cognitive and physical
effort. Participant effort was captured in terms of the time they spent on filling in the
form. Interestingly, 86% of the participants overestimated how long it took them to
submit the form, which might be an indicator that they perceived the form to be a
nuisance. In terms of physical and/or cognitive effort, 30% stated that the form was
easy.
There was a strong impact of habit on participants’ disclosure behaviour. Also
what links to that was being conversational. If one is asked in a normal offline conver-
sation if it is sunny outside, very few would just reply ‘no’. Instead, they would politely
elaborate on the weather conditions. Similarly in the study, P526 explained: “a little,
not very, more like slightly overcast”. The influence of habit has not been studied ex-
tensively in relation to privacy behaviours. An exception is a study by Ko [137] who
investigated self-disclosure through blogs amongst Taiwanese youths. The researcher
found a strong influence of habit that accounted for the continuous use of such plat-
forms.
Participants also wanted to help research, it appears they projected on the task
what was expected of them, what it meant to be a good worker/participant/person and
acted accordingly.
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6.3 Informing disclosure
6.3.1 Study aims and hypotheses
The preceding study showed that users do not keep their effort in dealing with web-
forms to a minimum. The study showed that participants spent more effort and time on
webforms than required as they knowingly provided optional details at 3.5 seconds per
field. Prevalence of over-disclosure was quantified at 57 to 87% for data items such as
date of birth or favourite colour respectively.
More prevalent than voluntary over-disclosure is accidental over-disclosure: the
onus is on the users to tell mandatory and optional fields apart and this can be a difficult
task. When surveying 140 websites, Preibusch and Bonneau [192] found that less than
one third provided visual or textual indicators of which of the webform fields were
mandatory. The preceding study, however, showed that users make clear distinctions
between mandatory and optional fields and – if possible – selectively decide which
fields to leave blank. On a form which features a mix of mandatory and optional fields,
the latter see significantly lower disclosure rates compared to the former and compared
to a form featuring no mandatory fields. This might be an indication that if users knew
what was required, they would only fill in fields that were mandatory and in this way
limit disclosure and protect their privacy.
In the absence of visual or other hints regarding the mandatoriness of input fields,
identifying the minimum set of data items could be time- and effort-consuming. It
would require a user to leave a field blank and attempt to submit the form to see if the
form is accepted despite the field(s) being empty. Depending on the server logic behind
the form this would need to be done with every combination of fields. Additionally,
after an unsuccessful submission, the previously entered data might become removed
and would require re-entry.
The study aimed to identify the characteristics of actionable privacy alerts, focus-
ing in particular on the wording of the warning messages, the different options offered
to the user, and the characteristics of the audience. Eight hypotheses guided the analy-
sis of the results.
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Warning text
Warnings currently deployed in browsers typically feature a short message that men-
tions the diagnosis, why the warning was displayed, and optionally explains the threat
(Fig. 6.4).
Figure 6.4: Screenshot of an existing privacy warning in Internet Explorer.
Since as discussed earlier, security events are associated with a more definite outcome
than privacy events, it is hypothesised that users who will see a security warning will
be more likely to delete information than those who will see a privacy warning. It
is further hypothesised that the mention of security and privacy will have a stronger
impact on the user than not providing such an explanation.
H1a: Users presented with warnings mentioning privacy and security threats will
delete previously entered data.
H1b: Users presented with a warning mentioning security will be more likely to delete
previously entered data than those presented with a warning mentioning privacy.
H1c: Users presented with a warning which has no accompanying explanation will be
less likely to delete previously entered information than those presented with a
warning that mentions a privacy or security threat.
Item sensitivity
It is hypothesised that the impact of the warning will depend on item sensitivity. Users
who are asked to provide personal data on a webform can restrict its proliferation by
either leaving the fields blank or by deleting previously entered data. Data items with
low sensitivity do not need to be deleted; data items with high sensitivity cannot be
deleted if users did not provide them in the first place. One can therefore predict a
U-shaped relationship between data item sensitivity and its likelihood of deletion after
a privacy warning.
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H2: Users will be more likely to remove sensitive information while keeping the less
sensitive information in place (U-shaped relationship).
Time and effort
Filling out a form requires an amount of work and humans tend to be protective of what
they have produced. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the more time the participant
spent on filling out the form, the less likely they will be to remove their entries and let
all this work and time invested be for nothing. This reflects the sunk cost fallacy and
the escalation of commitment as discussed in Section 2.1.2.
H3a: The more time users spent on filling out the form, the less likely they will be to
remove the information entered.
Furthermore, as current security advice instructs the user to perform time- and
effort-consuming checks, tool support should be better integrated with security mecha-
nisms to take some of the effort off the user. It is therefore hypothesised that a warning
that provides the options to remove non-mandatory information for the user will be
preferred.
H3b: Users will prefer options that minimise effort and save time over other options.
Demographic characteristics
It is hypothesised that the decision to go back and delete some information after hav-
ing seen a warning could be associated with users’ computer literacy as the level of
knowledge might help them more accurately assess the risk linked to disclosing per-
sonal information online. As previous research demonstrated an impact of cyberthreat
exposure on user behaviour [141], it is hypothesised that prior experience of viruses,
fraud and scam will be associated with users’ willingness to provide the requested
information.
H4a: Users will differ in their deletion/altering behaviour depending on their levels of
computer literacy.
H4b: Users will differ in their deletion/altering behaviour depending on their cy-
berthreat exposure.
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6.3.2 Method
Design
As previously, the study consisted of an experiment and a follow-up questionnaire.
Experiment
The webform and all instructions used were directly replicated from the preceding
study (Section 6.2.3).
Upon attempting to submit the webform, a warning was shown if the participant
had filled in any non-mandatory fields (Fig. 6.5). No warning was displayed unless
at least one optional field was filled in. The warning text typically consisted of two
sentences – the statement saying the user has completed some non-mandatory fields
and the mention that this can be a threat to their security or privacy.
Figure 6.5: An example of a warning used in the study (condition WS1HO, security warning –
highlight optional fields).
The study was a between-subjects design. The form presented as the task in-
cluded two check questions that required reading and understanding the instructions.
Payment of $0.50 was unconditional of participants’ answers to the check questions.
In the following, those who answered both check questions correctly are considered
as having understood the instructions including the optionality of the form fields. The
other participants who answered at least one check question incorrectly or neither are
classified as not having read and/or understood the instructions.
Eight types of warnings were used in the study. They can be divided into two
groups: (1) four manual warnings varying the message and (2) four one-click warnings
varying the options on the buttons. Table 6.2 provides an overview of the warnings
used in all eight conditions. The first warning (WS) mentioned security, while the
second privacy (WP) as the explanation for why it was being shown. The warning in
the WNX condition (no explanation) did not provide an explanation and only stated:
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“You have completed some non-mandatory fields”. The warning in the WO condition
(o as in ‘orthography’) served as a control: it stated that there may be spelling mistakes
in some fields and gave the explanation that it can be difficult for others to read a text
that contains spelling mistakes.
A control condition was chosen that displayed a warning instead of removing
the intervention altogether. The rationale behind it was to confront participants with
the stimulus warning to see if it impacted their altering behaviour. The idea is to
benchmark against the absence of a privacy/security warning rather than the absence of
a warning at all. The baseline of undisturbed disclosure rates is available by observing
participants’ behaviour in the preceding study or in this study, before participants saw
the warning.
A spelling warning is well-suited for the following reasons. First, spelling errors
are a real and credible ‘threat’. They are potentially embarrassing but are not related to
security or privacy. Second, it is a plausible pop-up since spelling is something where
tool support is already widely implemented. Third, manual investigation is needed
from the user: similarly to the security and privacy warnings, the participants needed
to go back and inspect each field. The warning in the control condition was structured
in the same way as in the conditions WS and WP, they all provided a diagnosis and an
explanation, totalling three lines of text.
For the one-click warnings, the same warning text was used as in the security
warning (condition WS). Again, there were two buttons for each warning. The first
one always said “Submit anyway” while the second one was subject to our manipu-
lation. The four phrases used for the second button can be subdivided into two cat-
egories: highlighting and manipulating. For highlighting, “Highlight filled optional”
was juxtaposed with “Highlight all optional”. A screenshot of what the highlighting
looked like in condition WS1HO can be seen in Appendix D. For the manipulating
buttons, “Submit only mandatory” was juxtaposed with “Clear optional fields”. When
confronted with one of the warnings, participants had to make a choice, they could not
proceed unless they clicked on either of these two buttons.
Why use warnings? Although active warnings are (at least initially) more effective
in alerting users and making them change their course of action, there is also a cost
associated with them. For instance, research has shown that most certificate warnings
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condition warning
WS Security warning:
You have completed some non-mandatory fields.
Revealing too much about yourself online can be a
threat to the security of your personal information.
WP Privacy warning:
You have completed some non-mandatory fields.
Revealing too much about yourself online can be a
threat to the privacy of your personal information.
WNX Warning (no explanation):
You have completed some non-mandatory fields.
WO Orthography warning (control condition):
There may be spelling mistakes in some fields.
It can be difficult for other people to read a text with
spelling mistakes.
WS1HO Security warning: highlights all optional.
highlight optional fields
WS1HFO Security warning: highlights filled optional.
highlight optional fields
WS1SM Security warning: submits only mandatory.
submit only mandatory
WS1CO Security warning: clears optional.
clear optional fields
Table 6.2: Overview of experimental conditions: over-disclosure warnings used in the study.
appear to be false positives [112]. Users heeding a certificate warning would not benefit
from added security as there was no threat in the first place. But more importantly,
heeding security advice often means users are prevented from completing their primary
task. For instance, checking URLs is time-consuming, while attacks are rare. For that
reason, Herley stresses that ignoring security advice is rational from an economic point
of view [112] as human memory and attention are a finite resource [113].
The use of warnings can also be desensitising since studies have shown that users
are habituated to warnings and ignore them. Krol et al. [141] showed that users dismiss
warnings if they have the impression that they appear indiscriminately for all the items
they attempt to download.
Despite this overwhelming evidence against warnings, it was decided to imple-
ment over-disclosure warnings as active pop-up windows that interrupt the primary
task since otherwise they might not have been noticed by the participants. The evi-
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dence from studies on security indicators shows that passive warnings are less likely
to attract users’ attention. This represents a ‘fail early’ approach – to know whether
an over-disclosure indicator works, it is better to test it in its active form that would be
noticed. If it is effective and receives user acceptance, then it should be explored if and
in what form it could work as a passive indicator.
Furthermore, this study is meant to map out and explore the design space of differ-
ent warning parameters. Importantly, the differential assessment of wording effective-
ness and the acceptance rate of different privacy remedies suggested by the warning,
are independent of whether a warning is passive or active.
Success metric. Security warnings may be dismissed because they are seen as a false
alarm but an accurate security warning applies to all users. For privacy threats, the
situation is rather different: even an accurate privacy warning may still be dismissible
depending on the user’s specific privacy preferences. In other words, security is a ‘yes
or no’, privacy is a spectrum. While in security users cannot partially get infected with
a virus, in privacy they can disclose some personal information but withhold other.
The users’ risk analysis must be more nuanced and the warning design has to have a
built-in feature allowing them not to follow the warning’s privacy-enhancing advice.
Our study therefore adopts a success metric that does not presuppose universal pri-
vacy preferences. Warnings are considered successful not only if participants deleted
previously entered information. Instead, this research adopts two different criteria.
(1) The warnings are considered effective if users return to the form and revisit the
information entered. The warning’s actionability is assessed by the click-through rates
generated by the privacy-enhancing response option on the warning. (2) Also the
post-experimental ratings for usability are analysed to establish if users considered the
warnings helpful, easy to understand and relevant.
Follow-up questionnaire
At least one day after completing the experiment, participants were sent an invitation
to fill out a feedback questionnaire for which they received an additional payment of
$1.50. A reminder was sent to those who had not completed the questionnaire.
The questionnaire started by reminding the participant of the original webform
with a screenshot. There was no option to enlarge it so participants could not read
the original questions or instructions. The aim was to make participants recall the
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original experiment rather than base their answers on what they saw. The questions in
the questionnaire can be divided into four main groups. (1) The first nine questions
related to the survey asking if the participant enjoyed the original task of completing
the webform, how long they spent filling it out, if they had revealed any personal or
sensitive data in it, and what they thought the intended purpose of the original form
was. (2) Further questions related to computer and security experience. Within that,
the first one aimed to gauge the participant’s computer literacy and consisted of 14
sub-questions. The second one focused on cyberthreat exposure and contained eight
sub-questions. (3) There were 10 questions relating to the warning. (4) Finally, four
questions asked for demographic information.
The follow-up questionnaire was completed by 87% of the original participant
population (response rate). For 3,203 participants, there were the complete records of
form filling behaviour plus feedback data. For a random subset of the participants, the
link could not be established with the first phase.
Participants
Participants were workers on the mTurk platform, all recruited to be based in the
United States. According to the data provided in the follow-up questionnaire, the ma-
jority of the participants were aged 18 to 24 years (36%), 25 to 29 (23%) and 30 to
39 (21%). 16% of participants were aged 40 or older; less than 4% refused to indicate
their age bracket. Male participants made up 53% of the sample. Regarding formal
education, 28% had completed one or more years of college and an additional 7% had
completed their college with an associate degree (for example, AA, AS). 30% had com-
pleted a bachelor’s degree (for example, BA, AB, BS), and additional 7% a master’s
degree. For 16% of participants, English was not the language spoken at home.
6.3.3 Experiment results
General results
Findings from the preceding study as to the level of disclosure were corroborated.
Amongst participants who were aware that none of these details were required, all per-
sonal details were disclosed by at least three quarters of participants, with the excep-
tion of date of birth, which was still revealed by more than two thirds of participants.
Favourite colour was the data item volunteered most often (84%). First name occupied
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rank five when ordering data items by disclosure rate; in the subsequent analysis date
of birth, first name and favourite colour are considered as representative for data items
of high, medium and low sensitivity, in line with extant literature that takes disclosure
rates as a proxy for sensitivity [191]. Date of birth was also the field left blank most
often (19%), well ahead of spending, which was the field left blank second-most often.
91%
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First name
Current city
Favourite colour
Siblings
Weather sunny
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Computer browser
Health good
Date of birth
Person good
accidentallyknowingly
Figure 6.6: Initial disclosure rates for each of the ten items of personal information collected
on the form. Knowing disclosure applies to those participants who had read the
instructions and correctly answered the check questions; accidental disclosure ap-
plies to those who had not.
Interestingly, participants who had not read the instructions and who were thus
unaware that disclosure was voluntary, shared more personal details with high statisti-
cal difference (p < 0.0001, two-tailed t-test). The average number of fields completed
by participants who had not read the instructions was 9.1 and thus 1.0 items more on
average. Amongst the unaware, 80% fully filled the form with all ten items of personal
data compared to 64% amongst those who had read the instructions. Similarly, a blank
form was submitted less often by the former than by the latter (6% versus 10%). Con-
sequently, disclosure rates are much higher when participants ignore the optionality of
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the data requirements, with all of them being above 90% except date of birth with 83%
(Fig. 6.6).
Hypotheses
For simplification, the following analysis is mainly based on three data items to cover
the whole sensitivity spectrum. The sensitivity of these items was established based on
three sources. Exogenously based on the results from two different, previously con-
ducted experiments which requested them and then asked participants to rate them in
the post-experiment questionnaires [193, 162] as well as endogenously. Endogenously,
the initial (i.e., pre-warning) completion rates are considered from this study, as out-
lined earlier in this section. Based on these, date of birth (DOB) was identified as the
high-sensitivity data item as it had the highest proportion (19%) of participants who
left it blank (69% completion rate, lowest), first name as the medium-sensitivity item
(81% completion rate, ranked fifth out of 10) and favourite colour as the low-sensitivity
one (84% completion rate, highest).
H1a: Mentioning privacy and security. It was hypothesised that warnings evoking
privacy and security threats will make users delete previously entered data. When
comparing the deletion ratios for the security and privacy warnings with the control
condition (WO), for example for date of birth: the deletion ratio was 26% for WS,
25% for WP but only 4% for WO. The comparison for the three items of differing
sensitivity showed that warnings evoking security and privacy threats made users delete
previously entered data (p< 0.0001 at least for all items, G-test of independence). H1a
is therefore supported.
H1b: Security vs. privacy. It was hypothesised that those confronted with a warning
mentioning security will be more likely to delete previously entered data than those
confronted with a warning mentioning privacy. For the security warning (WS), the
deletion ratio was 27% for DOB, 26% for first name, and 14% for favourite colour.
In the post-experiment questionnaire, participants indicated the security warning as
being more severe than the privacy warning (rated 4.6 versus 4.4 out of 7, p = 0.03,
two-tailed t-test). The distribution of severity ratings is shown in Figure 6.8. For the
privacy warning (WS), deletion rates were very similar (Fig. 6.7). It was hypothesised
that the security warning could have a stronger impact on the users than the privacy
one. However, this difference was not statistically significant for any of the three levels
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Figure 6.8: Perceived severity of the warning by condition, as rated by the participants in
the follow-up questionnaire. The graph shows the proportion of participants who
perceived the corresponding warning at least as severe.
of sensitivity: high (p= 0.92), medium (p= 0.50) and low (p= 0.78). H1b is therefore
rejected.
H1c: Providing no explanation. It was hypothesised that a warning providing no
explanation will have a lower deletion ratio than warnings giving an explanation. A
comparison of WS and WNX showed that the proportion was more than double across
all levels of item sensitivity. There were significant differences across all items (low:
p = 0.00001; medium: p < 0.00001; high: p < 0.00001). H1c is therefore supported.
Additionally, the warning that provided no explanation was rated as the least usable in
the follow-up questionnaire, achieving an even lower score than the orthography one.
Although the analyses of results are based on participants who had read and un-
derstood the instructions, it is interesting to assess post-warning deletion patterns for
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those who had not read the instructions. In the combined WS and WP conditions, dele-
tion ratios are significantly lower amongst those who had not read the instructions (for
date of birth: p = 0.002; for first name: p< 0.001; Fisher’s exact test; n.s. for favourite
colour). It could be argued that this might reflect overall lower engagement with the
task at hand. Not only did participants not invest the time to read the instructions, but
they also wanted to submit the form as quickly as possible, thereby not spending time
on re-visiting their entries.
In the WNX condition, the difference in deletion ratios between those who had
read the instructions and those who had not is similarly pronounced as for the pri-
vacy/security warnings that featured an explanation. The WNX warning stimulated a
deletion action only for current city and date of birth.
H2: Item sensitivity. It was hypothesised that more sensitive items will be removed
more often, forming a U-shaped relationship. Data sensitivity ratings were taken ex-
ogenously from a study by Malheiros et al. [162], where participants indicated their
willingness to disclose a variety of data items online. Ratings were recorded on a
four-point Likert scale (1 – happy to provide, 4 – unhappy to provide). The data items
asked on the webform were mapped on those for which data item sensitivity ratings
were available (e.g., ‘good’ was mapped to ‘health’). The relationship was then ap-
proximated by a polynomial trend (Fig. 6.9). Highest deletion ratios were observed
for items with medium willingness to disclose; low deletion ratios were observed for
items with low or high willingness to disclose, such as favourite colour or health re-
spectively. A parabolic fit explains a high 73% of the variance (R2 = 0.7317). H2 is
therefore supported.
H3a: Sunk cost fallacy. It was hypothesised that in line with the sunk cost fallacy
the more time a participant spent on filling out the form, the less they will be likely
to remove the information entered. On average, participants saw the warning after 86
seconds on the form (range between 82 seconds for WS1HO and 91 seconds for WO).
As expected, there is no statistically significant difference across the conditions (two-
tailed t-test: p = 0.12). The data across all conditions are therefore considered. Partic-
ipants who took more time completing the form were more likely to delete information
than those who had spent less time on the form (p = 0.02, G test of independence).
This is the exact opposite of what was hypothesised, H3a is therefore rejected.
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Figure 6.9: A parabolic (U-shaped) relationship between item sensitivity and deletion ratio.
H3b: Options minimising effort. It was hypothesised that the options that minimise
user effort and save time will be preferred. From the warnings that varied the options
on the buttons, the one with the highest click-through rate was ‘highlight optional’
(53%), ‘followed by clear optional’ (43%) and ‘submit only mandatory’ (34%). This
came as a surprise since it was hypothesised that the warning that would minimise user
effort would be preferred. H3b is therefore rejected.
H4a: Computer literacy. It was hypothesised that participants will differ in their dele-
tion/altering behaviour depending on their levels of computer literacy. Computer liter-
acy was measured with an eight-item question battery (reliability measured by Cron-
bach’s alpha: α = 0.69). Participants were asked whether they had ever performed
tasks indicative of elevated computer literacy. This included changes to computer con-
figurations, some which were security-related (various browser settings, firewall con-
figuration), registered a domain or designed a website, or unscrewed anything on their
laptop or PC. Participants generally showed a high level of computer literacy, with the
lowest skill being ever having written some computer programme at 33%. As many as
95% respectively 92% of participants had changed the homepage or the default search
engine in their browser. In the context of the study (webform completion behaviour
and usage of browser-provided privacy-enhancing technologies), these are very high
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Figure 6.10: Deletion prevalence by computer literacy score.
values. Fewer than 1% of participants did not know whether they had done so, also
indicating high literacy about these computer concepts.
Deletion behaviour was distributed uniformly over varying levels of computer
literacy as presented in Figure 6.10. There was no statistically significant relationship
between participants’ deletion behaviour and their computer literacy. Hypothesis H4a
is therefore rejected.
H4b: Cyberthreat exposure. It was hypothesised that participants will differ in their
deletion/altering behaviour depending on their cyberthreat exposure. The term ‘cy-
berthreat exposure’ was adopted from Sunshine et al. [247], but expanded since their
original item battery only contained four questions. A 14-item battery of yes/no ques-
tions (reliability measured by Cronbach’s alpha: α = 0.70) was used. Questions in-
cluded: whether participants had ever been victims of cybercrime (e.g., hacked email
or other online accounts), Internet-mediated fraud (e.g., phishing, spam), banking
fraud (e.g., fraudulent transactions) and privacy crime in particular (e.g., data breaches,
identity theft). As with computer literacy, there were two check questions here (after
questions 4 and 9) to ensure the participants were paying attention. The individual
scores were calculated for each participant by giving each affirmative answer the score
of 1 and summing these. Figure 6.11 shows the results. When mapped on deletion
behaviour, there was no clear trend there. Hypothesis H4b is therefore rejected.
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6.3.4 Questionnaire results
Reasons for disclosure
Based on their disclosure in the experiment, participants were asked in the follow-
up questionnaire for the reasons why they provided or did not provide their date of
birth (DOB). Since these were free-text responses, participants were able to provide as
many reasons as they wanted (or none at all) and there was no length restriction for
their answers.
Reasons for disclosing DOB. Amongst those who provided their DOB, the most com-
mon reason for why they did so was that they did not mind (308 out of 1,612 responses,
19%). P76 explained: “I did not mind revealing that information.” This was followed
by participants saying they did not see any harm in providing it (297, 18%). Apart
from that, 17% stated they did so to help research in some way. Also the sensitivity of
the DOB was thematised by participants; 15% of participants stated the DOB was not
a sensitive or personal piece of information whereas 16% that it was a sensitive piece
of information but they gave another reason why it was fine to disclose it this time.
For instance, P15 stated: “While its sensitive information, I don’t feel too concerned
about sharing it.” Also, 10% stated they thought providing their DOB would bring
some benefits with 87 (5%) emphasising a benefit to themselves, P397 stated: “If i
give you my date of birth, You may use it for helping me”. Interestingly, 159 (10%)
participants filled in their DOB to satisfy their completionist instinct, P91 explained:
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“It would have bothered me more to have everything filled in but that one.” Further,
130 (8%) participants argued that they their DOB was already out there so not pro-
viding it on the form would not have made much difference: “Date of birth is easy to
obtain through a simple google search, more information is typically available on the
average users facebook page” (P879). P118 also assessed the probability of something
bad happening as low: “My date of birth it public information that can be easily found.
The likelihood of a negative outcome from giving this information was low.” Partici-
pants also reported on their coping strategies, 5% of participants stated they provided
an incomplete DOB (e.g., only year or only day and month). Also time and effort were
thematised, one answer was particularly interesting as it shows that users are attempt-
ing to economise their effort, P318 said: “it took about as long to enter it as it would
have to think about whether or not i wanted to enter it.” Finally, 43 (3%) participants
stated it had become their habit to enter their DOB.
Reasons for not disclosing DOB. When asked why participants did not provide their
date of birth, two responses dominated: 34% (693 out of 2,060) of participants stressed
their DOB was a sensitive or personal piece of information and 32% emphasised the
DOB was an optional form field. Further, 11% participants said that DOB can be used
to identify them. Interestingly, 4% of participants mentioned that the DOB could help
identify them when combined with other information they provided on the form or
that someone could find on the Internet, P96 explained: “I thought you might be able
to use that, along with my first name, and my city to search other databases and get
more information about me.” Also, 5% of participants stressed providing their DOB
could harm them in some way; for example, P3585 stated: “It can be used to steal my
identity”. Interestingly, 169 (8%) participants stated they heeded the warning that told
them to limit disclosure. Also, 6% stressed they did not see the reason why their DOB
was needed in this situation and 2% said they would have had no problem providing
their age but not their full DOB.
Warnings have a bad reputation
There were several participants who expressed gratitude for being able to participate in
the study saying it taught them a lesson: “its to make sure to let you know that you don’t
have to put in all you info. i wish more websites had notifications like that” (P2658).
However, participants expressed negative attitudes towards warnings and were disillu-
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sioned about the reasons why the industry used them. Overall, 12 participants in the
study interpreted the warning as a means to transfer liability for keeping the data se-
cure from the requester or mTurk onto the user. P719 stated the purpose of the warning
was “To try to protect the liability of the company or website it was displayed on” and
P2090 thought the warning was “[a] disclaimer that the information [they] provided
will be at [their] own risk.”
There were three participants for whom the control condition, the orthography
warning, did not work. P1525 described what they thought the purpose of the warning
was by saying: “It was a verification request to make certain I wanted to submit the
form in the previous survey. It was slightly funny in that it pointed out the reasoning
was because of spelling errors and not because of security issues.” This shows that
pop-up warnings have a strong connotation with security advice. Similarly, P1735
stated: “I had never seen this before on turk. I thought it was strange. I felt like it
meant that I hadn’t filled out all of the fields, and so I should go back and check them.”
Possibility of tapping into existing knowledge
Some participants also read things into the warning that were not included there. With-
out being prompted, 354 (9%) participants mentioned some type of crime that could
happen as a consequence of over-disclosure, the most common was identity theft. P116
stated: “any information you share online could be used against you; even information
that is vaguely identifying could lead to potential theft of your identity.” The fact that
US population seems to be particularly aware of identity theft could be used in the
future to illustrate possible consequences of over-disclosure in the warning text.
6.3.5 Discussion
Warning text
The study found that warnings can be effective in reducing users’ privacy exposure
resulting from excessive disclosure of personal details on webforms. It is acknowl-
edged that warnings, as a user experience principle, suffer from fundamental flaws as
discussed in Section 6.3.2 but these would not matter for the research question at hand.
Warnings that evoke a privacy or security threat make users take privacy-
protective measures significantly more often than an arbitrary warning not related to
the threats of disclosing personal data. When comparing the conditions where users
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were warned about over-disclosure with the condition notifying users about spelling
mistakes, the former resulted in users going back to the form and removing previously
entered details with much higher prevalence. Therefore, the fact that users disclosed
fewer optional data items is not due to just any warning, but specifically due to the
privacy and security warnings containing an explanation.
The results show that it made no difference whether the threat evoked was negative
privacy or security consequences. Participants were nearly equally likely to delete
previously entered information after having seen either of the warnings. However,
providing an explanation increased the deletion ratio. This corroborates the findings by
Egelman et al. [67] who found that participants were more tolerant of security delays
if the threat was explained to them. Similarly here, when there was no explanation
provided, participants rated the warning as less severe and less usable. The explanation
is an aid for participants to make an informed decision about the real threat. They are
thus more able to choose an action that better reflects their privacy preferences. One
can argue such explanations are important for users even when the privacy indicator
would not be deployed as an active pop-up warning.
Item sensitivity
Data sensitivity is a traditional operationalisation of privacy threats. The law enumer-
ates a list of particularly sensitive data items and it is corporate practice that certain
items require protection above and beyond the safeguards implemented for other items
of personally identifiable information. However, data sensitivity does not seem to be
a decisive factor for users’ behaviour regarding disclosing or withholding their per-
sonal details; its influence is less significant than that of perceived relevance and fair-
ness [162]. At the same time, disclosure rates were previously identified as a way to
measure privacy concerns and those varied by data item sensitivity [191].
Users’ deletion behaviours were found to vary significantly by data item sensitiv-
ity, but the relationship is not monotonous. One the one hand, users do not delete low
sensitivity items they had previously entered, as the privacy threat may not exceed their
desire to disclose. On the other hand, high sensitivity items cannot be deleted because
users left those fields blank in the first place, knowing their optionality. Consequently,
medium sensitivity items are deleted most often.
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Contributions of the study
Material results. This study explored the uncharted territory of over-disclosure indi-
cators and found that warnings can help users manage the disclosure of optional details
through webforms. The main lessons learned include: the mention of privacy/security
threats makes a privacy warning effective and an explanation of the threats associated
with disclosure further heighten users’ propensity to remove previously entered per-
sonal details. Actionable warnings are characterised by keeping the user in control as
to which items they would like to remove from a webform: optimisation for reduced
manual effort leads to lower acceptance than giving users the choice about which op-
tional fields to submit and which ones to erase.
Methodological contributions. The study stands out from previous research into pri-
vacy by (i) being a true experiment (ii) in a naturalistic environment (iii) tested on a
large number of participants (iv) using fully functional warnings. First, there have been
numerous studies in both security and privacy showing that there is a discrepancy be-
tween users’ reported and actual privacy and security choices (e.g., [24, 141]). Users’
actual reactions were studied here: participants were not asked about their apprecia-
tion of privacy-enhancing tool support but the warnings were trialled under scrutiny
and objective metrics were adopted to assess their effectiveness. Participants took part
in the study in their homes as opposed to in a lab. If a study is conducted in a lab, par-
ticipants might feel less comfortable and there might be a trust relationship between
the experimenters and the participants. An online study at least partially removes such
bias (there is still a potential impact of the requester’s mTurk reputation). Third, each
warning was tested on hundreds of participants which would not have been feasible if
the study was lab-based. Fourth, in exploratory studies, the warnings or designs used
are sometimes mock-ups which can give the participants the impression the interaction
is not real. In the study presented here, the warnings were fully functional, they did
what they said they would. For instance, if the ‘clear’ or the ‘highlight’ buttons were
pressed, form fields were actually erased or flagged.
But aren’t warnings bad? Previous research has shown that warnings are effortful
and users are conditioned to ignore them. Feedback data from the study confirmed that
users have negative associations with warnings. For these reasons, an over-disclosure
warning should ideally be implemented as a browser plug-in that would highlight
6.4. Conclusions 157
mandatory and optional fields for the user while a webform loads on a website. In this
way, one could achieve visible but non-disruptive warnings – users would not need to
click them away to continue with their primary task. However, unlike previous passive
indicators discussed in Section 2.5.4, they would not be placed on the periphery of
the screen but in the centre of the user’s visual attention. The plug-in could also be
configurable and the user could pre-define what kind of information they are comfort-
able sharing with what type of website. This would pave the way for a context-aware
auto-fill feature. The results of the study show that a more paternalistic approach, such
as suppressing optional form fields, needs to be assessed carefully given users’ quest
for control.
Further research. Future research could juxtapose privacy indicators of over-
disclosure over a longer period of time to measure how they would impact users’
actions. Only such panel studies can assess habituation effects, counter-balance nov-
elty biases and observe reactions across contexts. The development of robust success
metrics will be key in guiding the development of such privacy-enhancing tool sup-
port. A long-running study would allow privacy indicators to become part of the web
browsing routine, making it possible to investigate appropriation and habituation. The
indicators would need to be implemented in real life which is not difficult as it used
to be. HTML5 introduced advanced webform mark-up capabilities that include an at-
tribute for form fields to indicate whether it is optional or required [264]. In addition,
the browser could examine and interpret existing visual cues. Browsers have access
to a combination of signals to sense the mandatoriness of fields and advise the user
accordingly.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter presented the results of two studies investigating user disclosure be-
haviours when completing webforms. The received wisdom is that filling in webforms
is a nuisance; nevertheless, both studies presented in this chapter showed that users
over-disclose at the expense of time, cognitive and physical effort. The first study var-
ied the mandatoriness and incentives to assess their impact on disclosure behaviour.
Once some fields were marked as mandatory, disclosure dropped for the remaining
optional fields. Once there was a bonus for some fields, disclosure increased for the
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remaining unincentivised fields. The message from both conditions is that users adapt
their behaviour if there is some indicator as to what is expected of them. If there is
none, they tend to just fill in all the blanks. Participants’ over-disclosure could be at-
tributed to the fact that it was easier just to fill in all the information than to try and
submit a form with only some fields and then have it rejected. It could be a way of par-
ticipants dealing with uncertainty that they completed everything “just in case”. The
second study addressed the fact that most webforms online do not provide mandatori-
ness indicators and it tested eight types of over-disclosure warnings. Users preferred
warnings that provided an explanation and preferred options that left them in control
even at the expense of effort.
6.4.1 Limitations
Both studies described in this chapter might suffer from the following limitations:
(1) they observed one-off reactions, (2) the sample of participants might not have been
representative, (3) the primary task was weak, (4) there might have been a trust bias
and (5) participants might have falsified their webform entries.
First, both experiments focused on only one reaction to a webform or one instance
of a warning and this might not be representative of the participants’ general behaviour
in varying situations. A longitudinal study to examine repeated reactions to the same
warning is therefore necessary.
Second, both studies might have suffered from a sampling bias. By deploying
on mTurk, the studies could have had a bias towards people who are used to filling
in forms. The skills and the mindset of mTurk workers may be such that they are
trained to complete forms quickly. However, when optimising for speed, uniformity
and thereby over-disclosure may be more desirable than time-consuming selective dis-
closure. However, compliance with instructions was carefully checked and those par-
ticipants who had not passed the check questions were removed from the analysis. The
mTurk platform does not provide access to participant statistics, such as the number
of previously completed tasks for each worker, which could have been a moderating
variable.
When it comes to the representativeness of the sample, there have been stud-
ies that showed that the mTurk population is diverse across several demographic di-
mensions such as gender, age and income [210]. One might argue that workers on
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the mTurk platform may deliberately over-disclose to increase their chances of future
working opportunities. In this study, participants might have believed the webform was
a pre-screen for future tasks. In the exit questionnaire, participants were asked about
their motivation and there was only limited evidence for signalling behaviour. How-
ever, one should note that the quest for future tasks can hardly explain over-disclosure
at this level of detail. Also, most mTurk workers are trained for compliance with in-
structions rather than for volunteering personal data.
Third, since security and privacy are secondary tasks that users encounter while
performing a primary task online [220], a study has to mimic this to produce ecologi-
cally valid results. Although there was no explicit cover story provided for collecting
the data, it is likely that the participants considered the form to be a pre-screen for
future tasks. One could argue that the lack of an explicit primary task could have made
participants more suspicious or on the contrary, more inclined to volunteer their details.
Fourth, the studies might have been biased by participants trusting a university as
a requester more than they would trust a commercial entity. However, only a minority
of participants named trust as a driver for participation (4% in the first study). It is
important to note that well-known retailers or social networks may benefit from similar
trust biases resulting from brand effects.
Fifth, it might be argued that the participants in the studies had no motivation to
provide correct information and this could invalidate the results. Due to the deployment
specifics of the experiments, it was not possible to perform data verification. However,
commercial websites are similarly handicapped in their ability to test the accuracy of
users’ personal information, but the motives for voluntary over-disclosure work against
lying. Also, misreporting only partially affects the effort of over-disclosure: the typing
effort for an answer is independent of its truthfulness. Also in the exit questionnaire,
participants were asked what they thought the purpose for collecting this information
was and 287 (7%) answered it might be to pre-screen them for future tasks. Thus, the
more accurate the information, the more likely they would be invited to the correct
future tasks.

Chapter 7
Discussion
7.1 Summary of work
The six studies presented in this doctoral dissertation examined security and privacy
behaviours through the lens of human effort. Two studies using authentication diaries
and interviews aimed to capture the effort required to authenticate in an organisation
and for online banking respectively. Further two studies examined the usability, ef-
fort and user acceptance of proposed mechanisms for authentication and verification.
Finally, the last two studies investigated how users disclose information about them-
selves through webforms, with the second study assessing the impact of warnings on
user disclosure behaviours.
7.2 How do users manage their effort?
Both authentication diary studies documented the various coping strategies partici-
pants employed to manage their authentication effort. These can be divided into facing
authentication and avoiding it where avoidance can be permanent or temporary, de-
pending on if the user postpones authenticating or removes the need to authenticate
entirely. Postponing authentication means that users move the effort to a moment
where it is more convenient to take the time, recall (or look up) their password and log
in. This often happens when the authentication effort might interfere with the user’s
work as physical and cognitive effort might take the user’s mind off their primary task.
An important lesson here is that not all logins are equally effortful as some users back-
grounded logins they performed from muscle memory but foregrounded ones that were
effortful, disruptive and interfered with their work.
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7.2.1 Habituation and familiarity
Both authentication diary studies showed that participants had become used to security,
had developed coping strategies and facing the demands of security tasks was part of
their daily routine. Participants reported being able to enter some of the passwords
from muscle memory habitually without even noticing it. But it was not the case for
2FA where participants stressed they could not automate that process because they
had to generate an OTP on each login. For completing webforms, a proportion of
participants stressed they were used to filling in all the blanks and they did so in the
study “without thinking”.
Habituation is a response of the human brain to deal with environmental signals,
it helps diminish cognitive and physical effort through automation. But in order for
a security task to become automated, the user has to adopt a process or a mechanism
and use it. The authentication in an organisation study showed that sometimes the
user would simply give up or avoid the use of a technology if they consider it too
much effort. The user must be motivated to give a mechanism a try, learn how to
operate, not forget this skill between uses and gradually get into the habit of using it.
This is a hurdle some security mechanisms might not overcome. Humans are goal-
oriented, they want to “get their work done” and not to second guess what the designer
or developer meant or apply thinking to figure out how to use technologies [149].
This holds true especially when there already is a competing mechanism the users
are familiar with that might lead them to achieve the same goal. Switching to a new
technology is always costly and users prefer the familiar.
Habituation is a natural evolutionary response however research studies have seen
it as the enemy of security [10]. The advocated approach is that users should try harder
to focus on warnings or the designers should make warnings harder to ignore. This
approach has been called by Sasse “scaring and bullying people into security” [216].
Instead, systems and warning designers should focus on making indicators work for
users taking their capabilities and natural responses into account.
Closely related to habituation is familiarity; relying on the familiar is a way for
the user to save effort. From a decision making point of view the recognition heuristic
works here in that users choose what appears familiar to them [92]. However, the
danger is that the cues that users rely on might not be valid in the online world as users
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do not realise how easy it is to imitate trust indicators [222] or the ‘look and feel’ of a
reputable website [280].
7.2.2 Cognitive and physical effort
The studies showed that participants were bothered by both cognitive and physical
effort. The problem of physical effort will become even more pronounced in the future
as devices are becoming more ubiquitous and input methods more diverse. In the past,
most devices just had a mouse and a physical keyboard, nowadays touchscreens are
becoming more and more prevalent and virtual keyboards have usability flaws [99].
At the same time, the userbase is becoming more and more diverse including users
with different motor and cognitive capabilities. One solution is that password entry or
verification methods could be optimised for devices and/or user groups. The evidence
from the studies presented here shows that participants were faster authenticating on a
tablet’s touchscreen using the VAG but slower verifying using NoBot.
7.3 The need for control
Throughout all the studies described in this dissertation, participants to some degree
expressed the need to be in control of their tasks and security as part of these tasks.
The coping strategies discussed above are a manifestation of users’ desire to exercise
control over their authentication effort. Participants adopted various coping strategies
in order to move the effort (be it physical or cognitive) to where it was least disruptive
to their primary task. They planned and batched activities to be in control of how they
went about their work.
In the studies that evaluated verification mechanisms, some participants felt that
using NoBot left them outside of control. Deciphering and entering reCAPTCHA text
gave participants the sense of having more influence on the outcome of the verification
than letting NoBot verify them with only a biometric input from them. Participants
preferred to actively prove they were human in order to have a feeling that this was
done correctly and they are not at the mercy of a technology that can lack accuracy.
Users’ desire for control has been documented by several studies in usable secu-
rity and privacy. Ruoti et al. [213] studied participants’ use of different email encryp-
tion software that varied in how much of the underlying encryption process was visible
to the user. Interestingly, participants preferred the system that required more effort as
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encryption was done manually, they also made fewer mistakes and had more trust in
the system. Although the researchers did not directly address this, the need for control
might be behind it as one of their participants stated: “I like that you can see all the
steps of what you’re doing, so you feel more in control of the process” [213, p. 19].
Control has also been documented as a factor in users’ choice of password man-
agers. Karole et al. [130] studied how comfortable users were with giving up control
over their passwords to a password manager. Participants felt they had the greatest
control over their passwords when using USBs and their phone rather than an online
application. The authors concluded that managing passwords locally on their devices
gave participants a feeling of control and authority.
However, the relationship between control and user behaviour has been proven
to be complex. Brandimarte et al. [40] investigated users’ feeling of control and their
willingness to disclose information. They found that the more control their respondents
felt, the more likely they were to disclose information about themselves. This might
have been due to the effect of a ‘risk thermostat’ as described by Adams [5] (previously
mentioned in Section 2.4.3). If users felt they were protected, they were more likely to
share information about themselves.
Also Internet service providers tap into users’ desire to exercise control in the
way they present their services. Vodafone, for example, advertise “Family Time lets
you control who can use broadband and when. Set up your own family network and
control who uses what and when.”1
7.4 Views on effort and security
In the studies described in this dissertation, participants often expressed more general
views on security that revealed their mental models of how they imagine the systems
worked.
7.4.1 “Hard for me, so hard for an attacker!”
In both lab studies evaluating the usability of authentication and verification mecha-
nisms, there was a theme of participants emphasising that security had to be hard to
protect what is valuable to them. In the study examining verification mechanisms,
some participants emphasised that an easy CAPTCHA gave them the perception that
1https://www.vodafone.co.uk/broadband/choices
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anyone could access the system to steal their information and money. Others explained
that CAPTCHAs had to be hard so that they do not make purchases too quickly.
In line with the fundamental security principle saying that the strength of a se-
curity measure should be proportional to the value of the asset it is protecting, the
strength of authentication should be proportional to the importance and value of the
accesses it is protecting. However, the need for stronger authentication should not
mean increasing the burden on users. The old myth that there is a ‘usability-security
trade-off’ leads security experts to assume that it is acceptable for stronger security
to require more effort. The myth affected participants in the studies here where some
consoled themselves that if the mechanism is demanding, it is secure. However, in
the VAG study, the majority of participants were frank that they found the mecha-
nism too demanding for regular authentication, and research to date has shown that
authentication mechanisms that create too high a burden are circumvented, avoided or
abandoned altogether by users as shown in the diary study examining authentication in
an organisation.
Performing security tasks can give users the rewarding feeling that they have con-
tributed to making their online interactions secure, but the effort has to be proportion-
ate. The challenge is to be able to strike the right balance between providing users with
sufficient reassurance and demanding their attention, time and effort.
7.4.2 “If there is no other choice, I’ll do it”
In the authentication diary study and the VAG study, there were some participants who
said, if they really needed the access, they would go through a cumbersome security
procedure and get used to it if there were no other alternatives. This is not a sustainable
approach since it will exhaust users’ compliance budget. Research in organisations has
shown that if forced into compliance with security policy, employees will start to resent
it and will find ways to circumvent it [20].
7.4.3 Downplaying effort
On several occasions, participants downplayed the effort that they had to expend to
use a security mechanism. There was a discrepancy between actual and perceived time
needed to verify using NoBot. When filling in a form, participants often overestimated
the time that they needed to complete it. Those who filled in more fields, tended to
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enjoy the process more. In the evaluation of NoBot, one can speculate that the novelty
of this verification mechanism overshadowed the fact that the verification process took
longer than for reCAPTCHA and PlayThru. There might have been a similar effect
in the second disclosure study examining the impact of warnings. Participants might
have been more attentive to the warning since it was novel. If deployed in a real-life
setting, this effect might diminish over time.
7.5 Effort for security and privacy
The studies in this dissertation also thematised the differences between security and
privacy behaviours. The security tasks in this dissertation – authentication and veri-
fication – required explicit effort from users, privacy choices studied here were less
explicit. This might reflect the nature of privacy choices since privacy is something
that in the physical world happens naturally as disclosure is part of the development of
human relationships [146]. It comes more naturally to users as every human assesses
the situation and chooses the level of disclosure they deem appropriate in the given
context. This often is implicit and requires little effort. This is different in the digi-
tal world. Facebook, for example, asks users upfront what type of information they
want to share with whom and this is not in line with how humans go about information
disclosure in reality. It is a challenge for both research and industry to create inter-
faces and controls to enable user to set privacy boundaries in ways that would be less
disruptive and more natural.
This dissertation worked from the assumption that privacy preferences are diverse
and disclosure is mediated by context. Being completely private is neither feasible nor
desirable. In this respect, the difference between security and privacy can be described
as a difference between vertical and horizontal preferences for products as theorised by
economists Hotelling [118] and Lancaster [151]. Security preferences can be described
as vertical as better security is considered to be desirable. Privacy preferences are
horizontal as individuals moderate how private their information is based on context.
To use the words economic theorists use, privacy is something users develop a “taste”
for. Research into the economics of privacy has found evidence for horizontal privacy
preferences [192, 25] and the fact that users develop “a taste for privacy”, using the
example of privacy settings on social media [156]. The disclosure studies presented
7.6. Ways to minimise user effort 167
in this dissertation provide further evidence. They showed that users do not want the
strictest privacy by limiting the amount of disclosed information to the mandatory
minimum but choose to selectively disclose information about themselves based on
different preferences, motivations and expected consequences.
7.6 Ways to minimise user effort
7.6.1 Learning from coping strategies
The long-term goal of studying user coping strategies is to understand what level of
effort is acceptable and in what contexts. Some of the coping strategies (e.g., simplify-
ing credentials to avoid resets) resembled workarounds known from previous studies
in organisations (e.g., [20, 135]). Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation
to examine this, many of the coping strategies participants employed had the potential
to undermine security. It is therefore crucial to learn about them and anticipate their
development as new technologies and processes are being introduced. Research has
postulated not to block workarounds but to learn from them and better support users in
the future [134].
Rituals could be considered a special type of coping strategies, performing certain
actions such as hiding a hardware token gave a participant the sense that they were
doing the right thing, making them feel protected. Although this again lies beyond the
scope of this dissertation, it is undeniable that some of them could be considered less
effective in protecting users. One reason for this is that they are based on incorrect
mental models, folk models as Wash [267] called them. To ‘correct’ these models,
researchers and practitioners have suggested that users need to study IT security to
both know what to do and appreciate the risks accurately. The approach that users
need to learn about security is neither feasible nor desirable. Instead, the process or
device design together with associated instructions should convey the correct mental
models needed to operate them. Researchers have postulated to give users a set of if-
then rules [1] that would make individuals use security tools effectively as is the case
with driving a car.
7.6.2 Consolidating authentication effort: SSO
For the organisation examined in the first authentication diary study (Section 4.2), sin-
gle sign-on (SSO) could be a way to reduce authentication effort, but as in the study
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by Inglesant and Sasse [122], most participants reported that they had credentials for
a system on which it had not been implemented. Participants expressed a preference
to have one complex and longer password rather than many passwords with different
requirements as is currently the case. P11 shared their dream to only have one pass-
word: “I guarantee for me I would sit down and practice that thing and practice that
thing and practice that thing until it’s automatized and I wouldn’t forget it and I would
be totally happy to enter a 20-digit password if I could use the same one and not have
to go through this hullabaloo of calling and resetting.” Properly implemented SSO
could also solve the problem that participants in the study sometimes did not know
which username and/or password to use to access which system.
7.6.3 “Technology should be smarter than this!”
In an age where there is so much emphasis on interactions being seamless and sleek
and delivering users the best possible experience, users are still bothered with authenti-
cation which causes frustration and affects their productivity. Very often users are used
to smooth interactions from personal accounts and devices and these are in a stark con-
trast with stagnated organisational systems. Study participants were knowledgeable
about technology and they emphasised that technology should be smarter than this and
should use different cues to know the user is still there but for example has not moved
their mouse in a while. Also as described in Section 4.3.4, time of day made a dif-
ference to participants’ authentication experience which could be used to adjust login
requirements to user preferences and treat time of day as a contextual cue.
7.6.4 Shifting from explicit to implicit authentication
As cloud computing is becoming more and more powerful, even long and seemingly
strong passwords now need less time to be cracked. Also attacks have been increas-
ingly targeting password databases and in this situation, there is little individual users
can do to protect themselves [112]. In this situation, companies push for two-factor
authentication to achieve better security. It is predominantly tokens, smart-cards or
mobile phones that are used to create the second factor. Although the solution may ap-
pear plausible, the findings from studies in Chapter 4 show it can be rather error-prone
and creates additional work for the user. They have to remember to have the token with
them and it can pose usability challenges due to screen size and confusing operating
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instructions. In other contexts of use, for example the case of mobile phone-based two-
factor authentication, one has to remember to have the phone with them and wait for
the credential to arrive. Additional challenges include the phone running out of battery
or not having reception. Here, the diary study of 2FA for online baking showed that
the more effort was required, the lower participants’ satisfaction was.
Because of the shortcomings of the state-of-the-art two-factor authentica-
tion mechanisms and in general mechanisms relying on the interrupt-authenticate
model [132], a better solution would be to use implicit rather than explicit authenti-
cation. Existing work in this area has considered authenticating users based on either
(i) them carrying a token or on (ii) behavioural biometrics.
Token-based implicit authentication requires the user to have the token on their
person and for it to send a signal to a receiver that they have the right to access a system.
Approaches like this have been under development, some use proximity sensors. The
Pico project is working on creating a hardware solution, consisting of a main token
and associated smaller tokens, to replace passwords, PINs and other knowledge-based
credentials. Pico would provide continuous authentication resistant to various types
of attacks [239]. Otherwise, a token for implicit authentication has been proposed for
environments such as hospitals [18, 17] where time is critical to save human lives and
secondary tasks that cost too much time and effort cannot be tolerated.
In turn, behavioural biometrics aim to authenticate the user based on their interac-
tions with devices such as their typing rhythm, mouse movement or voice. For exam-
ple, Shi et al. [233] explored the possibility of implicit authentication through obser-
vations of user behaviour such as their location, patterns of messaging and browsing.
Killourhy and Maxion’s [133] work on keystroke dynamics showed that users can be
recognised by the way they type with high levels of accuracy. Also in the age of touch-
screens and gesture-based interactions, systems could authenticate users based on the
way in which they gesture or interact with touchscreens as part of their primary task.
In this way, we could achieve what Sasse [223, 219] calls 0-effort, 1-step, 2-factor
authentication. The added advantage of behavioural biometrics would be increased
security as they would recognise the presence of a human rather than the presence of
a technology. In commercial products, Kinect Identity identifies the player based on
several cues such as their height and clothing [204].
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7.6.5 Accounting for a diverse userbase
In both authentication diary studies, there is evidence that systems were not designed
with users in mind and users are asked to expend effort to compensate for the short-
comings of the systems and procedures. This can negatively affect satisfaction as well
as organisational and individual productivity.
In the study assessing the user experience of 2FA in online banking, the participant
sample consisted of relatively computer literate participants. Given that this group of
participants struggled, it is likely that older, less technology-savvy users are put off
online banking by its lack of usability which is an accessibility issue. It is also a
missed commercial opportunity for banks seeking to lower transaction costs.
Authentication could be tailored to different user groups. Younger participants
were faster authenticating using the Vernitski Authentication Grid than older partici-
pants. Sreeramareddy et al. [238] tested the usability of gesture-based passwords with
younger and older participants and found that senior users entered their passwords with
greater accuracy and fewer pauses. These findings show again how users differ and
suggest that authentication should be tailored to individuals based on their capabilities
and preferences.
7.6.6 Giving smart choice
Given the great diversity of users and their different goals, capabilities and needs, of-
fering more choice of authentication technologies appears to be a plausible option.
However, giving choice is not easy due to high administration and maintenance costs.
Choice also requires user effort in needing to learn about options and adopt them.
Consequently, research has shown that users hardly ever change their default set-
tings [160, 273, 237]. At the same time, choice is not necessarily going to result in
increased user satisfaction. A study by Korff and Bo¨hme [138] showed that partici-
pants who had more privacy options to select from reported more negative emotions
and were less satisfied with the choice they made.
7.6.7 Being sensitive to context
People’s use of technology is embedded in a context – it matters who they are, what
experience they have, what they need to accomplish, what device they are using etc.
One cannot give a stamp of approval for a technology that it is effortless and usable
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in every context because as the design mantra says “it depends” [236]. For example,
the study on the Vernitski Authentication Grid showed that the effort needed to use the
mechanism was seen as appropriate in some context more than in others. Authentica-
tion using the grid was faster on a tablet, so it might be more advisable to deploy it on
touchscreens. Most users struggle with infrequently used passwords, and there the use
of a more memorable password can offset the longer input times. An important les-
son from all the security studies described in this dissertation is that there is no usable
one-size-fits-all replacement for passwords – rather, mechanisms need to be selected
to fit the devices, context of use (primary task, physical and social context), security
requirements and preferences of individual users.
7.6.8 Providing extra benefits
Researchers in the area of usable security and privacy have argued that users should
be educated to understand the benefits of security and follow the advice of experts
regardless of how much effort it requires. This approach is neither feasible nor desir-
able, instead security researchers and designers should aim to make the first hurdle to
adoption of secure and privacy-preserving tools lower, by making them intuitive and a
pleasure to use. Additionally, it has been suggested that security mechanisms could be
about more than just granting access but they could also provide additional benefits to
their users as suggested by Sasse and Krol [223]. For example, the Nymi band2 uses
electrocardiogram (ECG) as a secure biometric to authenticate the wearer to systems.
One can also imagine that this technology could monitor the users’ heart rate and offer
alerts if there were any irregularities.
7.7 Limitations of research
The limitations of each study were described in their respective sections. To sum-
marise, the diary studies examined security behaviours in two specific contexts which
might not be generalisable to other situations. Both studies had a small number of
well-educated and highly computer literate participants and other demographic groups
might have different capabilities, preferences and needs. Despite the use of diaries
which were employed to ground participants’ reflections in actual events, the studies
relied on self-reports which are subject to biases.
2https://www.nymi.com/
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The evaluations of authentication and verification mechanisms were conducted
in a laboratory setting where participants might not have been entirely under real-life
constraints. The studies therefore might have suffered from biases such as demand
characteristics, volunteer bias, an artificially strong focus on the task and obedience
to authority. The study on the VAG did not have a primary task to mimic a real-life
situation. In the study on verification mechanisms, there was a primary task but it might
have been not as meaningful to participants since it was not a product they wanted to
buy and they did not receive if after the study session. Nevertheless, the studies made
an effort to capture perceptions around the mechanisms and participants discussed the
broader context of deployment of these mechanisms in real life.
The two studies that looked at information disclosure in webforms were con-
ducted on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform where again the sample of partici-
pants might not have been representative of the general population. Due to the nature
of their work, mTurk workers could have been more willing to volunteer information.
The studies also observed only one reaction to a stimulus (i.e., webform, warning) and
this reaction might not have been representative of their general behaviour.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 The research problem restated
As more and more services go online, effortless, reliable and efficient security and pri-
vacy will become even more important in the years to come. Every day users are asked
to expend effort to keep accounts and services secure. For privacy, minimising the
amount of information users give away about themselves is difficult since the industry
prefer to collect more data and hence they do not make privacy-preserving settings the
default. This doctoral project addressed a research gap in that the impact of such devel-
opments and the high effort demanded have on users’ security and privacy behaviours
had not been rigorously studied yet.
8.2 Overview of findings
The studies described in this dissertation examined the role of effort in users’ security
and privacy behaviours online. The two diary studies (Chapter 4) found that users
developed coping strategies to manage their effort and stay in control of their overall
workload. While in some situations they decided to cope and expend the effort, in
others they just disengaged and avoided using accounts or devices. Participants took
these decisions based on factors such as frequency of use, urgency and the level of
security they believed was needed.
The studies conducted on proposed mechanisms (Chapter 5) demonstrated par-
ticipants saw authentication and verification very contextually, elaborating in which
situations they would find the use of these mechanisms acceptable. Often, they trans-
lated increased authentication and verification effort into better security which might
be a wrong inference to make. The fact that participants imagined difficult mecha-
nisms were more secure and preferred these mechanisms for more valuable accounts,
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shows that they need reassurance and they currently get best reassurance when they
take care of their own security themselves. One of the reasons why participants dis-
liked NoBot was because there were many things happening outside of their influence
and they were unsure how they would recover if an error occurred.
For information disclosure in webforms (Chapter 6), the first study showed par-
ticipants disclosed information that was not necessary for them to receive payment.
Giving a monetary bonus led them to disclose more information, even for fields that
did not have a bonus awarded for. Marking some fields as mandatory, however, did not
have this effect. This might mean that the uncertainty over what was really required
made participants fill in more information as it might have been more effort to try to
submit some information and be rejected than to fill all in from the start. The second
study investigated exactly this and deployed warnings to inform participants when they
were providing non-mandatory information. In brief, participants preferred a warning
that gave an explanation and left them in control over which form fields they submit.
In summary, authentication effort led participants to adopt different coping strate-
gies which might affect their own and organisational productivity, some of them might
also decrease the security of the systems and accounts. For both security and privacy
choices, participants showed they wanted control and choice as their decisions and
resulting behaviours are highly contextual depending on various factors.
8.3 Research questions answered
The overarching research question of this doctoral project referred to the role of effort
in users’ security and privacy behaviours online. The studies conducted show the ef-
fort required in performing security tasks such as authentication can alter users’ use
of technologies and users might try to move the authentication to a more convenient
time where it would not interfere with actual work. This leads to re-organisation of
individual and organisational work flows. Participants also showed that they have their
own views on what level of security they require and these are not always in line with
what policy makers mandate. As a response to authentication effort, users find coping
strategies which arguably might undermine security. A factor in users’ willingness to
expend effort is the belief that the level of security required of them might not be too
high for the risk they perceive they are facing.
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For the evaluation of mechanisms, participants found that time-consuming mech-
anisms should be used for infrequent and high-value transactions. Participants trans-
lated a high level of effort that was required to use a mechanism into a high level of
protection it would give them. Again, a coping strategy of pointing at a grid might
undermine the security of the mechanism.
In the case of information disclosure through webforms, habit, enjoyment and
expectation of future rewards can override the effort needed to provide information.
Making some fields mandatory and providing a bonus also impact disclosure. Once
participants know some fields are mandatory, they are less likely to fill in other optional
fields, the opposite effect holds for giving a bonus. For the proposed over-disclosure
warnings, participants preferred being provided an explanation and having control even
at the expense of effort. A longitudinal study would need to show if all these effects
would hold over time.
8.4 Contributions of the research
The studies that form this dissertation make several important contributions to the field
of usable security and privacy both in terms of findings and methodology.
8.4.1 Substantive contributions
The research contributes to the debate around security decisions and behaviours be-
ing based on a cost benefit calculation and a compliance budget [20]. It makes steps
towards quantifying user effort which is important in both consumer and corporate con-
texts. The studies in this dissertation provide an insight into how users adopt security
mechanisms and what their experience is with them over time. The two studies focus-
ing on proposed mechanisms – the Vernitski Authentication Grid and NoBot – are the
only user evaluations conducted on these mechanisms to date. Apart from providing
specific recommendations for improving their usability, they also generate new knowl-
edge around user perceptions, expectations and acceptability. The disclosure studies
benchmarked the impact of mandatoriness and incentives on information disclosure in
webforms. The subsequent study designed and evaluated warnings and examined their
impact on user disclosure behaviours.
On many occasions, the ways in which participants managed increased security
and privacy effort might have undermined their security and privacy. This shows that
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usability and security are not opposing goals [224] and proves the mantra saying: “If
it’s not usable, it’s not secure”.
8.4.2 Methodological contributions
The studies described in this dissertation were designed and carried out in a way to
maximise their ecological validity by either studying participant behaviour in real sit-
uations or approximating these conditions in a laboratory or through remote participa-
tion. The authentication diary studies furthered the use of diaries to capture authenti-
cation experiences in real life. The design of the diary was improved from previous
research and from the first to the second study. The lab studies of authentication and
verification mechanisms both not only captured performance data but also asked ques-
tions around acceptability and how these solutions would fit into users’ every-day lives.
The study on verification mechanisms provided participants with a realistic primary
task to first make them focus on achieving a non-security goal as it happens in real
life and second, to give them a context in which these mechanisms could be employed.
The experiments studying disclosure in webforms were conducted outside a lab envi-
ronment on a crowd-sourcing platform with participants taking part in an experiment
in their usual environment likely using a familiar device.
8.5 Recommendations
8.5.1 Recommendations for researchers
To produce valid research findings, it is important to consider the context of use and
test for use in different situations with different primary tasks if possible. The type of
primary task can make a significant difference for how users perceive the security and
privacy effort involved. What is acceptable in one context might not be acceptable in
another.
Developing a solution, not only in security, is a multi-stage process and users
should be involved at every stage of it. This includes testing mechanisms post-adoption
to learn how users have incorporated them into their lives. First, this allows to change
these mechanisms to improve the user experience. Second, the feedback can also ben-
efit the design of future technologies.
It is advisable to use mixed research methods including quantitative and qualita-
tive elements in a study. Had the studies in this dissertation only employed quantitative
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measures, they would have missed explanations of user motivation and mental models
that showed what kind of effort is acceptable and when. That said, it is important to
be aware of participants making post-hoc rationalisations of their intuitive choices and
reactions.
Following the designers’ guideline that it is best to elicit feedback when users are
shown designs side by side, this should be done for security and privacy too.
Finally, if it is a preliminary evaluation as opposed to in-the-wild study, it is in-
teresting to gauge participants’ intent to use a proposed technology. Although some
participants liked NoBot in the study presented here, they said they were happy to con-
tinue using reCAPTCHA. Positive experience with a mechanism does not necessarily
mean users will adopt it because most of them are likely to just continue using the
established technology due to familiarity and habit.
8.5.2 Recommendations for practitioners
Advice for developers of technologies
It is crucial to involve users at every stage of the development of a product, starting
from eliciting requirements and finishing with an evaluation post-adoption to see how
users have appropriated the technology. As the study on verification showed, users
tended to be more critical when they had a direct comparison between different prod-
ucts and they tried each one only once. As a general rule, acceptance improves over
repeated use but this is not necessarily a good sign since users often learn to put up
with mechanisms that are not usable. While a laboratory study often requires repeated
use, in reality users might just give up after a first unsatisfactory experience. Even if
they seemingly have no other options but to use a mechanism that is unusable and re-
quires effort, they often find ways to circumvent it, sometimes meaning they will give
up on devices or accounts and find alternatives.
Giving users choice is very important but the options that are presented to the
user should not be a catalogue of every possible configuration but a selection of the
most suitable choices. Setting up a security or privacy mechanism is likely to be a
tertiary task for the user, meaning it takes place distantly from their actual goal. For
this reason, it cannot cost too much effort as users will feel side-tracked and pushed
further away from completing their primary task.
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For privacy, users disclosed more when they were given a bonus, even on the
fields that the bonus did not apply to. Making fields mandatory reduced the disclosure
for the optional fields. Participants preferred control over effort and this might have
something to do with the fact that users are all different, they had different attitudes
to and expectations from completing the form. Rather than adopting the patronising
approach of removing all optional information, users should be given choice.
It is advisable to study the existing products on the market to learn what users
think about them. Even if a proposed product can be considered to require less effort,
this has to be validated in a real-life setting and it is important to study user acceptance
and readiness to switch. Established products even if resented, have the advantage of
being well-understood by users and accepted as a necessary evil. A new product can
often incur switching costs in that users need to learn how to use it and/or accommodate
for new hardware.
Advice for decision-makers
Those mandating security solutions for organisations and consumers should consider
how the introduction of a security measure would impact users’ productivity, how it
would interact with various primary tasks and also with other security tasks. Although
initially users might like a new mechanism due to its novelty, this effect might wear
off over time. It is therefore important not only to design well but also to monitor use
and satisfaction over time.
8.6 Future work
Effort was a useful lens to consider security and privacy choices through. It brought
up other interesting factors that affect behaviours such as the desire for control or the
perceived level of security required. Future research could explore these issues in a
systematic way to determine how exactly they impact the decisions users make.
8.6.1 On real-world authentication
Both diary studies were qualitative rather than quantitative in nature and were con-
ducted on a small sample of participants. A larger study, for example a survey of the
general population, would be needed to confirm if the established trends would hold.
Diaries have their shortcomings as they are disruptive and self-reports can be sub-
ject to biases. For this reason, the author’s research group has been working on an
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ethical and privacy-preserving tool [263] that currently collects data on the frequency
of password entry, password strength and re-use. The idea is to extend it to capture
authentication completion times, resets, mistakes, lockouts etc.
8.6.2 On proposed mechanisms
Future work could continue with further stages of a usability evaluation of the VAG.
Participant responses showed in what kind of situations and for what types of systems
the grid could be used and any future evaluations could focus on testing its deployment
in these real-life contexts.
Authentication is different across contexts and the same level of effort can be seen
as acceptable or unacceptable depending on the circumstances. To assess the suitability
of security technologies for different contexts, it would be important to develop a range
of standardised primary tasks to test the proposed mechanisms for. Authentication is
contextual and to be valid, studies need to recreate use of these technologies under
different conditions.
One of the limitations of the studies on the Vernitski Authentication Grid (Sec-
tion 5.2) and verification mechanisms (Section 5.3) was that they were tested on a rel-
atively small sample of participants who tended to be young and well-educated which
might limit the generalisability of the findings. Testing the mechanisms in the wild
with a wider range of services and in different primary tasks would be the next step.
For all studied security mechanisms, future work should focus on finding a better
fit between the primary task and the authentication or verification task so that they are
not competing for the same resources (cognitive or physical) and they do not interrupt
or negatively affect the actual production task.
8.6.3 On helping users manage disclosure
Future work into tools helping users make an informed choice as to the disclosure
of personal information could examine the usability of in-situ indicators that would
interfere less with the primary task. They would need to appear at a suitable moment
during the interaction in order not to disrupt the actual task.
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Figure A.1: An entry sheet from the diary used for the study on authentication in an organisa-
tion.
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Figure A.2: Example Keystroke-Level Modelling sequence of steps for manually logging in
to an application.
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Figure A.3: A sample CogTool script for the Keystroke-Level Modelling sequence of steps for
manually logging in to an application.

Appendix B
Two-factor authentication in online
banking
Bank Username 1st Factor 2nd Factor
Barclays-1 Surname + [Membership, 8-digit OTP (PINsentry –
Card, or Account No] or Mobile PINsentry
Barclays-2 Surname + [Membership 5-digit passcode 2 of 8+ characters
Card, or Account No] memorable word
Halifax, User ID 8+ character password 3 of 6+ characters
Lloyds memorable information
HSBC, User ID memorable answer 6-digit OTP (Secure Key
First Direct or Digital Secure Key)
Nationwide-1 Customer Number memorable data 3 of 6 digits passnumber
Nationwide-2 Customer Number 8-digit OTP (card reader) –
NatWest, RBS, Customer Number (DOB 3 of 4-digit PIN 3 of 6+ characters
Ulster ddmmyy + 4 digits) password
Santander-1 Personal ID 6+ character 5-digit registration
password number
Santander-2 Personal ID 3 of 6+ character 3 of 5-digit registration
password number
Table B.1: Credentials required for authentication to online banking with different UK banks.
Bank ID always Authentication Factor(s)
required?
Barclays No 5-digit PIN
Halifax, No 3 characters of
Lloyds memorable information
HSBC, Yes Memorable answer + 3
First Direct No characters of a password
Nationwide No 3 of 6-digit passnumber
NatWest No 5-8 digit PIN
RBS No 5-8 digit PIN
Santander Yes 3 characters of password,
3 digits of security number
Ulster No 5-8 digit PIN
Table B.2: Credentials required for authentication to mobile apps with different UK banks.
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My Authentication Diary
1. Date: Time:
2. Location: Where was I?
2 Home
2 Workplace
2 Public place
2 On the move
2 Other:
3. Reason: Why did I authenticate?
2 Check account balance
2 Transfer funds between my accounts
2 Set up a payment to someone
2 Other:
4. Device: What device did I use?
2 Desktop Computer
2 Laptop
2 Mobile Phone
2 Tablet
2 Other:
5. Information: What information was I asked to provide?
2 Username
2 Password
2 Memorable answer
2 One Time Code
2 Other:
6. Token: Did I use my authentication token? 2 Yes 2 No
7. Problems: Did I encounter any problems?
(forgotten credentials, mistypes, forgotten fields, token problems etc.)
2 Yes :
2 No
8. How were these resolved?
9. The process left me: Very Dissatisfied 2—2—2—2—2 Very Satisfied
10. Comments:
Figure B.1: An entry page from the diary used for the study on two-factor authentication in
UK online banking.
Appendix C
Human verification mechanisms
Easy to understand Difficult to understand
Intuitive Unintuitive
Exciting Boring
Fast Slow
Normal Weird
Acceptable Creepy
Fits well Gets in the way
Great Terrible
Harmless Unhealthy
Trustworthy Untrustworthy
Predictable Unpredictable
Effortless Effortful
Table C.1: A list of adjectives used in the study on human verification mechanisms. Each
participant was asked to choose three adjectives that best described the verification
mechanism(s) they used in the study. To shorten the reading time, positive adjec-
tives were placed in the left-hand column while the corresponding negative ones
were in the right-hand column.

Appendix D
Informing disclosure
Figure D.1: A screenshot of the highlighting after the warning in condition WS1HO (highlight
optional fields) was displayed.
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Glossary
Authentication is the act of proving that the user is who they claim they are. Often,
the term is used synonymously with ‘login’.
Disclosure refers to the act of sharing information. In this dissertation, the term ‘over-
disclosure’ is also used, it describes a situation where a user provides more in-
formation than what is mandatory to submit a webform.
Effort describes the amount of work that an individual has to complete in order to
achieve a goal. In this dissertation, ‘effort’ is used synonymously with ‘work-
load’.
Heuristics are simple decision-making rules that enable fast and frugal decision mak-
ing. The decisions are not guaranteed to be perfect or optimal but the aim is for
them to be good enough in the given circumstances [90].
Information Sensitivity refers to how vulnerable the revelation of a certain piece of
information would make an individual.
Privacy describes an individual’s right and/or ability to protect their personal informa-
tion [11]. It can also be summarised as the right and/or ability to determine flow
of information mediated by social norms and governed by context [172, 119].
This term has a particularly rich history of being difficult to define. Gu¨rses [103]
provided a comprehensive overview of the different definitions of privacy. Based
on these definitions, she identified three research paradigms into privacy: privacy
as confidentiality (hiding), privacy as practice (identity construction) and privacy
as control (informational self-determination).
Security refers to a state where a system and/or data is free from compromise. When
speaking of user security, this dissertation means their assets (e.g., devices, ac-
counts) are protected from interference. Traditionally, three aspects of security
are mentioned: confidentiality, integrity and availability [93]. Confidentiality
refers to the prevention of unauthorised access of information. Integrity de-
scribes the prevention of unauthorised changing of information. Data must be
accurate, complete, timely and valid [39]. Finally, accessibility refers to the fact
that a system has to be available to legitimate users when they need it. This as-
pect, thus, refers to “the prevention of unauthorised withholding of information
or resources” [93, p. 34].
Two-Factor Authentication refers to logging in users with the use of two factors
where factors can be based on knowledge (e.g., password), possession (e.g., ac-
cess card) or a biometric (e.g., fingerprint). For example, banking customers
wanting to withdraw money from a cash machine are usually asked to authen-
ticate with their bank card which is a possession-based factor and a four-digit
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PIN which is a knowledge factor. In the study of authentication in an organ-
isation (Section 4.2), for certain logins, employees are asked to provide their
username, a PIN and a one-time password (OTP) generated by the SecureID
token.
Usability This dissertation adopts the ISO 9241-11 [123] definition of usability. Ac-
cording to this definition, usability is the “extent to which a product can be used
by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and
satisfaction in a specified context of use”(p. 2).
Verification In this dissertation, ‘verification’ is used to describe the process of a user
verifying they are human in order to access services or buy goods online. The
most commonly used term for it is CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public
Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) but also the acronym HIPS
(Human Interaction Proofs) has been used in the literature [52]. In this dis-
sertation, the term ‘verification’ was chosen instead as one of the mechanisms
studied, NoBot, might not be considered to be a CAPTCHA.
